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 ABSTRACT 
 
This study analyses large-scale foreign land investments, the trends, the drivers, the 
actors and the extent. It focuses on Africa and on Zambia in particular. In addition, it 
aims to understand the role of smallholder farmers and of host governments in these 
investments. Further, it seeks to establish how large-scale foreign land investments 
can contribute to economic development in host countries. The study draws on a large 
body of literature as well as interviews and data provided by a number of 
organisations in Zambia. The research shows that in global terms Africa receives most 
interest, with investors mostly based in Europe and Asia. The single largest investing 
country is, however, South Africa. Aside from traditional agribusinesses, newly 
established biofuel companies, investors and governments have become involved in 
land deals. These actors are driven by high oil prices, biofuel policies, high food 
prices, the financial crisis and general climate change considerations. 
 
From Zambia’s experience it is argued that if large-scale foreign land investment is to 
contribute to economic development and poverty reduction, smallholder farmers, who 
make up a large part of the rural poor, must be included in a fair way. Rather than 
using small-scale farmers for taking risks, such as exist with new crops and rain-fed 
crops, these farmers should be sufficiently supported and given a fair share for their 
produce. In addition, they should not be forced off their lands and be encouraged to 
keep part of their land for their own food production. Experiences to date however, 
show that investors are more interested in short term profit rather than the 
development of the local area. Many projects have been reported to have displaced the 
local population, have created only a limited number of jobs at low wages and in 
general have not generated considerable economic growth. 
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Since the financial and food price crises of 2008 a new trend labelled ‘land grabbing’ 
in the media, has received increasing worldwide attention. It is argued that resource 
rich but land poor countries are appropriating large areas of fertile land in developing 
countries with the aim of either feeding their own population or to grow crops for 
biofuel production (Cotula et al., 2009). These investments are subject to a global 
debate in which some parties advocate the benefits these projects can bring to the host 
economy (World Bank, 2010a), whereas opponents claim that these investments are 
exploiting the local population with few benefits for the targeted developing countries 
(Daniel and Mittel, 2009).  
 
Many organisations, including the World Bank, the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a wide range of Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), have contributed to the research and discussion regarding 
large-scale foreign land investment. Despite all their work, the extent and the impact 
of these deals are still difficult to assess. Global reports generally are based on 
literature research without any observations done on the ground, whilst more in-depth 
studies based on fieldwork only cover a small area. It is the aim of this research to 
establish the scale and impact of foreign agricultural investment as per mid-2011 in 
the case of Africa with particular focus on the situation in Zambia, a country which 
has received little attention despite its argued large agricultural potential.  
 
This chapter starts with framing the context by presenting a short historical overview 
of large-scale land investment in overseas countries in order to illustrate how trends in 
the 21st century differ from earlier investments, mainly during colonial times, and the 
lessons that can be learned from earlier experience. Based on the historical 
background, the central questions that will be answered in this study are outlined, the 
research methodology is explained and the structure of the report in which the several 
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topics will be discussed is given. The chapter then offers a definition of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in land to set it aside from other types of FDI followed by an 
explanation of the scope of this study. 
1.2 History of large-scale foreign land investment 
The search for fertile land overseas is not a new phenomenon. The Romans plundered 
North Africa for wheat, the Portuguese, Dutch and English raided the Indonesian 
islands for their spices and for numerous years colonial powers appropriated land in 
their overseas territories to enrich themselves. At the beginning of the 20th century 
African colonies became major exporters of agricultural commodities such as 
groundnuts, palm oil, cotton, coffee, cocoa and sisal (Meredith, 2005). Not only was 
colonial land used for highly profitable exotic products, the mineral resources of 
particularly African countries promised a huge source of wealth for the colonisers. 
Mining activities were one of the first forms of foreign “land grabs”, continuing until 
today (FIAN, 2010). Even after African and Asian countries gained independence, 
extraction of resources and commercial agrarian land use has continued, mostly in the 
form of large-scale plantations and mining (UNCTAD, 2009). 
 
Most of these historic investments have been for the growth of cash crops: produce 
that cannot be grown in the developed world, are not part of the staple diet of the 
population in the target country, and sell for premium prices. Land ownership was one 
of the possible business models, but long-term ownership of land was not the main 
aim of investors (Dinham and Hines, 1983). Large trans-national corporations also 
used contract farming and out-grower arrangements, for example Campbell’s and Del 
Monte in the Mexican state of Guanajuanto in the 1960s (Echánova and Steffen, 
2005), a practice also used by many investors at the beginning of the 21st century 
(Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010). In addition, the investments tended to be much 
smaller than some of the contracts signed in the last few years.  
 
Nevertheless, even in the 20th century ownership of large areas of land was granted to 
private businesses, especially under colonial rule in Africa. One of the first plantations 
was established by the Lever Brothers (currently Unilever), operating as a local 
subsidiary under the name Huileries du Congo Belge (HCB) (Dinham and Hines, 
1983). In 1911 HCB received rights over five concessions in the Congo to grow palm 
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oil, to be used for their soap factories in Europe. The deal with the colonial 
government specified that the company had to build its own infrastructure consisting 
of roads, railroads and a postal service. In addition HCB was obliged to build schools 
and hospitals for its employees and their families. Nevertheless, the local population 
did not gain from these investments. Thousands of farmers were dispossessed of their 
land and subjected to strict controls working on the concessions. As Gondola (2002, 
18) remarks in his classic study of the history of Congo: “It is notable that after some 
thirty years of activity, HCB, like most capitalistic ventures in Congo, had failed to 
create any substantial economic development”. Although nearly a century has passed, 
experiences with this operation are still relevant for more recent investments as will 
be illustrated in Chapter 3. 
 
Another major player in the early 1900s was the Firestone Natural Rubber Company, 
part of the US based Firestone Tire and Rubber Company. This business venture 
started as a way for the Americans to become independent of the British who 
dominated rubber supply (van der Kraaij, 1983). In 1926 the company obtained an 
agreement with the government of Liberia for the lease of one million acres (over 
400,000ha), four percent of the country’s territory for the period of 99 years. The 
company would pay a rental fee of US$5 cents per acre. The initial plans were to 
employ 350,000 Liberians, which the government would provide. To enable easy 
exports, the company would build a deep-sea harbour, the costs of which would be 
reimbursed by the Liberian government (Johnson, 2010). Lastly, Firestone forced the 
Liberian government to take out a US$5 million loan with the company’s subsidiary 
Finance Corporation of America to pay off its foreign debts, making the country 
largely dependent on Firestone (van der Kraaij, 1983). By 1960 only 35,000ha of the 
total 400,000ha had been planted, an increase from the 22,000ha of land cleared in 
1930 (Johnson, 2010). The harbour was only completed and opened in 1948 with 
support from the American government after Firestone abandoned the project shortly 
after the first surveys highlighted difficulties and high expenses (Taylor, 1956). With 
regards to the loan agreement, “Only half the loan, for up to $5 million over 40 years 
at 7 percent interest, was ever issued; but service charges and advisors’ salaries cost 
over $270,000 a year which was 20 percent of government revenues in 1928 and 50 
percent in 1931” (Lanning, 1979, 258). Overall, Liberia received little out of the 
Firestone operations, whereas the company made major profits (Johnson, 2010). 
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As these examples show, agribusiness has had a long-term interest in Africa, in 
several cases on a very large scale. Companies wanted to gain maximum control over 
their supplies, rather than being dependent on small farmers or foreign companies or 
harvesting natural sources (as in the case of rubber). Owning land and growing their 
own crops gave them the desired degree of control (Dinham and Hines, 1983). An 
important stimulus was the support given by the colonial governments in securing 
land rights (Christopher, 1984). Settlement took place at the expense of the local 
population which was removed from their land (Christopher, 1984). All plantations 
were focussed on cash crops for export and were highly concentrated, such as: 
groundnuts in Gambia, cocoa in Ghana, rubber in Liberia, sisal in Tanzania and cotton 
in Uganda (Lappé and Collins, 1978). These patterns are visible to the present day 
with a large part of the exports of these countries still dependent on these crops 
(FAOSTAT, 2011a). 
 
The abundance of cheap labour was another factor that made setting up in Africa, and 
other developing countries, an attractive proposition. Nevertheless, the indigenous 
population was not easily convinced to work for the large plantation companies. 
Those people who were forced off their land had no option other than to become 
labourers on plantations (Christopher, 1984). Another means of forcing locals to 
become plantation workers was by introducing taxes that had to be paid in money. 
This made it necessary for local farmers, most of whom were involved in subsistence 
farming, to find a source of monetary income, either by growing cash crops (sold to 
the European companies at their terms) or becoming a wage labourer (Lappé and 
Collins, 1978; Meredith, 2005). Through this enforcement, western plantation 
companies gained access to a wide pool of cheap labour. This occurred at the expense 
of local food production, an effect that can be felt to the present. Overall, the 
plantations brought little to local populations but rather filled the ‘pockets’ of the 
corporate owners (Dinham and Hines, 1983). 
 
Decolonisation led to a decline in foreign plantation ownership (Dixon, 1990). The 
newly independent countries faced the problem of how to maintain a larger share of 
the agricultural activities to benefit their own population. Some governments adopted 
a hostile stance to foreign investors and either nationalised plantations or split them 
up into smallholder units (Dixon, 1990). Other countries were more favourable 
INTRODUCTION 
- 5 - 
towards foreign companies (Dinham and Hines, 1983), perhaps realising their 
dependence on these companies for export earnings. In general, policies were 
introduced to secure stricter control over financial flows, like the limitation of foreign 
exchange a company could send back to its home country. In addition, local interests 
had to be increased in several cases. Although companies did not leave, many did 
reduce their interests in Africa as a result (Dinham and Hines, 1983). 
 
With actual land holding becoming either impossible due to new land policy or more 
risky (UNCTAD, 2009), agribusinesses started to move away from controlling land. 
Instead, they focused more on the upstream activities of processing, trading and 
marketing of the products, activities with a steadier stream of income and high profit 
margins (Dixon, 1990). To keep control over crop input, large agribusiness trans-
nationals either opted for managing large estates owned by locals or to engage 
smallholders in supply schemes (Dinham and Hines, 1983; UNCTAD, 2009). 
Smallholder development was supported by the newly independent governments. For 
example, the government of Kenya, in cooperation with UK based Booker 
Agriculture International and the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC), 
established the Mumias Sugar Company. This company consisted of a nucleus farm 
supported by a network of 33,000 outgrowers and was situated in a remote area of the 
country. The idea behind the scheme was to bring development to the region and to 
decrease Kenya’s dependence on sugar inputs (Glover and Kusterer, 1990). The 
example of Booker is indicative of the preference for multinationals to be engaged in 
an advisory and management role rather than be the direct owner of the operation 
(Dinham and Hines, 1983). 
 
In more recent years, Africa has become a source of fresh fruit, vegetables and 
flowers. Driven by demand for all year round fresh produce by customers in Europe 
and the USA, food companies started to look for low cost locations to satisfy this 
request and found their answer in Africa (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). One of the 
first companies to move in was Bud Antle Inc., which set up a subsidiary in Senegal 
as early as 1972 (Dinham and Hines, 1983). With support from the Senegalese 
government, which put in a pipeline to supply water for irrigation and assisted with 
relocating people from the 800ha assigned to the company, Bud Senegal started to 
grow vegetables such as beans and peppers (Chasm, 1982). Financing was done by 
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the World Bank and the German Development Bank which saw this enterprise as a 
development project for Senegal (Lappé and Collins, 1978). However, after just four 
years the company ran into financial difficulties and the Senegalese government took 
a majority share in the venture. Without the expertise, eroded and depleted soils and 
continual transportation issues, the operation finally closed down in 1979 (Dinham 
and Hines, 1983). During the years that Bud Senegal was operational, little was done 
to overcome local developmental issues. Relying on drip irrigation and technology, 
employment generation was minimal. Upon closure in 1979, 3,000 people were 
employed by the then nationalised venture (Chasm, 1982). The project certainly did 
not help to relieve hunger, caused by severe droughts. When the price for green beans 
in Europe fell below the cost price of Bud Senegal, rather than selling the crop in the 
local market, the company decided to destroy the complete harvest (Chasm, 1982). 
 
The 1980s and 1990s saw a sharp increase in the export of fresh produce from sub-
Saharan Africa, especially from Kenya and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast 
and Zambia (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). Initially, smallholder farmers supplied the 
bulk of the produce to a group of concentrated exporters which supplied the overseas 
supermarkets. High standards on quality, consistency, health and safety set by the 
supermarket chains in Europe made it increasingly difficult for smallholders to be 
able to supply according to requirements. Whereas in 1992 nearly 75% of fresh 
produce in Kenya was produced by smallholders (Harris, 1992), in 1998 this figure 
had dropped to around 18% (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). In Zimbabwe, 
smallholders only supplied a meagre 6% to the five major exporters. Production is 
now taking place on large-scale commercial farms and on land owned or leased by the 
exporter (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). Increased post-production activities, such as 
packing at the source, have created a large number of jobs, although these are 
generally insecure and low-paid (Barrientos et al., 2005). Even the few exporters and 
large-scale farmers reap limited benefits due to the dominance of supermarkets in the 
supply chain (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000). 
 
Many studies have looked into the impact of smallholder farming for agribusiness 
supply. Despite some relative successes like the Mumias Sugar Company in Kenya, 
most research indicates that small-scale farmers gain little from participating with 
agribusinesses, either through outgrower schemes (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002) or as 
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independent growers of cash crops (for example, Toulmin and Guèye, 2005). The 
next chapter will discuss in further detail the role that small-scale farmers can play in 
an increasingly commercial agricultural sector. 
 
In general, land expansion has shown a continuous increase since at least the 1960s. 
In the period from 1961 until 2007, an average of 3.8 million hectares of land was 
brought under cultivation annually (World Bank, 2010a). Whilst there was a slight 
decrease of farmland used in the industrial countries, this was more than compensated 
for by expansion in developing countries, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia 
(FAOSTAT, 2011b). This development has been driven both by domestic small 
farmers, commercial farmers as well as international players. 
1.3 Research questions, methodology and structure 
Although large-scale agricultural investment has a long history, several differences 
exist between projects from the 20th century and those being initiated in the 21st 
century. This study aims to analyse the situation with regards to foreign large-scale 
land investment in Africa and in Zambia in particular. In order to do so, the main 
questions that will be answered are: 
 
• What is the extent and what are the characteristics of foreign large-scale land 
investments in sub-Saharan Africa in general and Zambia in specific? 
• What are the drivers behind foreign large-scale land investments? 
• Who are the actors investing in foreign large-scale agricultural operations in 
Africa and Zambia in specific and which are the main host countries on the 
African continent? 
• What is the impact of large-scale foreign land investment on the local 
population where these investments take place? 
• How can large-scale foreign land investment contribute to economic 
development in the host country and Zambia in particular? 
• What is the specific role for both host governments and smallholder farmers to 
ensure local development? 
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This study looks into the situation on Africa in general since many projects are 
targeting countries on this continent. Also, these are the most controversial 
investments due to the high rates of poverty and hunger in the target countries. 
Zambia is the country of specific interest to this study and the above questions will be 
answered with particular focus on this nation.  
 
In order to analyse developments in large-scale foreign land investment, a database 
has been established containing information on host country, investor, land area and 
land use and the status of investment projects. Desk research forms the source of this 
database. Information from other studies such as published by the IIED (Cotula et al., 
2009), the Oakland Institute (Daniel and Mittal, 2009) and IFPRI (von Braun and 
Meinzen-Dick, 2009) has been triangulated and investigated in more detail. In 
addition, a large number of in-depth studies on a limited geographical area have been 
combined to establish an up-to-date and comprehensive set of data for the African 
continent. The investments cover the period from 2004 until mid 2011.  
 
To get a more detailed picture on the case of Zambia, fieldwork was undertaken in 
January 2010. During this visit 19 interviews were conducted with managers and 
employees of two large-scale foreign farming operators, people in the direct area of 
these activities who are impacted by the operations, government officials and 
representatives of stakeholder organisations such as the farmers union and the land 
alliance. These interviews are referred to in the text either by name of the interviewee 
or the name of the organisation in case the person interviewed wished to remain 
anonymous. The information gained from these interviews is being supplemented 
with data from resources such as the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and the Zambia 
Development Agency (ZDA). In addition, a limited body of written material is 
available which describes findings on large-scale agricultural investments in Zambia. 
 
Large-scale foreign land investment projects are part of a host country’s agricultural 
sector. One of the aims of a country to welcome these investors is to develop their 
overall economy. The role of the agricultural sector in overall economic development 
has been the subject of discussion since the 1950s. The central question was if 
agriculture was subject to industrialisation or whether industrialisation was only 
possible once the agricultural sector was able to produce sufficient resources for the 
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whole country. This discussion is still valid and is particularly relevant to understand 
the role that large-scale foreign investment can play in the overall development of the 
host country. The several theories and experiences are discussed in Chapter 2. In 
addition, the chapter will elaborate on the role of smallholders and land policies, 
especially in Africa, which are important contributing factors for the success of the 
agricultural sector and wider economic development within a country. Altogether, 
Chapter 2 provides the theoretical background for this study. 
 
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the existing international research done into large-
scale land investments. It will cover the geographical areas of South America, the 
former Soviet Union and Asia and will touch on general developments in Africa. Due 
to the large scale and many countries involved, this last region is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4. Not only are many countries across the world targeted by 
investors, these investors themselves are highly diverse, including both private actors 
and governments. Different actors are driven by different reasons to invest in large-
scale agricultural operations in developing countries. It is argued that the several 
crises (food, fuel and financial) are the underlying drivers, making the investments in 
the early 21st century different from those of the previous century. These drivers will 
be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Lastly, the chapter will cover the impact, both 
theoretical and practical, that these large-scale investments can have on the host 
country. Can the local population benefit from these projects and if so, what are the 
conditions to make these ventures a win-win? 
 
Having set the theoretical background on the role of the agricultural sector in 
economic development and having painted the picture of recent developments of 
large-scale foreign investment globally, Chapter 4 is dedicated to an analysis of the 
situation in sub-Saharan Africa. This area consists of a large diversity of host 
countries with different policies, national resources and histories. In general, most 
sub-Saharan countries are not self-sufficient from a food point of view. The prevailing 
hunger and poverty makes large-scale commercial agriculture investments 
controversial. Chapter 4 aims to illustrate the extent of large-scale foreign land 
investments up until mid-2011. Ethiopia and Madagascar are two countries well-
studied. Findings from previous research are summarised in this chapter to illustrate 
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experiences that have taken place in these nations, which can be an example for 
Zambia and other African countries.  
 
Chapter 5 then focuses on Zambia. This land-locked country in Southern Africa is 
said to have a high potential for growth in the agricultural sector due to its abundance 
of fertile land. Despite this potential, little attention has been paid to foreign 
investment in this country. This study aims to make an inventory of projects so far 
and how Zambia can benefit from these projects. Understanding the impact that large-
scale investors have had so far can enable the country to develop a strategy to ensure 
both the local population and the country as a whole can seek to maximise local 
benefits from this global trend. 
 
Based on the theoretical framework and the observations both globally, in sub-
Saharan Africa in specific and particularly in Zambia, this study concludes by 
detailing if and how large-scale foreign investment can contribute to overall 
development in host countries. It is argued that even though certain possibilities for 
growth exist, a large number of conditions must be met. Many projects have shown 
that if strict regulations are not set by the host government, the local population is 
likely to face deteriorating living conditions and the country as a whole does not gain 
from these projects. 
1.4 Definition and scope 
Land investment can take many shapes and forms; large-scale versus small-scale, 
domestic versus foreign, commercial versus subsistence, food crops versus fuel. This 
study looks into large-scale foreign land investment as a particular form of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI). The World Bank (2004) defines FDI as “Investment in an 
enterprise that operates outside the investor’s country, that establishes a lasting 
interest in or effective management control over [this] enterprise”. The lasting interest 
implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the 
enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. 
 
FDI in land differs from FDI in commercial entities. Rather than having the objective 
of influence in the management of an enterprise, FDI in land is aimed at taking a large 
degree of control over the land or the fruits of the land in the host state. This may be 
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in the form of lease, concessions or purchase. To underline this difference, the 
German government development agency GTZ1 offers the following characterisation: 
 
“FDI in land by a foreign company or state is based on a lasting interest in 
taking control over land use rights. The transaction includes either rights of 
land-use or land-ownership. The land-use rights are generally valid for a 
limited period and can possibly be extended” (Görgen et al., 2009, 9). 
 
Terms used in this study are agricultural or land acquisition, investment, projects, 
ventures and the like. Media reports and publications made by certain NGOs use 
terms as “land grabbing” and “neo-colonialism”. These terms imply a negative 
connotation to the investments. This report aims to be objective and therefore will not 
use such terms. 
 
Important in the definition given by GTZ is the notion of “lasting interest”. Although 
difficult to establish, this research intends to examine projects where leases are valid 
for at least 15 years or land rights are purchased outright. In addition, the size of the 
investment is important, since this is one of the distinctive features of the new trend. 
This study is limited to investments larger than 5,000ha, considerably more than an 
individual commercial farm. Partnerships with domestic companies are often used by 
foreign investors to reduce risks in setting up in the host country and are included in 
this study. 
 
Although not the main focus of this research, attention is also paid to large-scale 
projects singularly driven by domestic investors. When looking into large-scale land 
acquisitions, the World Bank found that domestic players were more dominant than 
foreign investors (World Bank, 2010a). As Chapter 5 illustrates, domestic investors in 
Zambia certainly do play a role which should not be left unmentioned.  
 
Finally, it should be noted also that, Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 
agriculture is not included in this research. The aim of ODA is not to take control of 
foreign land but rather to assist the recipient country to develop its own agricultural 
                                                 
1
 Now part of GIZ, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
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sector (IMF, 2006). ODA can play an important role in the increase of agricultural 
productivity and food security and will be mentioned where applicable. 
 
A last remark is on the country of Sudan. Due to the fact that most material 
researched for this study was published before the independence of South-Sudan in 
July 2011, the data for Sudan as mentioned in this research covers both Sudan and 
South-Sudan. 
- 13 - 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
THEORIES ON THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN 





Agriculture plays a major role in the economy of developing countries in terms of 
both employment and foreign exchange earnings (World Bank, 2007). This sector has 
therefore been a major area for discussion on the role it plays in overall economic 
development (e.g. Chang, 2009). The aim in this chapter is to look in detail at the 
various theories and modes of agricultural planning since the 1950s, when many 
LDCs gained independence, until the early 2000s. Analysing these theories and 
experiences over this period provides a framework in which large-scale foreign land 
investment can be contextualised and establishes the contribution these investments 
can make to the development of the host country. 
 
This chapter covers three distinct periods: the Post-Independence decades, including 
the Import Substitution Industrialisation policy and the Green Revolution popular 
from the 1950s until the 1980s, Structural Adjustment Programmes which dominated 
the 1980s and Agro-industrialisation which emerged in the 1990s. During these 
periods, agriculture has not always been at the centre of economic planning for many 
countries and for organisations such as the World Bank (Deininger and Binswanger, 
1999). The sector has had to find its place in a constantly changing policy world and 
has adjusted considerably over time.  
 
Important conditions in the possible developmental scope of the agricultural sector are 
national land policies and the role that smallholders play in growing food and cash 
crops. These conditions determine the extent to which local farmers are included in 
investments made and how much they can benefit from the inflow of investment 
funds. After covering the theories on agricultural planning, this chapter incorporates a 
discussion on both subjects, with a specific focus on Africa which is the continent 
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central to this study in order to enable a better evaluation of experiences reported on 
across the continent in Chapter 4 and more particularly in Zambia in Chapter 5. 
 
Although the agricultural sector is of major importance in most developing countries, 
investment from both the government and the private sector has lagged behind, 
particularly in Africa. Based on the theories discussed in this chapter, it is argued that 
a central role must be played by national governments to ensure food security is 
achieved and productivity can reach at least a minimum standard. Once the basic 
infrastructure is in place, private actors will be interested in investing and the country 
can be integrated in the increasingly global agricultural supply chains. To ensure 
maximum benefits to a host country, particularly in large-scale land investment, it is 
important that local smallholders are integrated in the operations and that part of the 
production is produced for the domestic market. In this way, opportunities for both 
jobs and income are generated whilst reducing the dependence of the country on a 
volatile world market for its food/fuel security. 
2.2 The Post-Independence period: 1950-1980 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the time when many of the current LDCs gained 
independence, so-called “classical theories” on economic development were the 
mainstream thinking amongst economists. At the core of these theories was a linear 
development pattern taking countries from a ‘traditional society’ based on agriculture 
to a ‘modern economy’ characterised by highly productive industrialisation (Brara, 
1983). According to these theories, the relative importance of the agricultural sector 
declines over time as a country develops, both in terms of contribution to GDP and 
share in employment. Fischer (1939) first observed this trend, which was later 
generalised by Kuznets (1957). 
 
In the classical theories, four roles for the agricultural sector are identified (see 
Kuznets, 1964; Johnston and Mellor, 1961): 
• Product contribution: the agricultural sector provides food for the industrial 
workforce and raw materials for agro-processing industries such as textiles; 
• Market contribution: the large agricultural population is a market for items 
produced by the domestic industries; 
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• Factor contribution:  the agricultural sector generates excess capital to be used 
for investment in the non-traditional sectors and by becoming more efficient, 
also becomes a pool of labour for non-agricultural activities; and, 
• Foreign exchange contribution: agricultural production can be exported to gain 
access to foreign exchange and/or it can substitute agricultural imports hence 
reducing the need for foreign currency. 
 
Throughout the 1960s there has been fierce debate on whether industrial development 
should precede agricultural development or vice versa (Weitz, 1965). Despite 
influential academics, including Lewis (1954) and Fei and Ranis (1961), emphasising 
that sufficient food production was a necessity to enable industrial expansion, this was 
not a generally accepted view. The structuralist school, best known for the Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis, argued that (agricultural) export commodities produced in LDCs 
are less price-elastic than commodities exported from developing countries, resulting 
in less rapid price increases and thus deteriorating the terms of trade for LDCs over 
time (Singer, 1950, Prebisch, 1951). Others, such as Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) and 
Hirschman (1958) argued that due to the limited linkages of the agricultural sector 
with other areas of the economy, this sector would be unable to “pull” wider 
economic development. 
2.2.1 Import Substitution Industrialisation 
Against this theoretical background, many newly independent countries adopted a 
strategy focussing on the industrial sector rather than agriculture (Anderson and 
Valenzuela, 2010). According to the classical theories, labour productivity in the 
industrial sector is higher than in agriculture. Development therefore would 
necessitate the transfer of labour from farming to manufacturing (Diao et al., 2007). 
According to the linear development notions as put forward in the classical theories, 
industrialisation was envisaged as a way of modernising economies, which in the 
colonial period had focussed on agriculture and minerals. In addition, the politically 
influential urban population had greater interest in manufacturing than in rural 
development (Bezemer and Headey, 2008). Agriculture was negatively perceived as 
‘backward’ and a ‘remnant’ of the colonial period (Schiff and Valdès, 1998). This 
thinking led many developing countries to implement a policy of Import Substitution 
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Industrialisation (ISI), aiming to build up a manufacturing sector behind a 
protectionist wall of government instruments (Krueger et al., 1988). 
 
The role for the agricultural sector in an ISI environment mainly was seen as a source 
of excess labour and capital that could be transferred to the new manufacturing sector 
(Diao et al., 2007). In order to do this, governments introduced high taxes on 
agricultural production and exports (Anderson and Valenzuela, 2010). One of the 
many examples is the taxation of commercial crops in West Africa (Bates, 1981); 
similar policies were implemented in several other countries across the world, 
including Argentina (Maffucci and Reca, 1974). Marketing boards, state agencies 
holding a near-monopoly on the marketing of agricultural products, were a legacy left 
by the colonial powers through which taxation could be achieved. Prices paid to 
farmers by the marketing boards were kept below those on world markets, the price at 
which the boards could sell, thus generating an income for the state at the expense of 
farmers (Bates, 1981). There was pressure to keep domestic food prices low for the 
urban population, forcing the same marketing boards to sell in the domestic market at 
prices sometimes under the producer price (Krueger et al., 1988). Since agriculture 
accounted for most exports of developing countries, centralised purchasing below 
market price was a highly successful policy to transfer capital from the agricultural 
sector to national governments that could, in turn, invest it in the industrial sector (e.g. 
Bates, 1981; Krueger et al., 1988).  
 
In addition, farmers were disadvantaged by the overvaluation of domestic currencies 
(Krueger et al., 1988). Often the exchange rate was kept artificially high to reduce the 
price for imports necessary as inputs for the favoured manufacturing sector, at the 
same time making the export of agricultural products less competitive (Adelman, 
1984). Krueger et al. (1988) executed an in-depth study on the impact of both direct 
(taxes) and indirect protection (mostly unrealistic exchange rates) on the agricultural 
sector in a number of developing countries. Their study shows that agricultural export 
products were greatly impacted in a negative way, whereas food imports received 
considerable support. Even though the authors mention price stabilisation as a 
possible reason behind these price-distorting policies, they can also be interpreted as 
bias of governments to extract maximum capital out of the agricultural sector, whilst 
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at the same time favouring the urban population involved in the industrial sector with 
low food prices. 
 
Even though the agricultural sector overall was greatly neglected at the expense of 
industrial growth, some developing countries followed different policies. For 
example, Thailand implemented a gradual ISI policy under which it managed to 
successfully grow its industrial sector. This growth was supported by a rapid 
expansion of food output in which the national government played only a limited role, 
focussing mainly on rural infrastructure to enable the opening up of more land for 
crop production. Whereas initially agricultural exports consisted mainly of an excess 
of rice, farmers gradually started producing cassava, sugar and fruits, primarily for the 
export market. The main driver of agricultural growth came from the private sector, 
which gave incentives through market prices both to increase production and to 
diversify crops (Tongpan, 1974; Siamwalla, 1987; Breisinger and Diao, 2008). This 
strategy is in sharp contrast with the market distorting policies of the state-owned 
marketing boards as followed in many other developing countries (Krueger et al., 
1988). 
 
Rather than growing staple food crops, several newly established independent 
countries in Africa were more dependent on export crops, set up during the colonial 
era. This was particularly the case in West Africa where crops such as cocoa and 
coffee dominate (Dinham and Hines, 1983). New governments nevertheless adopted 
different approaches, which were reflected in their agricultural planning. Miracle 
(1970) analyses the approaches of Ghana and Ivory Coast from 1960-1966. Ghana 
opted for a socialist path, concentrating on large state-owned farms and cooperatives 
both for the production of food and export crops. By contrast, Ivory Coast favoured 
foreign investment and, as an incentive, gave monopoly powers to overseas investors 
for the growth and marketing of particular crops. The government itself focussed 
more on development of extension services to ensure staple food production. 
Although some limited successes have been achieved on plantations and by 
smallholders linked to the large foreign players in Ivory Coast, Miracle (1970) 
concludes that both approaches largely have failed. He mentions not only limited 
knowledge, but also “ignorance of the economic environments in which African 
farmers must operate” (Miracle, 1970, 328). Hinderi
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analysed both Ghana and Ivory Coast over a longer period of time and concluded that 
the continuous focus on smallholders, combined with a large budget allocation to the 
agricultural sector and stimulating price incentives, ensured a relative successful 
development in Ivory Coast, whereas Ghana neglected its agricultural sector with 
inconsistent policies and its focus on large-scale production.  
 
Overall, African countries made little progress with their industrialisation despite the 
positive environment created by government ISI policies. Manufacturing only made 
up a small contribution to GDP, with agriculture still the main economic activity (e.g. 
Hinderink and Sterkenburg, 1983, 20). This argues in favour of those theorists who 
claim that growth in the agricultural sector is an absolute requirement for overall 
economic development. Latin America offers examples where agricultural growth 
could not keep up with industrialisation. As a result, foreign exchange earnings from 
agricultural exports were insufficient to ensure continued manufacturing growth 
(Maffucci and Reca, 1974; de Janvry, 1981).  
 
By contrast South Korea and Taiwan achieved agricultural growth at an early stage, 
laying the foundation for successful industrial development. Both countries abolished 
the heavy taxation of their agricultural sector in the 1960s and started to follow a 
more liberal trade policy. After directing significant investments towards irrigation 
projects, infrastructure, improved seeds varieties and cultivation techniques, these two 
countries ensured sufficient food could be produced to support the industrialisation 
process (Lee, 1974; Kang and Ramachandran, 1999). As the next section will 
illustrate, India has been able to follow the path of these countries in the growth of its 
agricultural production during the Green Revolution. 
 
The relative success stories of Taiwan, South Korea and India share the experience 
that smallholder farmers were the main beneficiaries of government policies and 
consequently were the main drivers of agricultural growth (Wiggins et al., 2010). 
Hinderink and Sterkenburg (1983), in their study on policies in five African countries, 
also conclude that smallholders are crucial for development. They argue that to grow 
the agricultural sector and build the foundation for wider economic growth, policies 
need to be focussed on stimulating a favourable price policy and production 
environment for smallholders, combined with high budget allocation to enable 
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development. Based on these experiences and studies done by researchers such as 
Schultz (1964) which illustrated the high efficiency of small-scale farmers, the World 
Bank adopted a new policy changing to a more ‘pro-poor’ attitude, putting small-scale 
agriculture at its centre (McNamara, 1973). Schultz (1964) identified technology as a 
possible vehicle for smallholders to break out of their cycle of poverty. Experience 
during the Green Revolution in Asia, and India in particular, shows that technology 
has potential. 
2.2.2 The Green Revolution 
During the 1960s and the 1970s agricultural productivity increased rapidly across 
Asia (Barker and Winkelman, 1974). This period became known as the Green 
Revolution. Many countries, including China, Indonesia and the Philippines, focussed 
their policies on agricultural growth. India has become the country synonymous with 
this development (World Bank, 2007). Before the widespread implementation across 
Asia, more isolated cases of a Green Revolution took place in, amongst others, 
Mexico (Breisinger and Diao, 2008) and Taiwan (Lee, 1974). 
 
The Green Revolution was driven by technology and research and development into 
new, high yielding varieties of the main staple crops rice and wheat. In combination 
with fertilisers and pesticides and a reliable source of water, these new varieties 
boosted cereal production. As a result, India managed to double its wheat output in 
only seven years (Brown, 2001, 145–46). 
 
Instrumental to this success was active involvement by the State. First, governments 
invested heavily in irrigation projects and infrastructure. This enabled the efficient 
distribution of seeds and fertiliser to a wide network of farmers. Governments also 
introduced fertiliser subsidies and easy credit access to stimulate (small-scale) farmers 
to switch to new high yielding varieties of wheat and rice. This was further supported 
by extension services to train farmers to obtain maximum benefits from these inputs 
(e.g. Islam, 1974; Breisinger and Diao, 2008; World Bank, 2007). Some countries, 
such as Taiwan (Lee, 1974) and the Philippines (World Bank, 2007), implemented 
land reform policies to give more people access to land. Smallholder farmers were the 
focus of government policies, driven by fears of food security under increasing 
population pressure (Boserup, 1974; World Bank, 2007). C. Subramaniam, Indian 
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Minister of Agriculture from 1964-1967, stressed the importance of the role 
government played in bringing about the Green Revolution amongst small-scale 
farmers, but also indicated that this support did not come easily (Subramaniam, 1995). 
The work of the governments was facilitated by generous financial assistance from 
Official Development Aid (World Bank, 2007) and technical knowledge from 
institutes such as the Rockefeller Foundation (Sachs, 2005).  
 
The Asian experience reinforces the argument for strong linkages of the agricultural 
sector with the rest of the economy as was first argued by Johnston and Mellor 
(1961). In addition it once again underwrites the theory that wide economic growth is 
not viable without first producing sufficient food. It emphasises the importance of 
dedicated government support and clear planning. Both India and China have since 
embarked on a rapid growth path outside the agricultural sector (Sachs, 2005). 
2.3 Liberalisation and Structural Adjustment Programmes – 
1980-2000 
During the 1980s, many developing countries witnessed the start of an economic 
crisis. Failed ISI policies combined with external factors such as deteriorating terms 
of trade since the 1960s slowed down economic growth. Especially sub-Saharan 
Africa started to lag far behind the rest of the world (World Bank, 1994). As a result, 
these countries faced high trade deficits and debt and suffered from high inflation 
(e.g. Commander, 1989; Wiggins et al., 2010). Access to international credit became 
more difficult (Reardon and Timmer, 2005). The World Bank and the IMF were the 
institutions lending assistance under newly developed Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs). Countries were given loans on conditions focussed on fiscal 
stabilisation, free market operation and trade liberalisation, together with a sharp 
reduction in state intervention (Easterly, 2005).  
 
Amongst the changes implemented across a wide number of countries was the 
devaluation of overvalued exchange rates, thus reducing the price of imports and 
making exports more competitive (e.g. Commander et al., 1989; World Bank, 1994; 
Easterly, 2005). As illustrated by Krueger et al. (1989), overvalued exchange rates 
had a considerable negative impact on the agricultural sector in the 1970s. The 
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argument was that devaluation would enable a growth in exports through more 
competitive prices. Exchange rate devaluations were accompanied by a closer link 
between producer prices and world market prices, with the aim of incentivising 
farmers to increase productivity (World Bank, 1994).  
 
Due to the central role of the agricultural sector in terms of GDP contribution, export 
earnings and employment, the World Bank put the increase of ‘traditional’ exports at 
the centre of agricultural policy to generate growth and benefit the balance of 
payments. The chosen implementation of currency devaluation and an increase in 
cross-border prices have led to an increase in exports with a consequent rise in income 
for farmers, and a stimulation of production. For example, cocoa production in Ghana 
increased significantly between 1982 and 1986 (Commander et al., 1989) as did 
cotton in Benin and Mali and cashew nuts in Tanzania (Kherallah et al., 2000).  
 
Another way of stimulating exports was through the liberalisation of export marketing 
channels, which were largely dominated by state owned marketing boards.  These 
boards were not abolished, but their operations became less stringent and more space 
was created for the private sector (World Bank, 1994). A large number of employees 
were made redundant to bring down the high labour costs burdening the government 
budget (Commander et al., 1989; de Rezende, 1989). A similar movement took place 
in marketing boards for staple food products, although reform of these parastatals, 
which mostly impact domestic consumers, proved to be difficult with governments 
reluctant to release control (World Bank, 1994; Kherallah et al., 2000). 
 
Overall, from the years since SAPs were first implemented in 1983-84 until 2000, the 
agricultural sector in developing countries performed better than in the 1960s and 
1970s. It has benefited from currency devaluation, less taxation and general market 
liberalisation (Kherallah, 2000; Yu and Nin-Pratt, 2011). Benefits were predominantly 
concentrated amongst larger farmers with access to resources and economies of scale. 
By contrast, small-scale farmers struggled to pay for more expensive imports such as 
seeds and fertiliser which were no longer subsidised. It is argued that SAPs resulted in 
increased inequality (Green, 2009). In addition, due to feeble government 
commitment and half-implemented or reversed policies, the private sector proved 
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hesitant to fill the space left by the retreat of government which was one of the main 
objectives of the SAP policies (Kherallah et al., 2000).  
The situation in Latin America was different from that in Africa. Here, despite an ISI 
policy, the agricultural sector still received substantial support from the government. 
This was mainly in the form of public investment, cheap credit and extension 
services. As a result, agricultural output grew significantly throughout the 1970s, 
mainly due to an increase in land under cultivation and technology (Buainain and de 
Rezende, 1995; Buainain and da Silveira, 2002). Latin American countries were late 
to introduce liberalisation policies, some countries only started during the late 1980s. 
For example, Brazil pursued a minimum price policy and increased its share in crop 
marketing during the 1980s, which encouraged domestic output (de Rezende, 1989). 
Despite continued interventionist policies, agricultural output steadily increased in the 
‘lost decade’ of the 1980s (Spoor, 2002). Only during the 1990s did Latin American 
countries introduce liberalisation strategies, albeit at a rapid rate. Import taxes for 
food imports dropped between 1988-1990 and 1991-1993 from over 20% to around 
5% in Argentina and from nearly 30% to just over 10% in Brazil (Spoor, 2002, 384). 
Due to credit market reform, driven by fiscal reasons, cheap credit was no longer 
available. This has had a specific negative effect on small-scale farmers who could no 
longer afford to borrow money at increased interest rates (Thorpe, 1997). Gains from 
structural adjustment were made mostly in the commercial farming sector (Spoor, 
2002). As a result of the adjustment policies, “output [...] has become more volatile 
(most likely because output performance is much more closely related to the now 
dominant export-led growth model, and subsequently with very volatile world market 
prices for agricultural commodities)” (Spoor, 2002, 397). 
 
But, terms of trade for export commodities have fallen, reducing the income of cash 
crop farmers and foreign exchange to exporting countries in general. The world prices 
for the main African export commodities such as coffee and cotton were reduced 
considerably (World Bank, 2007). The same happened in Brazil which has seen a fall 
in soya bean, poultry and coffee prices (Buainain and da Silveira, 2002). Even though 
export crops can bring much needed cash for small farmers and foreign exchange for 
a country, dependency on a small number of export crops, which is still the case in 
many sub-Saharan African countries (FAO, 2004), increases the vulnerability of a 
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country’s balance of payment and hence its ability to import staple foods. This 
situation can potentially lead to food insecurity. Nevertheless, the position of the 
World Bank during this period was one of “Exporters First” (World Bank, 1994). 
 
As observed by both Kherallah et al. (2000) for sub-Saharan Africa and Spoor (2002) 
and Kay (2008) for Latin America, the structural transformation of the 1980s and 
1990s mainly benefited large-scale farmers who had access to credit and international 
marketing channels and who focussed on export crops. Despite an increase in 
agricultural production, developing countries were still largely dependent on imports 
of staple food crops for their food security and have become more so in the years 
since structural adjustment (FAO, 2004). Some of the improvements aside, the overall 
consensus is that the structural reforms with the emphasis on the market and a 
withdrawal of government interventions did not lead to the intended economic growth 
(Kherallah, 2000; Chang, 2009). In the decade from 2000-2010, theories on the role 
of agricultural in development and its structure, in a continually globalising world, 
have changed. Key debates continued both on the role of smallholders and on whether 
to prioritise food or cash crop production.  
2.4 Agro-industrialisation 
Structural adjustment programmes exposed developing countries to the world market 
(Reardon and Barrett, 2000). Import and export barriers have been reduced 
considerably, foreign investment has been stimulated and domestic markets have been 
liberalised. Globally, the agricultural sector has undergone a process of 
industrialisation in which vertically integrated supply chains become more important 
(e.g. Boehlje and Doering, 2000; Pingali, 2007; Wiggins et al., 2010). These 
developments offer opportunities for the agricultural sector in developing countries, 
but also pose several threats, especially for smallholder farmers. 
 
Agro-industrialisation comprises an increasing vertical integration of the supply chain 
(Reardon and Barrett, 2000; Boehlje and Doering, 2000). Supported by evolving 
technologies, a growing group of urban consumers are now in a position to demand a 
wide variety of high quality goods (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). This is channelled 
via large food processors and supermarkets which are capturing an increasing market 
share in food distribution (Reardon and Timmer, 2005). In order to ensure high 
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standards of quality, availability and traceability in an increasingly competitive 
market, agribusiness and food retailers are looking for vertical integration as a means 
to coordinate complex supply chains (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). Concentration also 
takes place on the supply side where large firms such as Monsanto and DuPont 
dominate the market for inputs such as seeds and chemicals (Napier, 2001). Reduced 
numbers of both customers and suppliers lead to an increase in transaction costs for 
small-scale farmers, especially in areas where market access is limited (Pingali et al., 
2006; Hazell et al., 2010). Vertical integration has gone hand-in-hand with a 
replacement of the conventional spot market with contracts that enable downstream 
companies to obtain a greater degree of control (Drabenstott, 1995; Reardon and 
Barrett, 2000). 
 
A second development accompanying vertical integration is an increase in 
international food trade (Pingali, 2007), especially in processed foods, horticultural 
products and oil seeds (Reardon and Barrett, 2000). This is also the case for many 
developing countries which, since the 1960s, have become food importers rather than 
exporters. These agricultural imports are expected to increase further during the 
period 2015/2030 (FAO, 2002). On the one hand, demand for cereal products is 
expected to increase due to population growth in general and of the urban population 
in particular. On the other hand, the low productivity of the domestic cereal producers 
and the lower costs of imports after trade liberalisation leads to a dependency on 
imports of basic food items, which are often produced by subsidised farmers in 
developed countries (Pingali, 2007; Hazell et al., 2010). At the same time, markets for 
traditional agricultural export crops, such as coffee and cocoa, are not growing as 
rapidly (FAO, 2004). Developing countries are therefore experiencing a deterioration 
in their balance of payments accompanied by greater risks to their food security 
position.  
 
A third development in the agro-industrialisation process is that of a change in the 
agricultural production system itself, driven by changing supply chains and increased 
globalisation (Reardon and Barrett, 2000; Boehlje and Doering, 2000; Pingali, 2007). 
Farms tend towards larger scale operations, greater reliance on purchased inputs 
rather than free family labour and more specialisation. In general, production systems 
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are seen more as manufacturing operations where technology, information and 
management become more important (Boehlje and Doering, 2000).  
 
In an increasingly industrialising agricultural sector, transaction costs related to 
information, markets and technology become more important. It is argued that under 
these circumstances large-scale farming will become more and more efficient as 
compared to small-scale farms which gain their competitive advantage from low cost 
labour (Poulton, et al., 2010). The trend towards larger scale production has been 
analysed in a large number of works (e.g. Reardon and Barrett, 2000; Kirsten and 
Sartorius, 2002; Collier, 2008). Although the industrialisation of the agricultural 
sector has been particularly apparent in parts of Latin America, China and Eastern 
Europe, Africa and other developing areas have also been affected (Reardon and 
Barrett, 2000). 
2.5 Small-scale farmers in an industrialised and global world 
The changed environment in which farmers operate has led to a wider discussion on 
the role of smallholders in developing countries. Whereas some argue that agriculture 
in general is limited in its role as engine for economic growth (e.g. Sachs, 1997; 
Maxwell et al., 2001; Ellis and Harris, 2004; Gardner, 2005), others maintain that 
within the agricultural sector, there are growth opportunities but only for large-scale 
operations as these are better adapted to the circumstances of more integrated global 
supply chains (De Haen et al., 2003; Collier, 2008). Challenges faced by smallholders 
include higher costs to credit, higher transaction costs in the market and higher 
vulnerability to price changes (Hazell et al., 2010). In addition, small-scale farmers 
face greater difficulties meeting strict health and safety standards, and increased 
concentration in the supply chain combined with vertical integration results in a 
preference by large downstream businesses for a limited number of large-scale 
producers for them to enhance control and lower transaction costs (Kirsten and 
Sartorius, 2002). 
 
Nevertheless, a strong argument still exists for agricultural development with a central 
role for small-scale farmers. Lipton (2005) observes that productivity increases 
amongst this group of the population have been critical in nearly all cases of poverty 
reduction. Irz et al. (2001) sum up 12 effects of agricultural growth in the farm, rural 
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and national economy, indicating that the linkages first mentioned by Johnston and 
Mellor (1961) still play an important contemporary role. Jayne et al. (2006), Hazell et 
al. (2010) and Wiggins et al. (2010) emphasise the importance of smallholders to 
reduce poverty, the first of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. More 
specifically, despite increasing globalisation and international trade, it is argued that 
developing countries should focus on food production for the domestic market, rather 
than export crops (Kydd and Dorward, 2001). Timmer (2002) observes that food 
security has been essential in generating wider economic growth, an argument already 
made in the 1950s by the supporters of the classical theories. It has to be noted, 
however, that dietary changes due to increased urbanisation and increases in income 
(e.g. De Haen et al., 2003; Pingali, 2007) mean that demand for traditional staple 
foods declines whereas demand for non-traditional products increases. It remains to 
be seen if smallholders can make the transition to these new crops and if the growing 
conditions are suitable.  
 
In addition to food security, Diao et al. (2010, 1379) argue that “broad-based 
agricultural growth is more pro-poor than export-led growth”. The national and 
regional markets for staple food products, such as cereals and roots and tubers, are 
still the biggest markets for agricultural producers in many developing countries 
(Diao et al., 2007). Opportunities do exist in high-value export crops such as fresh 
fruit and vegetables, though this will only be available to a small number of farmers 
with access to capital required for expensive seeds, fertiliser and pesticides and who 
will be dependent on a highly variable demand (FAO, 2004; Pingali, 2007; Hazell et 
al., 2010). Developing countries with large mineral resources might have higher 
exchange rates that make food imports cheaper, leaving domestic food production 
uncompetitive. In this situation, it is argued that high value crops could be a better 
way of developing the agriculture sector (Hazell et al., 2010). 
 
Most land in Africa is under cultivation by smallholder farmers (World Bank, 2010a). 
Although these families might have income from non-farm activities, they largely 
depend on the harvests from their land to feed themselves (Jayne et al., 2006). Work 
on the farm mostly is done by cheap family labour (Wiggins, 2009). But it is amongst 
this group of people that poverty is highest. Many smallholder farmers seem to be 
trapped in semi-subsistence poverty (Barrett, 2008). Therefore, many 
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recommendations have been made to put smallholder development at the heart of 
poverty reduction strategies (e.g. World Bank, 2010). To understand the impact that 
large-scale farming, either by domestic or foreign businesses, might have in Africa 
and other developing countries, it is important to get an insight in the role of small-
scale farmers. 
 
According to Nagayets (2005), there are around 33 million small farms in Africa, 
representing roughly 80% of all farms on the continent. Despite a large variety, 
smallholders can produce up to 90% of total agricultural production (Nagayets, 2005). 
With a large share of production being generated by small-scale farmers, growth in a 
country’s agricultural sector can indicate increased performance by these farmers. 
During the past 40 years, West and North Africa have shown considerable growth in 
their agricultural output (FAOSTAT, 2011c). In general, in most countries in these 
regions, growth in agricultural production has kept pace with population growth. By 
contrast, productivity growth has been much lower in southern and East Africa and 
has lagged behind the rest of the world. There is, however, a marked variability across 
the region, as far down as the district level (Jayne et al., 2006). Certain authors 
indicate that crop input and management issues might be underlying factors that can 
explain this diversity (Jayne et al., 2006).  
 
Looking at smallholder farming from a labour productivity side, the figures are less 
favourable. Small-scale farming largely depends on the input of family labour, which 
is cheap, highly motivated and has intimate knowledge of the land (Poulton et al., 
2010). Productivity per hectare therefore can compare favourably with large-scale 
farming where labour input is less intensive (see Wiggins, 2009 for a number of 
examples). Nevertheless, important is the added value per person. For a family to 
reach at least the US$1 per day threshold, each active member needs to contribute 
US$365 per year plus extra income to cover for dependent family members. Almost 
half of all countries in Africa did not even reach the level of US$350 per labourer 
(FAOSTAT, 2011c). It is in these situations that families will be trapped in a constant 
situation of poverty. 
 
As Jayne et al. (2003) have demonstrated, per capita income for smallholder farmers 
shows a strong positive relationship with land access. The more land a family has 
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access to, the higher the per capita income. In the same study, it is shown that the ratio 
of land cultivated per person has come down significantly across a number of 
countries between 1960 and 1999. One possible cause of this decline is absolute 
population growth amongst the rural population which causes pressure on available 
land resources. As can be expected, small farmers in relatively land scarce countries 
will have smaller size holdings than in countries that have a relative abundance of 
land. This is clearly illustrated by Rwanda where the average landholding size is 
0.71ha, whereas in Zambia this is nearly four times as much at 2.73ha. Within 
countries there is a great spread amongst agricultural households where the quartile of 
households with the lowest land access is as little as 0.2 and 0.32ha in Rwanda and 
Ethiopia respectively, compared to 1.82 and 2.58ha for the quartile with the largest 
land holding (all figures from Jayne et al., 2003). 
 
Lack of capital is a severe issue for many small-scale farmers. With limited income, 
no funds are available to acquire inputs such as good quality seeds and fertiliser, for 
irrigation or storage, or for farm animals. This results in low productivity and thus 
little or no harvest that can be sold at the market place to obtain income to purchase 
inputs for the next cycle. This is a vicious poverty cycle from which many farmers 
find it hard to come out of (Dickenson, 1996).  
 
Staple food crops are the main crops grown by smallholder farmers. Cash crops for 
market sales might give them higher income and thus a means to get out of the 
poverty trap, but these crops make the family more vulnerable. Input costs for cash 
crops are usually higher than those for staple crops and it is important to have access 
to markets (Jayne et al., 2006). If the family cannot meet these two conditions, it will 
have to revert to staple crops. Even if the farmer can manage to raise the funds and is 
able to sell to the market, the food security of the family is highly jeopardised in the 
case of a failed harvest. The family then is fully dependent on the food market to buy 
all their food. Examples of high involvement of smallholder farming in cash crops are 
tea and coffee in Kenya (Kabura Nyaga, 2007), cocoa in West Africa (Duguma et al., 
2001) and cotton in Burkina Faso and Mali (Tschirley et al., 2009). 
 
This situation does not imply that staple food crops, such as maize and roots and 
tubers, are not being sold by small-scale farmers. In their study in five sub-Saharan 
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countries, Jayne et al. (2006) found that market integration of smallholder farmers is, 
however, limited. Only 20-35% of these farmers were sellers of maize, and mainly 
these were farmers with larger landholdings of 4-20ha. The majority, 50-70%, were 
buyers of cereals and only have access to a small area of land. In addition, due to lack 
of storage facilities, many farmers sell their crops immediately after harvest at a low 
price, only to buy it back later in the year at a higher price (Barrett, 2008). Similar 
patterns have been found in other studies (e.g. Levinsohn and McMillan, 2007, 
Stephens and Barrett, 2011). High food prices might give farmers an incentive to 
grow more. However, this will only benefit a small and already privileged group of 
farmers able to sell to the market, whereas it will hurt the majority of small farmers 
who cannot even reach their own food security and thus are dependent on buying food 
(Barrett, 2008).  
 
Governments and international organisations argue that smallholder farmers can 
benefit from foreign investment through access to market, technology and inputs to 
the domestic farmers. In his study over a wide area of literature on market 
participation amongst smallholder farmers in eastern and southern Africa, Barrett 
(2008) finds evidence that lack of access to these items certainly impedes smallholder 
farmers from involvement in market activities and traps them at low-income levels. 
2.6 The changed role of governments 
Governments have acknowledged the changes taking place in the agricultural sector 
and the role they need to play in developing their agricultural sectors, which in many 
sub-Saharan countries makes up more than 20% of GDP and can employ as much as 
80% of the population (World Bank, 2010b). Even though some African countries 
earn a large share of their foreign exchange through exports of cash crops, such as 
coffee and fresh vegetables, all sub-Saharan countries are net importers of cereals, the 
main staple for the majority of the population (FAOSTAT, 2011c; World Bank, 
2011). The agricultural sector thus has a large potential in reducing poverty, but needs 
government support in order to grow. 
 
During the years of ISI and SAPs, government support was withdrawn under 
budgetary constraints and the policy of free markets. The Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAAPD) under the NEPAD initiative argues 
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for a reversal of this situation and calls for the African Union (AU) members to 
dedicate ten percent of their national budget to agriculture and achieve a 6% annual 
growth rate in their agricultural output (NEPAD, 2010). Despite these good 
intentions, in the seven years since its signing in 2003 only eight countries have 
increased the budget allocated to their agricultural sector and only ten African Union 
members have reached the 6% growth rate. Likewise, in its World Development 
Report 2008, the World Bank (2007) acknowledges the leading role agriculture can 
play in generating overall growth. 
 
Even though financial support from both governments and ODA is increasing, the 
debate on how this money should be channelled continues. It is acknowledged that the 
market does not reach large parts of the developing world. For example, private R&D 
has not invested in developing seeds and technologies for crop production on 
marginal land (Pingali, 2007), especially the wide range of soils available in Africa. 
Public funds put towards the green revolution in Asia illustrates the potential of 
technological development geared towards smallholder food production and the 
importance of government funds to bring these developments into operation (World 
Bank, 2007). 
 
Another area for governments to play a key role is support for infrastructure and 
irrigation (Pingali, 2007). Small farmers need access to both information and markets. 
The provision of public goods such as roads and telecommunication infrastructure are 
essential for rural farmers to become connected to the market. Irrigation is essential to 
increase the productivity of the land but is usually expensive (World Bank, 2007). 
Communal irrigation provided by the government can increase the incomes of many 
small-scale farmers. As the previous section illustrated, government expenditure on 
infrastructure and irrigation were crucial to the successes obtained during the Green 
Revolution. 
 
On the other hand, there are arguments for the role of the private sector when it comes 
to the provision of inputs such as fertiliser, access to credit and storage facilities 
(Pingali, 2007). Government has to create an environment that stimulates the private 
sector, rather than sending mixed signals as has happened in many cases (Kherallah et 
al., 2000; Jayne and Chapoto, 2002; Harrigan, 2003;). For example, the continued 
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interference of government in export policies for food products creates uncertainty for 
private farmers and hence their reluctance to invest in food crop production (e.g. 
Nijhoff et al., 2002). Another case in which insufficient government support prohibits 
the private sector from stepping in is the provision of fertiliser and other inputs. Many 
governments provide subsidised inputs to smallholder farmers, with mixed impact on 
the operation of commercial traders (Xu et al., 2009). Private suppliers rely on good 
roads to minimise their distribution costs once again indicating the important role for 
government investment in infrastructure (Kydd and Dorward, 2001). 
 
Diao et al. (2007) argue that in the early stages of agricultural development many 
analysts expected profits in the food chain to be extremely low. Market failures are 
likely at this stage (Dorward et al., 1998; World Bank, 2007), further reducing the 
incentive for the private sector. In this case, the government must step in, ensuring 
that productivity increases, inputs become more readily available and incomes grow., 
After many years of SAPs, numerous researchers and institutions have acknowledged 
the failure of the market (Chang, 2009). The World Bank (2007), long one of the main 
promoters of the free market, has changed its position and now recognises that 
governments have a role to play in growing the agricultural sector and thereby 
reducing poverty. 
 
Central to the agricultural sector is land. Access to land (and water) is a major factor 
for international investors looking for large areas with agricultural potential. In 
addition, access to land and equal land distribution, combined with other measures, is 
seen as a critical factor to raising farm productivity (Chang, 2009). In many cases in 
Africa, this will require government initiated land reform policies. Of importance is 
the debate on private land ownership versus communal land holding with regard to 
productivity. Linked to this discussion is the impact that large-scale commercial land 
projects can have on the local population. Opponents of such projects claim that the 
land that the local population is dependent on is insufficiently protected by the 
government and hence small farmers lose access to their land when commercial 
investors require land (e.g. Daniel and Mittel, 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 
2009). Due to the importance of land access and the central part the government has 
in establishing land policies, this topic is looked at in more detail with a specific focus 
on Africa. 
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In Africa, land policies differ largely from those in developed countries. Whereas 
Europe and the USA rely on well-organised land markets and land is owned largely 
on individual title, “over 80% of arable land in sub-Saharan Africa is held under some 
form of ‘customary’ tenure” (Boone, 2007, 566). This has major implications both for 
local farmers and for foreign companies looking for agricultural investment 
opportunities. 
 
Many sub-Saharan countries have a dual land system which has its roots in the 
colonial days (e.g. Berry, 2002). When first settling the new areas, colonial authorities 
claimed all unoccupied or ownerless land for the state (McAuslan, 2006). This land 
was then brought under control in two different ways: one administered based on 
European rules and regulations where land was owned as private property, and one 
according to what was called “customary law” where land was held collectively 
(Berry, 2002, McAuslan, 2006). In this way, “Colonial rulers interpreted and sought 
to enforce rural land rights in ways that would shore up the power of their rural allies, 
create political structures for governing rural populations, promote the partial 
commercialisation of agriculture, fix some rural populations to the land, and promote 
the geographical mobility of others” (Boone, 2007, 561). The belief that customary 
law was a long established local practice does not seem to hold though. According to 
Whitehead and Tsikata (2003, 75) “many of the central tenets of African land tenure, 
such as the idea of communal ownership, the hierarchy of recognized interests in land 
(ownership, usufructory (sic) rights and so on) or the place of chiefs and elders, have 
been shown to have been largely created and sustained by colonial policy and passed 
on to post-colonial states”.  
 
Upon gaining independence, different countries tackled land policies in different 
ways. Some countries, such as Kenya, tried to continue on the road of increased 
individual tenure as initiated by the colonial government (McAuslan, 2006). Most 
newly formed states across the continent vested land ownership in the President, the 
state or local governments, ignoring the rights of customary owners. This leaves the 
community as mere occupant of the land, without any secure rights (Alden Wily, 
2001). By claiming all land to be under control of the state, the powers of chiefs in 
land allocation were greatly reduced (Lavigne Delville et al., 2002). At the same time, 
new governments used their control over land to “promote national integration, 
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accelerate the expansion of commercial agriculture, and demobilise rural populations 
who entered the political arena at the time of the nationalist struggle” (Boone, 2007, 
561). Examples of countries where the State gained control over all land are Senegal 
and Ivory Coast. Both countries excluded land with private title from state ownership 
(Boone, 2007). 
 
International donors believed that one of the underlying reasons for the low 
productivity in African agriculture was the insecurity of land tenure under customary 
law. The reasoning was that once farmers had legal title deeds, these could be used to 
obtain credit and make the farmer invest in land (Peters, 2004; McAuslan, 2006). 
Nevertheless, research by the World Bank, a major driver of establishing private 
property rights, indicated that private land tenure does not lead to the reduction of 
poverty (Deininger and Binswanger, 1999). Concerns that customary land policies 
prevented investment and commercialisation of the agricultural sector were refuted by 
studies showing the involvement of small farmers in the growing of cocoa on 
customary land in West Africa (Peters, 2004). At the same time, other studies showed 
that even under customary landholding systems, most farming activities are executed 
by individuals or families who have an independent claim on that particular plot 
(Atwood, 1990; Peters, 2004). Land reform policies designed to increase individual 
land tenure actually failed to achieve this aim, particularly amongst the poor. Rather, 
these programmes “encouraged speculation in land by outsiders, thus displacing the 
very people … who were supposed to acquire increased security through titling, and 
they facilitated practices of bribing, fraudulent titling and expropriation of land” 
(Peters, 2004, 274).  
 
The failure of land reform policies together with the growing evidence of the benefits 
of customary land holding systems (e.g. Atwood, 1990) prompted the international 
donor community, including the World Bank, to revise their position on this type of 
tenure, even though land titling, individually or collectively, is still seen as a tool to 
increase tenure security (World Bank, 2010a). Land policies in many African 
countries now recognise customary tenure, although in many different forms. For 
example, Tanzania distinguishes three kinds of land: reserved land, village land and 
general land (Theting and Brekke, 2010). Madagascar introduced a new land policy in 
2005 acknowledging “untitled private property”, being land collectively claimed by 
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local people. Before the policy change, all land without private title belonged to the 
state. Local land administration offices have been introduced to deal with private 
ownership based on previous local rights (Perrine et al., 2011). 
 
Nevertheless, giving more legal recognition to customary land does not necessarily 
imply that the poor have more secure access to land. Rights to these communal lands 
are not egalitarian (Atwood, 1990; Peters, 2004). Not only can secondary land rights, 
like those to communal grazing lands, be sold to individuals, the more powerful 
members of a community can decide to claim exclusive ownership for themselves or 
their beneficiaries. In addition, communal land rights are often disputed, depending on 
the interpretation of the law and often unclear, unrecognised boundaries. Liberia is 
one country where this has led to conflicts over land allocated to private companies 
but previously used by the local population (World Bank, 2010a). 
 
After more than 50 years of independence, most African countries still have a form of 
dual land tenure system causing confusion and conflict. As McAuslan (2006, 1) states 
“Colonial boundaries; colonial land grabbing and their spurious legal justifications as 
well as colonial policies, practices and laws within each colonial entity that is now an 
independent state provide the starting point and, too often, the framework for land 
management and reform today”. This has major implications for foreign direct 
investors looking for secure land rights and the local people historically using the 
searched after land. As will be shown, with land pressure rising, securing local land 
rights is one of the main issues facing poor families and one of the biggest issues 
where government policy in Africa has to balance the wishes of the poor smallholder 
families and commercial farmers, both domestic and foreign. 
2.7 The role of foreign investment 
In a world dominated by vertical supply chains, technology and information, foreign 
investment in developing world agriculture plays an important role. Foreign 
businesses, especially vertically integrated trans-national corporations, can open 
channels to both domestic and export markets, thus integrating developing countries 
in the global market. These companies usually apply modern technologies that 
increase yields but which are too capital intensive for developing country farmers to 
purchase. In order to operate efficiently, private investors build their own roads and 
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infrastructure for which the national government lacks the required funds. Through 
increased production, either food supply to the domestic market increases and thus 
potentially improves the food security status of the host country, or foreign exchange 
earnings increase in the case when the foreign investor focuses on export crops. A last 
argument for the role of foreign investment is their impact on the creation of jobs 
(Cotula et al., 2009; Görgen et al., 2009; von Braun and Meinzen Dick, 2009; World 
Bank, 2010a). 
 
Nevertheless, it is recognised that large-scale foreign investment can also pose serious 
threats to developing countries, and smallholder farmers in particular. These include 
displacement of farmers, loss of access to communal resources such as water or 
grazing land, ecological disruption, reduced domestic food supply if land use is being 
transferred from food production to export crops and environmental degradation (von 
Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; Daniel and Mittel, 2009). Especially in the case of 
investment where large areas of land are involved, the risks to the host country 
increase. As Hazell et al. (2010) argue, unequal land distribution has been less ‘pro-
poor’ than in cases where agricultural growth has taken place focussed on small 
farms. This makes a strong case to integrate smallholder farmers in the foreign 
investment operation, for example through contract farming or out-grower schemes. It 
is also through this set-up that local farmers can secure full benefits through access to 
improved technology, credit and other inputs that might otherwise be outside their 
reach. 
 
Large-scale foreign investment can contribute to domestic food supply, producing a 
surplus of staple food crops for the increasing urban population which cannot be 
supplied by low productive smallholder farmers. Not only will this increase domestic 
food supply, it can also lower staple food prices, leaving consumers with a higher real 
wage. Foreign investment also can be a vehicle to integrate a developing country into 
the agro-industrialised sector. As Reardon and Barrett (2000, 196) state “it appears 
that agro-industrialisation is merely a necessary, not a sufficient condition. It may 
accentuate prevailing inequities, deepen poverty among vulnerable subpopulations, or 
damage the natural environment if not induced and monitored carefully”. The next 
chapter will look into the trends, drivers and impact of large-scale foreign investment 
in more detail. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
Agricultural planning and policy has changed since many developing countries gained 
independence from the 1950s. Initially the sector was seen as supplier of labour and 
tax income to drive industrialisation and was greatly disadvantaged (Diao et al., 
2007). To finance import substitution industrialisation policies, governments became 
dependent on cheap credit, albeit these policies had little success in growing the 
manufacturing sector (Hinderink and Sterkenburg, 1983). It was during this period 
that small Asian farmers, supported by heavy government investment, multiplied their 
staple food production using new high yielding varieties, creating the basis for 
diversified economic growth in the following decades (e.g. Kang and Ramachandran, 
1999). 
 
In the 1970s oil prices escalated to record levels increasing the current account 
deficits of oil importing countries and so ending the era of cheap credit (Easterly, 
2005). Faced by fiscal constraints, developing countries became subject to conditional 
loans by the IMF and the World Bank as part of structural adjustment programmes. 
The main objectives of these SAPs were to reduce government intervention, liberalise 
markets and increase exports of agricultural crops (World Bank, 1994). Nevertheless, 
these policies have not had the desired effects. Especially the region of sub-Saharan 
Africa still suffers from low productivity and increased food insecurity (Kherallah, 
2000). 
 
Towards the end of the 20th century a trend emerged towards industrialisation and 
globalisation of the agricultural sector with more concentration both vertically in the 
supply chain as well as horizontally on larger scale farms (Boehlje and Doering, 
2000). This situation poses new threats to small-scale farmers in developing countries 
who might miss out altogether on agricultural development. On the other hand, FDI 
might offer a channel to connect with the rest of the world and give access to new 
technology to increase productivity. 
 
Regardless of the dominating planning theory, it is evident that only if domestic food 
supply is sufficient, overall economic development can be achieved. Governments 
have always played an important role in stimulating a growth in food production, 
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especially based on smallholder farmers, recognising that the free market does not 
ensure agricultural development. Under the CAADP, African governments 
acknowledge that their commitment to the agricultural sector must be enlarged after 
many decades of insufficient financial support (NEPAD, 2010). Small-scale private 
investment can play an additional role, especially in the more populated areas where 
commercial activities are more likely to be viable. Large-scale (foreign) investment 
requires vast tracts of unused land which mostly is available in more remote areas. 
This kind of investment has the potential to assist government in providing 
infrastructure and employment in what usually are the least developed regions. To 
ensure developmental benefits from these large-scale investments, the host country 
must ensure that the investor does provide both jobs and facilities. Additionally, the 
country as a whole will gain most if (part of) the produce, whether it be food or 
biofuel, is sold domestically. This can reduce dependence on volatile world markets. 
The integration of small-scale farmers in large-scale operations is thus considered as 
detrimental to the benefits of the region and the country as a whole. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 




In Chapter Two it was argued that agricultural development, and specifically 
production to secure domestic food security, is an essential step towards a more 
diversified economic structure. Nevertheless, this has not always been the underlying 
thought behind agricultural policies since the 1950s when it was viewed as a 
submissive sector used for resources and capital to develop manufacturing.  Since the 
turn of the century, agriculture has become part of a liberalised and global economy. 
At the same time, the sector has regained interest as the focus for poverty reduction on 
the one hand and as global investment opportunity on the other hand. In addition, food 
security has become an issue in a large number of countries. These developments 
have resulted in governments in developing countries receiving numerous requests to 
either lease or sell large areas of land. 
 
This chapter will look in detail at contemporary large-scale land investments by 
foreign parties in developing countries. These investments are diverse from many 
perspectives. This chapter aims to describe the range of projects identified in 
numerous sources in order to better understand current developments. It will first 
identify the drivers behind the interest of investors in overseas land for agricultural 
purposes. Next, an estimated scale of the projects is portrayed. This section not only 
looks at reported investments, but also at the actual developments on the ground, 
which can vary from reported intentions. Different regions are highlighted, with a 
distinction between food and fuel crops.   Subsequently, the focus will shift to the 
actors involved in the various deals. After having established the scale and 
stakeholders, this chapter will narrow to examine the impact these investments have 
on host regions. Several institutions such as the World Bank argue in favour of large-
scale foreign investment to support economic development whereas other 
organisations perceive that the risks outweigh the benefits. Based on literature 
research, this chapter argues that despite the theoretical benefits for local 
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development, there are numerous risks involved which may lead to the local 
population actually losing out to the more powerful investors. It is argued that 
governments need to be aware of the risks they take when allocating land to foreign 
investors. These allocations must be part of a well defined policy in order to obtain 
the goals the government has set. 
3.2 Current trends and drivers 
Numerous authors have identified several drivers behind the increased interest in 
agricultural land as investment opportunity (e.g. Cotula et al., 2009; Sarris, 2009; von 
Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). All these drivers are linked to the three main global 
crises of 2007/08: the food crisis, the oil crisis and the financial crisis. Another factor 
is the climate crisis which is driving the demand for alternative fuels and has made 
several countries more aware of the sustainability of their land and water use practices 
and impacts on future food production capacity. 
3.2.1 The Food Crisis 
From the 1950s until the start of the 21st century the world experienced an extended 
period of declining food prices. Occasional spikes were triggered by bad harvests due 
to weather-related events and were corrected with the next harvest (Brown, 2009). 
The oil crisis of the early 1970s caused the only major food price spike. Due to a rapid 
increase in productivity, driven by technological advancement, food prices were able 
to fall subsequently despite a continual increase in population (Brown, 2009; Sarris, 
2009). But, between 2005 and 2008 world market prices for most basic food staples 
increased in consecutive years, culminating in tremendous price spikes in 2008, albeit 
at a considerably lower level than during the 1970s (Sarris, 2009). As Figure 3-1 
shows, the generally downwards trend of world food prices came to a halt in the 
second half of the 1980s, after which prices flattened out. According to Sarris (2009, 
4) “this suggests that there may have been several slowly evolving factors affecting 
global food markets that gradually created a situation of tightly balanced supply and 
demand, where a spike was almost inevitable in response to small shocks”. 
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Figure 3-1: Real prices for bulk commodities from 1957-2008 (US$/tonne) 
 
Source: FAO Trade and Markets division; as published in Sarris, 2009, 18 
 
Many different authors mentioned several structural factors which led to the recent 
sharp increase of world food prices (e.g. Brown, 2009; Sarris, 2009) including: 
 
• A continuous increase in population: the world’s population has grown from 
2.5 billion in 1950 to nearly 7 billion in 2010 and is likely to increase to over 9 
billion by the year 2050 (UN Population Division, 2009);  
• More people moving up the food chain: as more and more people move up the 
income ladder, especially in Asia, consumption of meat increases. This 
requires an increase in grain production for animal feed (Brown, 2009); 
• Increased competition for land and water from increased urbanisation: The 
United Nations predicts that by 2035 over 60% of the world’s population will 
live in urban areas, compared to 43% in 1990 and 50% in 2010 (UN 
Population Division, 2009);  
• A rise in oil prices: world oil prices went up from an average US$12.28/barrel 
in 1998 to US$94.45 average in 2008, peaking at US$140.73 in July that year 
(OPEC, 2011). As section 3.2.2 will illustrate, a high correlation exists 
between oil prices and food prices for a number of reasons;  
• A slowing rate of increase in agricultural productivity: soil erosion, depletion 
of water sources, rising temperatures and an increasing difficulty to find 
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scientific improvements all challenge the continuous increase in land 
productivity which has driven the long term drop in food prices (Brown, 
2009);  
• A surge in the demand for biofuels: driven by high oil prices and climate 
change policies in Western countries, cars now compete with people for crops 
and hence for limited land and water resources (Cotula, et al., 2009); and, 
• A decline in global food stocks: in case of low food stocks, prices react much 
stronger to any disturbance in supply. As Sarris (2009) illustrates though, 
global food stocks for the main traded food commodities were not at unusually 
low levels in 2007/09. 
 
To make matters worse, the increase in domestic food prices prompted leading wheat 
exporting countries such as Russia and Argentina (Brown, 2009) as well as leading 
rice exporters, such as Vietnam and Thailand (The Economist, 2009) to limit or even 
ban exports of wheat and rice, driving world markets prices up even higher. As a 
result, riots broke out in several countries, from Haiti to Zimbabwe to Bangladesh, 
fuelled by people who could no longer pay for their daily food requirements (Tandon, 
2010). Whereas academics have argued for the importance of domestic food 
production as a generator for economic growth in developing countries (Chapter 2), 
food security without dependence on a volatile world market also seems to be a means 
to prevent domestic turmoil. 
 
With supply to the world food market being distorted by major exporters, food 
importing countries have become concerned about their dependence on the market for 
their food supply. Due to limited land and/or water resources, several countries such 
as the Gulf States and densely populated countries in East Asia (e.g. South Korea), 
have had to rethink their food security strategy (Görgen et al., 2009). One of the 
policies implemented as a result is large-scale land investment outside their borders to 
gain direct control over their food supply. For example, Qatar has established Hassad 
Food, part of the Qatar Investment Authority, which considers the achievement of 
food security for Qatar as first point in its strategic mission (Hassad Food, 2010). 
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3.2.2 The Oil Crisis and the Growth of Biofuels 
Since the early 1900s, oil has been a key driver of global economic development. It 
currently has a 40% share of the worldwide energy market and mainly is used for 
transportation purposes (Roberts, 2005, 5). Throughout the 20th century, oil supply 
seemed to be unlimited with new oil fields discovered on a regular basis. 
Nevertheless, since 1981 oil has been extracted at a faster rate than new reserves have 
been found (Brown, 2009). Recently, the notion of ‘peak oil’ has been established. 
Peak oil indicates the point where oil production will be at its highest level, expected 
to be around 2035 or later. If demand for oil continues to increase, this peak will be 
determined by a lack of supply: current oil reserves will be depleted at a faster rate 
than new sources will be found, reducing the overall stock of oil and possible 
extraction quantity (OECD/IEA, 2010). 
 
Figure 3-2: Yearly Average OPEC Basket Price, 1998-2011 
 















Source: OPEC, 2011 
 
Political instability has placed an additional upwards pressure on the world oil price: 
the oil embargo of 1973/4, the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf wars and the 2011 turmoil in 
Libya all have had a de-stabilising effect on world oil supply and prices. Overall, 
prices have increased continuously since 2001, a trend most experts say is unlikely to 
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change (see Figure 3-2). Oil importing countries are subject to this high volatility and 
increasing price of petroleum, and with it the trickle-down effects it has on their 
economies.  
 
In addition to the notion of oil supply running out, the world has become aware of the 
negative impact this resource has on the global environment. As with the burning of 
any kind of hydrocarbon material, the burning of oil releases carbon-dioxide (CO2) 
into the atmosphere. Oil is said to account for 38% of global CO2 emissions (Brown, 
2009). Besides, reports abound on oil spillage causing natural disasters, for example 
in the Niger delta in Nigeria (Duffield, 2010) or the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of 
Mexico (Goldenberg, 2010). 
 
Oil plays a major role in the agricultural sector, where it is used in tillage, irrigation, 
harvesting (Brown, 2009, 8), the production of nitrogen-based fertiliser and transport 
(Cotula et al., 2009, 53). The price of oil therefore shows a high correlation with that 
of food. Many authors linked the oil price spike to the food price increase in 2008 
(e.g. Cotula et al., 2009; Sarris, 2009). The expected long term increase of oil prices is 
thus likely to exert an upward pressure on food prices in the future. 
 
Driven by expected supply constraints, price volatility and negative climatic impacts, 
scientists and governments have started to investigate alternatives to petroleum. This 
search began as far back as the oil crisis of the 1970s (Birur et al., 2007). Figure 3-3 
illustrates that liquid biofuel production of both bioethanol and biodiesel2, have 
increased steadily and now hold a small market share of 1% of total fuel demand for 
the road transport sector (IEA, 2006). 
 
                                                 
2
 Biofuels are liquid fuels manufactured from biomass. Bioethanol is a distilled liquid produced  by 
fermenting sugars from sugar plants and cereal crops (e.g. sugar cane, maize). Biodiesel is produced 
from organic oils from crops such as soya, oil palm or jatropha. Both bioethanol and biodiesel can be 
used in pure form in adapted vehicles or blended with gasoline for use in conventional engines (Cotula, 
et al., 2008, 8) 
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Figure 3-3: World Production of bioethanol and biodiesel 
 
 
*Figures for 2009 are a projection. 
Source: Sorda et al., 2010, 6978 
 
Government policies are the main driver behind the growth of biofuel demand (Cotula 
et al., 2008). Amongst the reasons for governments to implement pro-biofuel policies 
are energy security, rural development, climate change and export development 
(Cotula et al., 2008; FAO, 2010). Policies focus on setting legally binding targets 
either on a blending mix with traditional fossil fuel (European Union, Canada, Brazil) 
or absolute volume quantities to be sold in the market (USA) (Sorda et al., 2010). In 
order to stimulate producers to reach targets, several financial incentives have been 
put in place such as favourable tax rates and subsidies (Sorda et al., 2010). With the 
exception of Brazil, where the ethanol sector has a long and fairly successful history, 
biofuels are not competitive without financial support3 (OECD/IEA, 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, biofuels are not without negative impacts. These fuels are made from 
food crops such as maize and sugar and thus are in direct competition with food 
production. Indirectly, they compete with food supply via the use of limited land and 
water resources. Other concerns relate to the possible loss of virgin forest and land 
access for the poor, and the actual net negative greenhouse effect (Cotula et al., 2008; 
                                                 
3
 Biofuel subsidies were estimated to be US$20 billion in 2009. Subsidies for all fossil fuels combined 
in 2009 were more than 15 times as much at US$312 billion, nearly half of which went to oil 
(OECD/IEA, 2010) 
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Brown, 2009; Sorda et al., 2010). Several governments have implemented policies to 
limit these negative consequences. The European Union has issued criteria that “no 
bio-feedstock shall originate from primary forests, highly bio-diverse grassland, 
protected territories and carbon-rich areas” (Sorda et al., 2010, 6982). In addition, it 
has set so-called Green House Gas emissions reduction targets to ensure the 
production of liquid biofuels will have less impact on the climate (Sorda et al., 2010). 
The USA has chosen to increase efforts to develop second generation technologies, 
producing biofuel from waste products rather than food crops (Sorda et al., 2010). 
 
Overall, the oil crisis of 2008 demonstrates the direct impact a high petroleum price 
has on food prices, a trend repeated in 2011. The expansion of the biofuel sector is 
one of the major reasons behind the recent surge in large-scale overseas land 
investment and is likely to remain so in the future. 
3.2.3 The Financial Crisis 
Since the early 2000s, an influx has occurred of private investment into the 
agricultural sector in general and in developing countries in particular (Blumenthal, 
2009; McNellis, 2009). The range of investors is diverse: governments, sovereign 
wealth funds, investment funds (such as hedge funds and pension funds), large private 
investors and agribusiness (McNellis, 2009). Investors anticipate a continuous 
increase in food and land prices and growth of the biofuel sector. This should lead to 
an increase in the value of their shares, and make their funds more attractive to new 
investors (Görgen, 2009, 15). Investment in farm land historically has proven to 
generate a higher return than the inflation rate, therefore being an effective tool for 
inflation hedging (HighQuest Partners, 2010, 17). 
 
Although the financial crisis greatly reduced available funds (UNCTAD, 2009), 
investors realised that performance of “hard assets” such as farmland are largely 
independent from general market developments (HighQuest Partners, 2010, 18). With 
the collapse of the derivatives market, portfolio diversification has been a major 
driver in attracting more funds into agriculture in developing countries where land is 
still cheap (Blumenthal, 2009; McNellis, 2009). The performance of the agricultural 
sector is expected to be strong in the near future and therefore likely to be of 
continued interest to investors (UNCTAD, 2009). 
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3.2.4 Climate Change Considerations 
Of longer-term impact on the world agricultural sector are considerations of climate 
change and the impact this will have on food supplies. As the IPCC study (2007) 
points out, temperatures around the world have risen slightly already and will 
continue to increase; weather events are expected to become more severe with more 
intense droughts, storms and rainfall; sea levels are anticipated to rise, threatening a 
large part of the population currently living in low-lying areas such as Bangladesh, the 
Mekong delta of Vietnam, and the coastal regions of China. Such changes will have a 
substantial impact on ecosystems, water resources and consequently, on food supply.  
 
Rising temperatures result in heat waves and prolonged periods of drought, wildfires 
and more intense storms that cause lower harvests (Brown, 2009, 59-60). A major 
impact is said to come from melting glaciers. Currently, glacier melt feeds major 
rivers across the world. It is this melting water that sustains agriculture through the 
dry season. Since the late 1980s glaciers around the globe have retreated consistently, 
threatening the long-term supply of water to irrigate fields downstream (Brown, 2009, 
66-67). In general, even a slight increase in temperatures will decrease the yield of 
crops (Brown, 2009, 69-70). The IPCC (2007, 48) anticipates a slightly higher yield 
in those countries situated in mid- and high latitude, but only if temperatures do not 
rise more than 1-3°C. In lower latitudes, crop yields will decrease even with a slight 
increase in temperature. 
 
Fischer (2009) analyses the effects climate change can have on food production and 
agriculture in terms of different regions and different crops. The overall conclusion is 
that maize production might benefit from climate change, whereas wheat productivity 
will decrease. The Russian Federation and Central Asia can expect higher 
productivity whereas southern Africa will be the main loser. Several other scenarios 
have been published to determine future production of the agricultural sector (e.g. 
Bruinsma, 2009; Msangi and Rosegrant, 2009). These studies do not take into account 
the effects of climate change and therefore paint a more positive picture. What future 
food production will be like is unknown, but all the studies illustrate that many 
criteria, most importantly increased production per hectare, need to be fulfilled in 
order to keep feeding the increasing global population. 
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3.2.5 Interconnectivity 
As this section has shown, there are many developments that are driving changes in 
the global agricultural sector. A renewed interest from investors in this sector, 
including in the developing world, is one of the outcomes, with large-scale foreign 
land deals a particular effect. Some drivers are short-term, others are more structural, 
but all are interrelated. High food prices are expected to remain due to an increase in 
population with the financial means to consume more protein-rich food. High oil 
prices will continue to keep food prices high, unless alternative competitive fuels are 
found. This situation, in turn, drives the demand for biofuel crops and with it the 
demand for land, a trend that is enforced by climate change concerns. On the supply 
side, there are fears that technological developments have been exhausted and that an 
increase in production must come from bringing more marginal land under 
cultivation. Nevertheless, both land and water are limited and climate change might 
reduce the availability of these resources even further, especially in the developing 
world and in sub-Saharan Africa in particular. In addition, these trends will be 
intensified in the short term by financial speculation and currency developments. 
Figure 3-4 summarises these various issues. 
 
Figure 3-4: The interrelationship between key drivers of change in food systems and their 
connection to large-scale foreign land investment 
 
Source: Based on Msangi and Rosegrant, 2009, 18 
 
LARGE-SCALE LAND INVESTMENTS: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW 
- 48 - 
Increased investment is required to feed and fuel an increasingly wealthy population. 
The yield gap between actual and potential productivity is the largest in the 
developing world (World Bank, 2010a). Despite the majority of the population in the 
developing countries being dependent on farming, many of these countries depend on 
food imports, and are likely to become even bigger importers in the years to come 
(World Bank, 2007). It is here that foreign direct investment can make a difference, 
although the risks to the local population are considerable. 
3.3 The extent of large-scale foreign land investment  
This section aims to analyse and profile the extent worldwide of the development of 
large-scale land investment. Before looking into detail on the scale in which large-
scale land investment is taking place, it is important to note data difficulties. These are 
applicable both to the global developments as discussed in this chapter and in the 
more detailed analysis of the situation in sub-Saharan Africa in Chapter 4. 
3.3.1 Considerations 
A large body of research has been devoted to try to establish the actual scale on which 
foreign land investment is taking place. Most research is based on media articles 
published on two blogs: the GRAIN website and the International Land Coalition 
(ILC) website4. Nevertheless, despite this effort, reliable data is still difficult to 
obtain. Friis and Reenberg (2010) attempt to quantify the scale of large-scale land 
investment in Africa based on media reports posted on the ILC forum. They argue 
that this information is highly dependent on which deals are reported by the media in 
the first place and, secondly, on the reliability of the sources the media uses. Further, 
they illustrate that articles appear in peaks. These peaks seem to be related to events 
associated to this topic, such as a major conference. It would be illogical to presume 
that actual land investments would peak at the same time. Rather, these investments 
are more likely to be spread out fairly evenly over the year.  
 
In addition, a large number of projects are not reported in the media and even fewer 
are posted on the ILC blog. For example, using the Friis and Reenberg (2010) 
                                                 
4
 See www.farmlandgrab.org and www.landcoalition.org/cpl-blog/?cat=149 respectively 
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overview, ILC reported two projects in Madagascar totalling 915,000ha5. Üllenberg 
(2009a) uncovered information on an additional 26 projects, totalling a further 
1,620,000ha, mainly based on interviews held with the Economic Development Board 
of Madagascar (EDBM). This divergence might imply that the scale on which large 
land investment is taking place is larger than that reported in the media. By contrast, 
Cotula (2011, 12) claims that figures reported in the media are considerably higher 
than those based on research. For example, it is argued that whereas the media reports 
deals for a total of 2.4 million hectares in Mali, only about 650,000 hectares of land 
actually have been acquired. These divergences suggest that another factor needs to 
be taken into account when assessing figures on large-scale land investments, namely 
that many media articles discuss plans or intentions. Yet, many of these projects are 
never actually signed, or are implemented on a much smaller scale.  
 
Lack of reliability is quoted by many authors as one of the main obstructions to 
establish a clear picture of the extent of large-scale FDI in land. In general, the 
contracts signed are mostly kept confidential. Both investor and host country are 
reluctant to share information. In addition, host governments do not always have the 
resources or infrastructure available to fully capture all land investments, adding to 
the unreliability of available data (Cotula et al., 2009). Furthermore, where contracts 
are available, numerous documents do not seem adequate and lack vital data such as 
the exact location of the area concerned (Cotula, 2011). One exception is Liberia 
where many “contracts have been ratified by parliament and are available on-line” 
(Cotula, 2011, 2). Likewise, in 2011 the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development released a number of contracts onto their website. 
 
This study has reduced the unreliability of data by triangulating information where 
possible, particularly with information on investors’ websites. Numerous detailed 
studies, such as those by Üllenberg on Madagascar and Cambodia, have been 
included to create a more comprehensive picture. In addition, the status of projects is 
updated where new information is available. The result is a definitive database until 
mid-2011. This is particularly the case for the African situation which is discussed in 
full detail in Chapter 4. Notwithstanding the shortcomings and possible pitfalls of the 
                                                 
5
 This excludes the 1.3million ha investment by Daewoo Logistics which has been cancelled. Chapter 4 
looks further into this deal. 
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data available still exist, an analysis of the figures published will now be made to 
establish the trends in large-scale agricultural land investments by foreign investors. 
3.3.2 The Reported Scale 
Due to the above-mentioned problems of data reliability, different reports reveal 
different numbers. One attempt to illustrate the trends in global large-scale land 
investment in recent years has been made by the World Bank (2010a). Based on 
media articles published on the GRAIN blog in the period between 1 October 2008 
and 31 August 2009, combined with further field study, this organisation has come to 
the conclusion that most of the activity takes place in Africa with Latin America and 
East and South Asia also playing a significant role. Most projects focus on food 
production (37%), followed by an equal share of 21% for both industrial/cash crops 
and biofuel crops. Game reserves, livestock and forestry make up the remainder of the 
projects. Figures 3-5 and 3-6 illustrate these trends. Analysis of a large number of 
sources until mid-2011 shows foreign investors have shown interest in a total area of 
over 53 million hectare worldwide (see Appendix). 
 
Figure 3-5: Frequency distribution of projects and total land area by destination region  
 
Source: Based on World Bank, 2010a 
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Figure 3-6: Frequency distribution of projects and total land area by crop 
 
Source: Based on World Bank, 2010a 
 
This section will analyse developments in South America, the former Soviet Union 
and South-East Asia in further detail. Table 3-1 gives a short overview of the reported 
large-scale foreign land investments in the main target countries in these regions. As 
Table 3-1 illustrates, African countries are amongst the most targeted by foreign 
investors, both in terms of number of deals, area covered and the percentage of 
agricultural land available in the country. Due to the large scale and the high diversity 
of projects across the African continent, this region will not be discussed here. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to an in-depth analysis of the situation in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
One note on the information in Table 3-1 is that due to in-depth field studies such as 
those by Üllenberg on Cambodia (2009b) and Madagascar (2009a) and several studies 
on Mozambique (e.g. Albino, 2010), more information is available for these countries, 
which is likely to have a distorting effect on the overall picture. A detailed list of 
investment projectes is included in Appendix A. 
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Table 3-1: Main host countries of large-scale foreign land investment 
Recipient Country # deals Area (1,000ha) % Land 
Agriculturea 
Ethiopia 28 1,456 4.2 
Madagascar 27 3,720 9.1 
Mozambique 22 11,066b 22.7 
Sudan 12 2,151 1.6 
Brazil 20 1,908 0.7 
Argentina 9 510 0.4 
Russia 18 3,780 1.8 
Ukraine 8 922 2.2 
Cambodia 12 906 16.3 
a
 The FAO defines Agricultural land as the sum of arable land, permanent crop land and permanent 
meadows and pastures. It excludes forest, fallow and other land. 
b
 This includes 10 million ha offered to farmers belonging to Agri SA, a commercial farming 
cooperation from South Africa, which could not be verified. 
Source: Own compilation, FAOSTAT 2011b 
 
Large-scale agriculture in South America developed at the time of SAPs in the 1980s 
(World Bank, 2010a). Enormous areas of land have been brought under cultivation, 
mainly in the cerrado6 area to grow soya beans, and in the Amazon area where 
between 2001 and 2004 2.3 million ha of forest was cleared for pasture land (Morton 
et al., 2006). Amongst the biggest landowners in Brazil and Argentina are domestic 
entrepreneurs. The André Maggi Group owns over 245,000ha in the Brazilian state of 
Mato Grosso (Grupo Maggi, 2007) and El Tejar, which controls vast areas in its 
homeland Argentina, recently expanded into Brazil, where it plans to manage a total 
of 405,000ha for soya bean production ((El Tejar; 2011Gartlan, 2010).  
 
Businesses from North America, Europe and Asia have invested in South America. 
Soya bean, sugar cane and wood are the dominant crops.  The private sector, both 
agribusiness and investment funds, are the main investors, rather than government 
related entities. Both Brazil and Argentina have large tracts of land available. 
According to the World Bank (2007), the agricultural area available in Brazil is 
double that of Sudan, albeit due to the higher population this is less in terms of area 
per person (FAOSTAT, 2011b). Despite the large interest, plans for foreign 
investment in land are still less than 1% of the agricultural land available in both 
Argentina and Brazil. This region is interesting to investors not only due to the 
                                                 
6
 The cerrado is an area typified by savannah, shrubs and dry forests (World Bank, 2010a) 
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availability of land, but also because of the legal system open to foreign investment 
and clear regulations on environmental requirements (Highquest Partners, 2010).  
 
In addition, South America has marketed itself as the global centre for soya bean 
production and, to a lesser extent, the rearing of cattle. In global terms Brazil, 
Argentina and Paraguay are ranked respectively second, third and fourth largest 
exporters of soya beans behind the USA (FAOSTAT, 2011c). Soya beans are used as 
fodder in the meat industry. With the increased demand for meat, global demand for 
soya beans has expanded considerably (Brown, 2009). Sugar cane is another crop that 
has grown rapidly, mainly to feed the increasing demand for ethanol. As section 3.2.2 
illustrated, Brazil is the only country where sugar-based ethanol can compete with 
petroleum. The country is the world leader in sugar cane production (FAOSTAT, 
2011c). The large infrastructure already in place attracts investors to supply sugar-
based ethanol to other countries. In Argentina, investors also show interest in growing 
wheat. 
 
The fact that Brazil and Argentina have well-functioning land markets, based on 
private ownership, makes these countries highly attractive to commercial investors. 
Although land prices are higher here than in the former Soviet Union and Africa, land 
rights are much more secure. Nevertheless, to curb the strong flow of foreign capital 
buying up land, the governments of both Brazil and Argentina consider policies 
designed to limit foreign land ownership. Since 1971 Brazil has attempted to limit the 
sale of land to foreigners although unsuccessfully. The government now intends to 
close existing loopholes by restricting non-Brazilians from gaining controlling shares 
in Brazilian businesses that own large areas of land (MercoPress, 2011). In 2011 the 
Argentinean president Cristina Kircher announced similar plans to curb foreign 
landownership (Downie, 2011). 
 
Aside from commercially focused investments, one example of large-scale investment 
in South America by a foreign government is the agreement between the province of 
Río Negro in Argentina and the state-owned collective of agribusinesses Beidahuang 
from China. In this deal, Beidahuang will lease an area of up to 320,000ha for a 
period of 20 years for the production of soya beans, wheat and oilseed crops. Part of 
the agreement is that the Chinese consortium does not have to pay land fees or any 
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provincial taxes. Beidahuang has pledged an overall investment of US$1.45 billion, 
including a new port facility and irrigation system. This deal has caused concern 
amongst the local population who claim that the area cannot support water intensive, 
chemical agriculture and fear that when the land is returned to them, it will be 
degraded and unfit for further food production (GRAIN, 2011a). 
 
Another region receiving agricultural FDI is the former Soviet Union. Russia attracted 
investment interest in nearly 3.8 million ha whereas Ukraine has received (planned) 
investment for close to 1 million ha. Amongst the published projects is a request by 
the government of Israel for an area covering 1.5 million ha in Russia for food 
production and cattle grazing to boost Israeli food security (Xinhua, 2010a).  Further, 
the Libyan government has signed a deal for 100,000ha with Ukraine for similar 
purposes. Private businesses and investors are also active in the former Soviet Union. 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, an estimated 23 million ha of productive land 
was abandoned (FAO/EBRD, 2008), opening opportunities for foreign investors. 
Visser and Spoor (2011, 300) argue that this area “contains much more fertile and 
well-endowed agricultural land than the African continent”, a view confirmed by the 
FAO (Davis, 2008).  This region is also likely to be the least affected by climate 
change (Fischer, 2009).  
 
Infrastructure in the region is relatively developed, as compared to Africa, albeit many 
bottlenecks still exist in storage facilities and port capacity. Thus, investors put part of 
their money into developing this network (Black Earth Farming, 2007). Domestic 
agro-holdings were the first private entities to secure the opportunities offered, 
followed by foreign states and foreign private investors/investment funds. Investors 
from China and Korea are government-related parties interested in the geographically 
closer region of eastern Russia, whereas private investors have a European base and 
mainly are active in the south-west of the country (Visser and Spoor, 2011). 
 
A land market has been set up in Russia that allows ownership, transfer and sale of 
farmland. Foreigners are excluded from these rights and can only obtain ownership of 
farm enterprises, not the actual land. In contrast, the Ukraine has issued a moratorium 
on land sales, leaving land lease as the only (legal) option to obtain rights to land. 
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Both due to these limitations and the cumbersome process of acquiring land shares 
from numerous small individual holders, foreign investors choose to gain a share in 
large domestic landholdings, previously owned by the state (Visser and Spoor, 2011). 
 
One often mentioned example of FDI in this region is the Swedish firm Black Earth 
Farming (BEF), established in 2005 and named after the Black Earth Region in south-
west Russia, where it has acquired 328,000ha, mostly under direct ownership. In 
addition, BEF has invested in storage facilities and industrial processing capacity 
(Black Earth Farming, 2007). The company prefers to obtain land from individuals, 
rather than state owned farms because “acquisition of agricultural land owned by state 
bodies, local authorities or legal entities requires substantial financial expenditures” 
according to the company’s website. This indicates either that obtaining land from 
state bodies is a highly bureaucratic process or that local landowners are not aware of 
the actual value of their land. The challenges of establishing a profitable operation are 
considerable as the Chief Executive of BEF acknowledges. Land needs to be restored 
before it can be brought under production (in 2010 just over half the land managed 
was under production) and yields are lower than expected (Dermy, 2009).  
 
South-East Asia experiences mainly a growth in intra-regional investment that is 
oriented towards traditional cash crops such as palm oil and rubber. China has 
investment projects in Cambodia and Laos mainly for the growth of food and for 
industrial crops. Vietnam is a major investor in rubber plantations in neighbouring 
Cambodia (Üllenberg, 2009b). The largest investors are palm oil producers from 
Malaysia and Singapore which have moved into Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. 
For example, Golden Agri Resources controls land totalling over 442,000ha for palm 
oil production in Indonesia (Golden Agri Resources, 2011) and Wilmar is reported to 
have obtained rights of over 200,000ha for the growth of sugar cane in Papua New 
Guinea (Indonesia Today, 2010). Despite these large-scale investments, small-scale 
producers still play an important role in the palm oil sector. Due to the high income, 
palm oil is a lucrative crop for smallholders. Large investors depend on these small-
scale farmers for part of their supply which is ensured through various contract 
arrangements (Rist et al., 2010). Despite the economic opportunities, large-scale 
plantation development has weakened the position of customary landholders and 
resulted in several conflicts over land rights (McCarthy and Cramb, 2009). 
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Malaysian business Sime Darby Berhad, one of the largest plantation companies in 
the world, shows the expansion drive coming from Asia (UNCTAD, 2009). Apart 
from the main palm oil operations in Malaysia and Indonesia, the company is 
involved in 20 countries across the world, managing not only the production of oils 
and rubber, but also downstream activities. In its bid for further growth, it has signed 
a contract for a 220,000ha rubber plantation in Liberia and is investigating options to 
acquire 300,000ha in Cameroon (Sime Darby, 2011). 
 
Population density is much higher in South East Asia than in the other regions where 
large-scale FDI takes place. This limits the land available for large-scale foreign 
investors. As Table 3-2 illustrates, the investment plans for Cambodia are less than 
one million ha, smaller than in most other countries, but representing a total of 16.3% 
of agricultural land. Conflicts over land use are thus more likely to erupt. Indeed, 800 
locals in Cambodia protested against a Korean rubber producer who was accused of 
clearing their cashew trees without compensation (Titthara, 2011). 
 
The case of the Philippines illustrates the sensitive nature of large-scale investment by 
foreigners, especially in a densely populated country that is dependent on food 
imports. The Department of Agriculture signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with two Chinese investors for one million and 400,000ha respectively, a 
combined area equivalent to 10% of all agricultural land. Several organisations 
challenged the legality of these MoUs, calling them “confusing” and “ambiguous”. 
The MoUs do not specify what the implication is for local farmers. In addition, there 
is no clause that prevents the investors from exporting the entire production 
(Bagayaua, 2007). The Philippines is a country that despite high efficiency and rapid 
productivity gains during the Green Revolution and continued government support, 
has been an importer of its staple food, rice, for most of the 20th century (Dawe, 
2006). Following these challenges, the Department of Agriculture has halted the 
further implementation of these contracts as explained by the department’s secretary 
“for deeper consultation with all possible stakeholders to come up with an acceptable 
mechanism” (Bagayaua, 2007). 
 
To summarise, Figures 3-7 and 3-8 give a geographical overview of both the target 
and investor countries and the scale of the land and number of projects involved.  
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Figure 3-7: A geographical overview of investor and target countries: land area covered (ha) 
 
Source: own compilation 
 
Figure 3-8: A geographical overview of investor and target countries: number of projects 
 
Source: own compilation 
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3.3.3 What happens on the ground? 
Developments published in the media do not necessarily have an equally large impact 
on the ground. The previous section mentioned issues of gathering reliable data on the 
size of large-scale investment deals such as reliability of sources, discrepancies 
between media and government information and incomplete data capturing by the 
host government, hampering efforts to get a clear picture of the extent of these 
projects. To determine the impact of large-scale foreign land investment, it is not only 
important to establish the size of the deals signed, but also to ascertain what happens 
on the ground after the signing of land deals.  
 
First, there appears to be a large divide between intention and the actual signing of a 
land deal. Many intentions reported on in the media are never heard of again. One of 
the reasons why intentions do not translate into actual deals is that the investor 
changes plans due to perceived political risk (Cotula et al., 2009). This scenario can 
especially be the case in politically unstable countries, many of which are situated in 
Africa. Other potential reasons can be problems with financing the deal or a change in 
company/government strategies. For example, two very large projects which have 
been reported on, but could not be verified, are by Chinese based telecommunications 
company ZTE International. According to media reports this company showed 
interest in securing two million ha in Zambia and has signed a deal for 2.8 million ha 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DPA, 2009; Brautigam; 2010). The Zambian 
project has never been signed and no further information could be found on the deal 
in the DRC.  
 
Second, those plans that are signed and reach the implementation stage in general do 
not cover the full amount of land acquired. In its overview on activities by corporate 
investors, GRAIN (2009) mentions several examples of projects that are only partly 
productive. For example, Agrifirma, a UK based investment firm backed by the 
Rothschilds, acquired 42,000ha of land in Brazil, but only 5,200ha has been brought 
under production. Another case is Black Earth Farming which in 2008 harvested only 
141,900ha out of the 323,000ha they own in Russia.  
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The World Bank (2010a) reports that lack of consistent procedures and institutional 
capacity in the granting of land leads to insufficient screening of investment plans and 
limits the protection of local land rights. As a consequence, approved plans are not 
viable which leads to neglect of investment promises and land. In these cases, the 
government does not have the means to monitor investor activities and to enforce 
contractual agreements. 
 
Many examples of unrealistic investment plans can be seen in the biofuel sector, 
mainly occurring in Africa. In 2005/06, GEM Biofuels, based in the United Kingdom, 
started growing jatropha in Madagascar. Its initial trials with growing this crop failed, 
forcing it to move to a different area in the country (Üllenberg, 2009a). The enterprise 
only managed to generate its first revenue from crude jatropha oil sales in 2010 and 
after four years is still running at a major loss (GEM Biofuels, 2010). Other 
companies, including Black Earth Farming, have blamed technical issues as the 
reason why they are not able to bring land under development as rapidly as hoped for. 
 
Economic factors can also limit the extent to which a project is implemented. This has 
particularly been the case in the biofuel industry. In addition to the general drying up 
of investment money during the financial crisis, the drop in world oil prices in 2009 
made biofuels uncompetitive, which aggravated the financial problems for biofuel 
producers (World Bank, 2010a). With technical difficulties being faced by many 
producers, returns on investment periods would be longer than initially anticipated. 
This led to a number of investors withdrawing their support and saw a number of 
biofuel companies become insolvent or largely reduced in size. For example, 
BioShape, which had obtained a 50 year lease for 81,000ha in Tanzania on which land 
clearing had already started went bankrupt in 2010 after a major investor pulled out 
due to doubts on the economic feasibility of the project. The share price of the 
German company Flora EcoPower, holder of a lease over 56,000ha in Ethiopia, fell 
from €18.40 in January 2009 to €1 at the end of that year. In addition to these 
financial problems, harvests by this company were nearly zero (Pohl, 2010). 
 
Another reason why projects have been slow to develop is local protests. The 
cancellation of the 1.3million ha deal by South Korean based Daewoo Logistics in 
Madagascar is one of the most widely reported cases. When details of this investment 
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were published, affecting one-third of the country’s arable land apparently at no land 
rental cost, the Malagasy population protested. It is believed these protests were part 
of a wider revolt against then president Ravalomanana, who was ousted shortly after 
the Daewoo news broke. Since then, the project has been suspended (Üllenberg, 
2009a). The Daewoo Logistics investment is not the only project that has had to 
adjust due to pressure from local civil society. Conflicts have also been reported to 
obstruct projects in Liberia, Ukraine and Mozambique (World Bank, 2010a). This 
illustrates the importance to the investor of prior consultation with and agreement 
from the local community before signing deals with (national) governments. 
 
Even without encountering any technical, economical or social issues, bringing large 
areas of previously uncultivated land under production takes a long time. In addition, 
depending on the level of mechanisation, a large number of labourers is required to 
maintain the land and the crops. Most projects start off with small plots and over a 
number of years increase the land being harvested. Only in the case of the take-over 
of already operating farms or with the extensive use of out-grower schemes can a 
large area be harvested in a fairly short time (World Bank, 2010a). 
 
A final reason for limited action on the ground is the fact that several investors 
acquire land rights for speculative objectives. The World Bank (2010a) found that 
motivations why investors acquire much more land than they can (initially) use is to 
get a favourable deal or ward off potential competition. In addition, the value of land 
has increased rapidly in the last years and this trend is expected to continue. In the 
soya bean growing area of Mato Grosso, Brazil, land prices have increased roughly 
700% between 2000 and 2010 (Sauer and Leite, 2011). GAIA Capital Advisors 
observed a doubling of land prices between 2006 and 2008 in the Black Earth region 
in Russia (Visser and Spoor, 2011). Speculative behaviour will be prevalent 
especially in countries with a developed land market or where a (long-term) lease can 
be transferred. 
3.4 The stakeholders 
The previous section looked into the scale of the foreign land investments that has 
taken place from around 2004 until mid-2011. It touched briefly on a number of target 
countries, situated mainly in Africa, South America, the former Soviet Union and 
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Asia, and gave examples of a number of investors involved in the deals. This next 
section will look in greater detail into the stakeholders that have an interest in these 
projects and the reasons why they are engaged in them.  
3.4.1 The investors 
As is clear from section 3.3, a wide range of different investors is looking to secure 
land management in other countries than where they are based. The main investors are 
governments, private investors and investment funds and agribusiness. Often, there 
are complicated relationships between these parties which can all have an interest in 
the same investment project. In his analysis of a number of contracts pertaining to 
large-scale land transfer, Cotula (2011) finds examples of a government signing for 
the land ownership but leaving the operational management to a private operator, land 
rights effectively transferred to a third party controlled by a signatory to the contract 
but not signing itself, and an investor who gained control over a domestic party to 
execute the project. Figure 3-9 gives a schematic overview of (some of) the parties 
that can be involved in the deals. 
 
Figure 3-9: Relationships between parties involved in land deals 
 
Source: Cotula, 2011, 19 
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Section 3.2 illustrated that the increase in land FDI appears to be driven by food 
security issues and biofuel policies (e.g. World Bank, 2010a). Governments are 
concerned about their dependence on what is perceived to be an unreliable world food 
market or increasing oil prices. Among the largest investing governments are Saudi-
Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea and China. These investments 
are supported by ample financial means from oil income or trade balance surpluses 
(Görgen et al., 2009). 
 
There are several ways in which governments can engage in land deals. In some 
cases, the government signs an agreement with the host government directly. For 
example, the Libyan government signed a lease of 100,000ha in Mali, although the 
land in effect is managed by a private enterprise, controlled by the Libyan government 
(Cotula, 2011). Another example is the north Chinese province of Heilongjiang which 
has obtained a lease of over 420,000ha across the border in Russia to grow 
agricultural crops (Xinhua, 2010b), indicating that it is not just national governments 
which are looking for food security overseas. 
 
A Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) is an investment fund owned by the state which 
manages government money but in a market oriented manner (Cotula et al., 2009). 
SWFs are not commonly involved in land deals directly, but usually put their money 
towards private investment funds, either domestic or international. It is these private 
businesses that are more directly involved in the land deals, making it difficult to trace 
the actual involvement of SWFs (McNellis, 2009). The Kuwait Investment Authority 
is said to own a share in the Kuwait China Investment Co, an investment firm which 
supposedly is looking at obtaining land in South East Asia for food production 
(GRAIN, 2009). 
 
Aside from direct involvement and through SWFs, governments also can be involved 
in overseas land deals through State Owned Enterprises, trade agreements and other 
ways of indirectly supporting private investors (Cotula et al., 2009). The case of 
Beidahuang in Argentina described in section 3.3.2 is one example. No matter which 
way governments invest in foreign land, the majority of the deals are implemented to 
ensure domestic food security. 
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Rising food prices, a continuous increase in population simultaneously moving up the 
food chain and a limited supply of arable land and water all contribute to make 
investment in agricultural land an attractive option for private investors. In addition, 
the market for biofuels is likely to grow, driven by government policies. As described 
earlier, many private investors have shown renewed interest in land investment as a 
way to diversify their portfolio, investing in hard assets. Blumenthal (2009, 58) 
argues: “land is limited and available prime production land is technically becoming 
scarcer. Capital flows to where it is rewarded the most, and nothing attracts 
investment better than a perceived market shortage”.  
 
Land prices in most of the target countries are much lower than in the developed 
world. Prices in Brazil are estimated to be between US$1,500 to 3,000 per ha and as 
low as US$300-500 per ha in Africa (HighQuest Partners, 2010).  GAIA Capital 
advisors value land in Russia at less than US$800/ha (Watson, 2010). This compares 
to over US$9,000/ha in the USA (Institutional Investor, 2010). Many African 
governments even give away the land for free, in exchange for promises by the 
investor to build infrastructure or provide social services. For example, the cancelled 
deal by Daewoo in Madagascar mentioned in section 3.3.3 did not involve any land 
charges. Instead, the company pledged to invest US$ 6billion over a 25 year period in 
developing a range of infrastructure and social services such as schools, hospitals and 
power stations (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al., 2011). 
 
It is for these reasons that a large range of private investors have initiated agricultural 
projects in developing countries, usually through the establishment of specific 
agriculture focussed funds. Amongst these investors are pension funds, hedge funds, 
private equity and banking institutions (McNellis, 2009). These enterprises are not 
traditionally involved with agriculture or land ventures. For the management of the 
actual operations, often professional farmers are hired for their farming expertise 
(HighQuest Partners, 2010). Aside from direct deals, these investors also support 
governments, agribusinesses or other private investors in their ventures. For example 
it was reported that an unnamed American pension fund had put a large amount of 
money towards the private equity African AgriLand Fund which was established by 
hedge fund manager Emergent Asset Management (Walsh, 2008).  
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The third type of investor is the agribusiness sector. This sector consists of companies 
in the agriculture business and involved with the production, processing and/or 
trading of food and non-food products on a commercial basis. Included in this 
industry are suppliers to the agricultural sector of inputs such as seeds, fertiliser and 
farming equipment (UNCTAD, 2009). Companies involved in the growth and 
production of biofuels also form part of the agribusiness sector. 
 
Traditionally, the large players in the agribusiness sector originated from the 
developed world with large trading houses such as Archers-Daniel-Midland (ADM), 
Bunge, Cargill and Louis Dreyfus (together called the ABCD group), processors like 
Nestlé and Unilever, and suppliers such as Monsanto (seeds), Potash (fertiliser) and 
Du Pont (agro-chemicals). These companies have achieved a high level of dominance 
in the supply chain of certain crops which is illustrated by the soya bean sector. The 
ABCD group controls 43% of the crushing capacity for soya beans in Brazil and 80% 
of that in the EU (Dros, 2004). Not only are these companies involved in processing 
and trading, but they also provide support to small-scale farmers in the form of farm 
inputs and credit. For example, Nestlé sourced crops from over 600,000 farms in more 
than 80 developing countries (UNCTAD, 2009). 
 
Although these companies traditionally were not engaged in actual crop production 
activities, since the early 2000s they have become involved in land management 
deals. ADM and Bunge both have shown interest in acquiring large areas of land in 
Brazil to grow palm oil and sugar respectively. Louis Dreyfus is already active in 
Brazil, growing citrus on an area of 30,000ha it has under its own management, whilst 
it also grows soya beans, cotton and sugar through its subsidiary CalyxAgro (GRAIN, 
2009b). Cargill has set up its own hedge fund Black River Management through 
which it invests in the agricultural sector. According to Selby (2009) the current 
agricultural supply chain has increased returns combined with reduced risks in the 
production stage whereas in the historical supply chain this used to be the link with 
low returns and high risks. This change in risk/return pattern is a major driving force 
behind the vertical integration which was exhibited by these large trading companies. 
 
Large agribusinesses from South East Asia also have become involved in global 
agriculture activities: Sime Darby (Malaysia), Wilmar (Singapore) and Karuturi 
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(India) are several examples of companies based in developing countries and now 
ranked in the top 25 of TNCs in the agribusiness sector, based on foreign assets 
(UNCTAD, 2009, 124). These companies either started out as businesses involved in 
the growth of agricultural products (Sime Darby and Karuturi) or as trading 
companies (Wilmar and Olam), but have sought to incorporate upstream activities 
into their business by operating their own plantations (UNCTAD, 2009). These 
companies are involved in large-scale land projects, initially in their own region, but 
recently all have ventured into Africa. Sime Darby operates a rubber plantation on 
220,000ha in Liberia and has plans to develop land in Cameroon and Madagascar; 
Olam is active in Gabon and, through a joint venture with Wilmar, in Ivory Coast; 
Karuturi grows roses and food crops on its approximately 300,000 ha in Ethiopia 
(GRAIN, 2009a). 
 
The production of biofuels is a new niche in the agribusiness industry. The list of 
large-scale foreign land deals given in Appendix A, shows that most biofuel 
companies are located in the developed countries, with China also playing an 
important role. Most biofuel enterprises have considerable land interests, 
predominantly in Africa. Europe is a leader in this sector in terms of overseas land 
acquisitions with companies such as Sun Biofuels (UK), Skebab (Sweden) and Flora 
EcoPower (Germany). The financial crisis and falling oil prices have placed these 
companies under severe strain. In addition, for new crops such as jatropha, it has 
proven more difficult than originally envisaged to bring these lands into production on 
a large-scale. It is especially in the biofuel sector that planned operations have not 
been implemented. 
 
More success for biofuel companies is evident in “traditional” food crops that are 
turned into fuel. For example, Latin American sugar production is growing fast, partly 
driven by the demand for ethanol. Palm oil, soya and maize are other crops that are 
used as feedstock for biofuel production. Agribusiness companies such as South 
African based Illovo Sugar are involved with growing these crops and now use part of 
their harvest for biofuel production rather than for the food industry (Illovo Sugar, 
2010).  
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As this section has illustrated, a wide range of actors is involved in large-scale land 
deals, each with their own objectives, which will impact on the host country. 
Governments concerned with their own food security generally invest for the longer 
term whereas hedge funds driven by profit objectives are more ‘footloose’. In 
addition, food projects growing crops already proven to thrive in the target area are 
less risky than ventures with new crops. The host country must be aware of these risks 
linked to the proposed land deals. 
3.4.2 The hosts 
As illustrated in section 3.3, a large number of countries across the world host large-
scale land investors, although with a major focus on developing countries. The host 
countries have a range of motives to try to attract foreign investors. 
 
In many African countries, the number of people employed in agriculture is extremely 
high (World Bank, 2007). Nevertheless, they are still dependent on food imports to 
feed their population and expect to import even bigger quantities in the future 
(Rosegrant et al., 2006). In order to change this situation, many governments are 
seeking to focus on enhancing their food self-sufficiency by expanding their 
agricultural sector. Both during the ISI policy and the SAPs, money flows into the 
sector have been limited, both from domestic governments and through ODA (Alpert 
et al., 2009). Thus, large external investments are now required to increase 
agricultural production. Host governments expect private investors, and specifically 
FDI, to bring new technology, infrastructure, jobs and an increased supply of food to 
the local market (Cotula et al., 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). In 
addition, FDI is expected to give developing countries access to export markets and in 
this way an inflow of much needed foreign currency (World Bank, 2010a). Lastly, a 
country can be motivated to develop its agricultural sector to diversify its economy as 
is the case in both Angola and Zambia (Cotula et al., 2009). 
 
Cotula et al. (2009) point out that a host country’s benefits mainly are in the form of 
investor commitments on investment levels, employment creation and infrastructure 
development. Land fees and monetary transfers do not seem to be the main benefit. 
Land fees are usually less than US$10/ha/year and many foreign investors have 
negotiated tax incentives. On the other hand, most deals involve promises by the 
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foreign party to invest in irrigation infrastructure, roads and/or social services such as 
schools and hospitals (Cotula et al., 2009). 
 
Foreign ownership of land, either through direct purchase or long-term lease 
contracts, is a sensitive issue. Therefore, governments in Brazil, Argentina, Australia 
and New Zealand are reviewing laws to limit access to land by foreign parties 
(GRAIN, 2009a). In Africa, where large areas of land are held under communal 
ownership, land allocation can become highly controversial. Host countries have been 
criticised for their neglect of the requirements of the local (rural) population. Land is 
allocated to investors under the assumption that the respective area is under-utilised or 
not utilised at all. Often, these land uses and claims can go unrecognised because land 
users are marginalised from formal land rights and access to the law and institutions 
(Cotula et. al., 2009). Such land might be used for animal grazing, fire wood or as the 
source of medicinal plants. Also, the land might be lying fallow in order to restore the 
nutrients in the soil. The government might not perceive this as being productive, 
although it plays an essential role to the livelihood of the local population (Spieldoch 
and Murphy, 2009).  
 
Even if in most cases it is the host country government (in the case of large-scale land 
deals, the national government) that allocates the land to the investor, private 
landholders are also involved in these ventures. Where the state is the landowner and 
users do not have protected land rights, these landholders only have a marginal say in 
the contract proceedings (Cotula, 2011). In the case of private sales, it is up to the 
landholder to directly engage in contract negotiations. In these situations, the investor 
usually pays a much higher price for the land than the nominal rental fees charged by 
the government (Cotula et al., 2009). Due to the fact that details of these private deals 
are mainly confidential, it is difficult to obtain an indication of land prices.  
 
Even though countries might have several reasons for attracting FDI into their 
agricultural sector and put policies in place to make it easier for investors to enter, this 
does not guarantee that the private sector will be persuaded to start operations. The 
World Bank analysed four different factors to determine the likelihood of countries 
being able to attract investors. It finds that: 
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• “investors are more likely to target countries with abundant non-forested but 
not forested land”;  
• “rule of law and a favourable investment climate […] has only a weak effect 
on planned and none on implemented investment”;  
• “the impact of rural land tenure recognition is negative, strongly significant for 
intended investment and still significant for implemented projects”; and, 
• “the yield gap is not relevant to explain interest in large-scale land acquisition, 
but is negatively associated with implemented investments” (World Bank, 
2010a, 37). 
 
This indicates that the World Bank’s own policies of enabling private parties to do 
business has little effect on actually attracting investors and that weak land policies 
seem to increase the attractiveness of a country, contrary to what the World Bank is 
aiming for with its advice to support more secure land rights for foreigners. 
Nevertheless, the finding that this negative correlation is stronger for planned projects 
than for actual implementations is a sign that the more serious investors do require 
security over their land.  
 
Political stability in the host country can be a major risk for private investors 
(Hardman and Co, 2010). In case a country becomes unstable, sometimes triggered by 
the land investment, the investor can lose control over its enterprise. For example, 
Daewoo had to leave Madagascar for this reason and after the 2011 turmoil in Egypt, 
the new rulers are contesting the legality of a land claim by a Saudi investor (Reuters, 
2011b). 
3.5 The impacts of large-scale foreign land investment 
This section will give an overview of outcomes of large-scale FDI in land. Due to the 
fact that many projects have not yet been realised on the large scale as envisaged, it is 
difficult to assess the full and final impacts of these deals. The section will start with a 
review of past investment experiences from which certain lessons can be learned. 
 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, large-scale foreign investment in 
agricultural land is not a new phenomenon. Even though previously investors were 
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interested in cash crops such as bananas, rubber and coffee, the intention was similar: 
to use land available in countries with the right resources to produce goods for export 
to markets in the developed world. History has shown that export orientated 
agricultural policies in underdeveloped countries make these countries extremely 
vulnerable. George (1976) and Barnet (1980) argued as much as 30 years ago why a 
high-technology, export-crop model increases rather than decreases hunger amongst 
the local population. Scarce land and water are reserved for the growth of export 
crops instead of feeding the local population. In addition, this model relies on high-
yielding seeds and fertiliser, inputs that poor local farmers cannot afford. Lastly, due 
to the high degree of mechanisation, the labour requirements are much lower than 
traditional ways of farming. The results are an increasing, landless, rural population 
and a higher degree of concentration of resources in the hands of a rich (foreign) 
minority.  
 
Because resources are used for the production of export crops, one consequence is 
that the host country can no longer grow sufficient food domestically and becomes 
dependent on the world market for the import of basic food crops. When the prices of 
the cash crops fall, when the importing countries decide to source their produce from 
somewhere else, or when the price of food staples increases, the picture indeed 
becomes very bleak. This is line with the arguments put forward in Chapter 2 to put 
domestic food production before export crops. The same scenario can emerge for host 
governments opening up to foreign agricultural investment as seen recently. It seems 
essential that scarce resources must be shared equally, labour opportunities for the 
rural population must remain and the yields should initially be used for domestic food 
supply in order not to become dependent on an uncontrollable world market. 
 
Daniel and Mittal (2009) illustrate how large fruit companies have benefited from 
unequal power relationships in Honduras during the early 1900s and in the Philippines 
throughout most of the last century. These companies have been able to manipulate 
local land rights, marginalising the local population. In their analysis on oil palm 
plantations in Malaysia and Indonesia McCarthy and Cramb (2009) point out the 
negative impact these operations have had on the local population: expropriation of 
land without sufficient compensation and unclear contracts which resulted in limited 
benefits for the smallholder farmers who handed over part of their land to the 
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plantations. This resulted in conflicts between the plantation operators and the local 
population. On the other hand, palm oil is a crop that can be economically profitable 
for small-scale farmers, and hence many farmers are willing to get involved in this 
crop (Rist et al., 2010). 
 
As the experience with oil palm in South-East Asia illustrates, the outcome of large-
scale agriculture on the local population can be manifold. In literature published since 
the ‘hype on land grabbing’ surfaced, much discussion has taken place on the possible 
impact of FDI. Potential benefits of large-scale private investment mentioned are: 
 
• Increased investment in rural areas in countries with small government funds; 
• Job creation both on and off the farm; 
• Development of rural infrastructure like irrigation and roads;  
• Investment in poverty reduction infrastructure such as schools and health 
clinics; 
• Improved technology based on local agricultural environment through R&D 
done by the investor in order to increase outputs; and, 
• Increased food supply to the local/domestic market (World Bank, 2010a; von 
Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). 
 
It is important to note that these are potential benefits and thus will not necessarily be 
realised. Many organisations are much more critical of large-scale land deals. They 
point out that host governments often do not have the legal or labour capacity to 
protect local rights and enforce contract agreements (Cotula et al., 2009). Negotiations 
either take place on unequal terms with the local population or they are left out of the 
consultation process altogether. As a result, organisations such as IFPRI and the 
Oakland Institute, point out a range of probable negative results of large-scale 
investments, amongst which are: 
 
• Displacement, especially in case of communal land ownership, often without 
compensation;  
• Farmers lease their land to the investor against unfavourable terms; 
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• Loss of access to communal resources such as water and grazing land, which 
serve as a safety net to the poor; 
• Promised investments/jobs do not occur; 
• Ecological disruption such as deforestation; 
• Land reform, aimed at increasing land security for small-scale farmers, is 
taken off the agenda; 
• Increased gender inequities; and, 
• Reduced food supply to local market if crops are grown for export or food 
crops are replaced by fuel/feed/industrial crops (Daniel and Mittel, 2009; von 
Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). 
 
The issue of displacement is extremely sensitive. Investors and governments perceive 
land as un- or under-productive and therefore are of the opinion that commercial 
agriculture will increase output (Cotula et al., 2009). As stated by the World Bank 
(2010a, 27) “If rights are well defined, if land markets function competitively, and if 
information is accessible to all, land prices should ensure that a mutually satisfying 
outcome is achieved”. Nevertheless, the weakness of local land rights, the absence of 
a land market and a complete lack of information make this a hypothetical situation. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will look in more detail into examples of large-scale land investment 
in Africa and Zambia in particular and the impact these have had. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Large-scale foreign land investment has increased considerably in recent years and in 
some target countries involves substantial areas of their arable land. Although in itself 
this is not a new phenomenon, the players, the dimensions and the driving forces 
behind the current ventures are different. Historically, private agro-companies gained 
control over land in foreign countries to take advantage of suitable growing conditions 
for cash crops. Although these plantations still exist, new players with different 
objectives have emerged. 
 
Governments concerned about their food security through rising food prices and new 
unpredictability of the world food market have adopted policies to obtain land in ‘land 
abundant’ countries to grow basic food crops for export back to their own market. 
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This is done either through direct investment or via SWFs, state owned enterprises or 
other institutions. The main players are the Gulf States (such as Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar), South Korea and China. 
 
Private investment funds, banks and other financial organisations are attracted by the 
portfolio diversification that land investments offer and the anti-cyclical behaviour of 
agricultural products. Many funds have been established, and new ones are regularly 
advertised to entice investors to put money into agriculture, specifically into land in 
developing countries. These financial businesses either obtain control over land 
directly or fund agricultural operations. 
 
Finally, agribusinesses traditionally involved with downstream activities such as 
trading and processing, are increasingly moving their business upstream and acquire 
management of the land on which their crops are grown. The perceived risk-return 
ratio has changed significantly to make downstream activities more attractive. In 
addition, a range of new businesses has been founded to focus on the production of 
biofuels, a rapidly growing market. These businesses are interested to obtain land to 
grow the (food) crops to be used as input for fuel production. 
 
It was shown that internationally, the main regions targeted by these investors are the 
developing countries in Africa, South-East Asia and South America and the transition 
countries of the former Soviet Union. These countries are attractive either because of 
extremely low land costs, high perceived land availability, geographic proximity or 
fairly stable land markets at competitive prices. Under pressure of institutional 
organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF, many host governments have 
opened up their land for foreign investment in agriculture. For many years, despite the 
importance of the agricultural sector, government investment in this sector has been 
lacking, resulting in low productivity and an increased dependence on food imports. 
The host governments hope that FDI will bring increased food production for the 
local market, investments in infrastructure and jobs in rural areas. A win-win scenario 
seems to be the ideal outcome. 
 
Opposition has been raised to this development through large-scale land investment. 
Accusations have been made towards both host governments and investors that 
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current land use and land rights of the local population have not been taken into 
account. In addition, promises on jobs and investments are vague and often not 
enforceable. Opponents fear for the environmental impact of large-scale land clearing 
and mono-cropping. Lastly, there are no guarantees that the (food) crops are grown 
for the domestic market. Mechanisms are hardly ever in place to prevent the export of 
(part of) the harvest and in some cases exports are even stimulated. In the case of 
biofuel crops, these are in direct competition for resources with food crops. Instead of 
increasing the food security of the host country, this might be adversely affected. 
 
To mitigate the risks of powerful investors taking advantage of weak government 
structures and to protect local land rights, a guideline has been recommended by many 
organisations (World Bank, 2010a). Nevertheless, such voluntary principles are hard 
to agree on and challenging to implement to full benefit. As a result, these 
investments are still highly controversial. Although countries cannot feed their own 
population, an increasing number of people live in poverty and are dependent on food 
aid, companies from developed countries are openly welcomed to use the scarce 
resources available for their own benefit. 
 
It is against the backdrop of this analysis of the global picture regarding the drivers, 
impacts and geography of large-scale land investment that attention narrows in 
chapters 4 and 5 to the African situation in detail. More specifically, the next chapters 
will illustrate what impact large-scale land investments have had so far in Africa and 
particularly in Zambia, a country with a low population density but which has been 
neglected in debates with regards to large-scale agricultural FDI. 
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Chapter 4 
 




As was illustrated in Chapter 3, Africa is the continent with the largest number of 
projects, covering the largest area when it comes to foreign large-scale land 
investment. Africa is a diverse continent, which is reflected in the large variety of 
investment projects, in size, crop and stakeholder. This chapter aims to give a detailed 
picture of the extent of large-scale foreign land investment in sub-Saharan Africa, the 
nature of these projects and the stakeholders. The base of the analysis is a wide range 
of literature studies, both in-depth case studies of a particular country and more global 
studies covering the whole continent. By collating and triangulating the information 
from these studies, a detailed database was created. Based on this data a 
comprehensive picture up to mid-2011 can be given. It must be cautioned that despite 
the triangulation, data is still unreliable in a number of cases due to the factors that 
were explained in Chapter 3. The detailed set of data is available in Appendix A.  
 
As the analysis will illustrate, the extent of large-scale land investment differs widely 
per country. Some countries, such as Ethiopia, Mozambique and Madagascar, receive 
much interest, whereas other countries, for example Namibia, have no reports of 
foreign land investment. The nature of the investments also varies greatly with some 
nations receiving more food investment, whereas other are mainly targeted for fuel 
crop production. It is also shown that the investors come from a wide range of 
countries. Last, it is argued that despite the large interest shown, the number of 
projects that have progressed to the implementation stage is limited. 
 
After analysing the overall situation with regards to large-scale foreign land 
investment, a more in-depth study is done on Ethiopia and Madagascar, two countries 
that have received much interest from foreign investors. Several researchers have 
looked into the developments occurring in these countries and have established the 
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impact of large-scale investments in both nations. It is argued that benefits to these 
countries, and in particular to the local population where investments occur, are 
limited. Other African countries, such as Zambia, can learn from the experiences of 
both Ethiopia and Madagascar. 
4.2 The scale of investments 
In total, nearly 39 million ha of land across the continent has been reported to be the 
topic of negotiation or is already managed by foreign investors. Table 4-1 lists the 
eight countries with the largest land area targeted by foreign investors. The table also 
includes the number of projects and the percentage of agricultural land7 that is 
covered by the reported deals. In some cases, such as Madagascar and Ethiopia, 
numerous investors have shown intentions to procure land, whereas in others, for 
example the Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the number of projects is limited and 
dominated by a single, very large, investment. 
 
Table 4-1: Top-8 host countries in Africa 
Host Area (1,000 ha) # projects % Land Agriculture 
Mozambique 11,036 22 22.4 
Rep of Congo 10,040 3 95.1 
Madagascar 3,719 28 8.3 
DR Congo 3,048 3 13.6 
Zambia 2,677 9 11.5 
Sudan 2,151 12 1.6 
Ethiopia 1,456 28 4.2 
Uganda 1,024 4 7.3 
Source: Own compilation, FAOSTAT 2011b 
 
The large figures for Mozambique and especially the Republic of the Congo are 
skewed due to the enormous areas (10 million ha in both countries) potentially 
assigned to the South African farmers organisation Agri SA, which will be discussed 
in more detail in section 4.2.  
 
                                                 
7
 The FAO defines Agricultural land as the sum of arable land, permanent crop land and permanent 
meadows and pastures. It excludes forest, fallow and other land (FAOSTAT, 2011b). 
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The countries listed in Table 4-1 are amongst those with the highest area of land 
available for cropping, currently not cultivated and with low population density as 
identified by Fischer and Shah (2010). This implies that these countries have large 
areas with agricultural potential. Nevertheless, Table 4-1 also shows that the area 
earmarked for foreign investors can cover a significant amount of agricultural land 
available in a country. The amount ranges from a mere 1.6% in Sudan to nearly all the 
agricultural land available in the Republic of the Congo.  Several reports examine the 
percentage of land planned for foreign investment as compared to arable land. Arable 
land only takes into account land under temporary crops and pastures and market 
gardens, it does not include land under permanent crops and pastures. In Madagascar, 
Mozambique and the Republic of Congo, more than all arable land is potentially 
allocated to overseas investment projects. This means that to accommodate all the 
plans from foreign investors, land currently under permanent grazing (mostly 
communal grazing grounds) and possibly forests, will have to be converted into crop 
land.  The large percentage of agricultural land potentially allocated to foreign 
investors can indicate a lack of coordination by the national governments that fail to 
integrate foreign investment into a wider land and agricultural policy and can have 
severe impacts on the land available to local, smallholder, farmers. 
 
There are numerous examples which illustrate that despite the perceived abundance of 
land, conflicts do arise. In their study on the (now discontinued) operation of ProCana 
in southern Mozambique, Borras et al. (2011) note that not only did the company 
receive leases over high potential agricultural land, part of the land allocation was 
already assigned to the relocation of people previously living in the newly formed 
Limpopo National Park. It was observed that “The fact that ProCana was nonetheless 
allocated land in conflict with pre-existing land use planning raises issues … as to 
which of the competing interests (biofuels, natural park, resettled communities) were 
being prioritised” (Nhantumbo and Salomão, 2010, 27). In addition, the company was 
reported to encroach on the land the local population used to get wood to build their 
houses (Nhantumbo and Salomão, 2010). The ProCana case has led Borras et al. 
(2011, 216) to conclude that “the notion of existing, available marginal lands is 
fundamentally flawed”. 
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Despite the large figures shown in Table 4-1, the actual situation on the ground is not 
as dramatic. This is due to the fact that numerous projects have been discontinued, are 
not yet signed or not yet operational as illustrated in Table 4-2. In Mozambique and 
the Republic of the Congo only a small amount of the 10 million ha has been signed 
over to Agri SA. Out of the 10 million ha potentially available, only contracts 
covering one million ha in Mozambique and 200,000ha in the Republic of the Congo 
have been signed over by the national government (Hall, 2011; Pearce, 2011). In 
Madagascar under 15% of the reported investments are operational, possibly due to 
the volatile political situation. Ethiopia is the country with the highest percentage of 
operational projects covering more than 45% of the area with an additional 32.3% as 
signed deals. 
 
Table 4-2: Land area by status of investment (1,000ha) 
Host Country Planned Signed Operational Discontinued Unknown Total 
Mozambique 9,100 1,780 55 101  11,036 
Rep of Congo 9,800 200   40 10,040 
Madagascar 140  498 2,145 937 3,720 
DRC  2,868   180 3,048 
Zambia 445 25 172 2,035  2,678 
Sudan 500 954 672 25  2,151 
Ethiopia 225 470 662  100 1,456 
Uganda 1,020  5   1,025 
Ghana  50 576 150 10 786 
Gabon  300 400   700 
Total top 10 21,335 6,987 2,858 4,451 1,267 36,898 
Source: own compilation 
 
One example of a deal surrounded by much rumours is that between the Qatar and 
Kenyan governments. In return for a loan to build a deep-sea port in the Kenyan city 
of Lamu, Qatar would receive 40,000ha in the fertile Tana River Delta. The Qatar 
operations would encompass horticultural produce to be grown for the Qatari market. 
Since the signing of the deal was announced in 2008, however, nothing further has 
been heard regarding this project (FIAN, 2010).  
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As was pointed out in Chapter 3, once operations start, it takes a number of years to 
bring the full land area under production. Green Resources, a company focussed on 
forest products, has numerous plantations across Tanzania under operation. These 
plantations total over 55,000ha of which more than 30,000ha is considered as 
plantable (the remaining land is set aside for conservation and other purposes). By 
2009 only 8,000ha had been planted with around 2,000ha additionally planted per 
year (Green Resources, 2012). The private equity fund Citadel Capital had only less 
than 1,000ha out of a total of 211,000ha under production on its Sudan land in 2011 
(Citadel Capital, 2011). Three years after signing the land deal, Sino Cam Iko, a 
Chinese company owning 10,000ha in Cameroon for the production of rice and other 
food crops, was still in the “experimental phase”, according to the ad interim 
company director, (Afronline, 2009). 
 
Even after deals have become operational, difficulties can cause early closure. In 2007 
a London-based company signed a 30,000ha, US$510 million dollar projects under 
the name of ProCana to grow sugar cane for ethanol production in Mozambique. 
Despite the aim of the Mozambican government to replace fossil fuels, up to 80% of 
the ethanol produced by ProCana would be exported to other countries in the region, 
mainly to South Africa (Borras et al, 2011). Although situated in a dry part of the 
country, the company was given land with high agricultural potential, next to a large 
dam from which water could be extracted for irrigation purposes required for the 
production of sugar cane. The activities would offer 7,000 employment opportunities, 
although this would depend on the laws regarding environmental, labour and safety 
regulations posed by the government. By August 2009 ProCana had cleared 850ha of 
land and planted a 25ha nursery with several varieties of sugar cane (Borras et al., 
2011). In October 2009 the main investor withdrew from the project and at the end of 
that year, after less then three years since the signing of the contract, the Mozambican 
government closed down the ProCana operations due to non-compliance with the 
investment plan. Apparently the loans required for the investment became difficult to 
obtain at a time when oil prices increased and the world economy turned into 
recession (Nhantumbo and Salomão, 2010).  
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4.3 The investors 
A large number of investors from many countries have signed land deals across 
Africa. As Table 4-3 shows, most projects are driven by European investors, followed 
by Asian, African and Middle Eastern investors. Due to the two Agri SA projects, the 
largest land area covered is by African investors. Asian projects cover a larger area 
than European; the average size of an Asian investment, over 270,000ha, is 
considerably larger than that of a European project, under 70,000ha. Middle Eastern 
investors are between these two with an average of over 110,000ha per project. 
 
Table 4-3: Number of projects and area covered (1,000ha) by host region and investor region 
Host 
region 
East South West North 
Investor 
region 
# proj. Area # proj. Area # proj. Area # proj. Area 
Europe 15 631 38 2,790 15 1,191   
Asia 15 734 12 7,150 7 1,336   
Africa 10 1,817 12 20,435 2 240 1 35 
Mid. East 18 1,894 3 135 1 100 4 762 
N.America 6 812 4 338 2 82   
Pacific   1 120     
S. America 1 17       
Unknown   1 80     
Note: This data includes discontinued projects 
Source: Own compilation 
 
The UK is the base of most European investors. UK companies are reported to have 
interests in 23 projects spread over 11 African countries. The majority of investors are 
privately owned biofuel companies such as D1 Oils and Sun Biofuels. D1 Oils has 
initiated projects in four countries: Madagascar, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. By 
2011 however, the company had discontinued its activities in Madagascar and 
Tanzania and greatly reduced their operation in Zambia (Ross, 2011). Somdiaa, a 
French based sugar company, grows sugar cane in four countries in West Africa. The 
average size of their operation is less than 10,000ha, relatively small compared to 
other projects. GEM Biofuels from the UK with a 492,500ha holding in Madagascar 
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(GEM Biofuels Plc, 2009) and Norwegian based ScanFuel Africa, which has signed a 
deal for 400,000ha in Ghana for jatropha production (Dogbevi, 2010), manage the 
existing largest African operations. Due to the ScanFuel deal, Ghana is the country 
with the second largest area (partly) under operation, after Ethiopia as is shown in 
Table 4-2. 
 
China and India are the most prolific investors from Asia with a total of 11 and 14 
projects respectively. Whereas Chinese investments are spread across the continent, 
Indian investments are concentrated in Ethiopia. The largest investments are 
2.8million ha signed by Chinese telecommunications firm ZTE International in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, plans for a two million hectare deal for biofuel by an 
undisclosed Chinese company in Zambia which have not been pursued, and the much 
reported 1.3million ha leased by South Korean Daewoo in Madagascar, which has 
been cancelled. These three projects explain the large area covered by Asian investors 
in southern Africa. Not all projects from Asian investors are on such an enormous 
scale. A growing number of commercial farmers from the Indian state of Punjab, 
where farm land is becoming scarce, are relocating to land secured in Ethiopia (The 
Economic Times, 2010). 
 
Other large investors from Asia are palm oil companies originally from Singapore and 
Malaysia, which are diversifying into other industrial (food) crops. For example, Sime 
Darby has shown interest in establishing rubber plantations in Liberia and Cameroon 
totalling 550,000ha (Sime Darby, 2011), whereas Singapore based Olam International 
has signed two deals in Gabon totalling an area of 700,000ha for timber and palm oil 
production (Olam International, 2007). These companies operate equally large areas 
in South-East Asia, an experience that can decrease the risk of non-usage as seen with 
other investments of such a scale. 
 
Investment from the Middle East is largely concentrated in the East African countries 
of Ethiopia and Sudan. It has been argued that this portion of investments is due to the 
close geographical proximity (Cotula et al., 2009). Due to their limited water 
resources, these countries are highly dependent on the world market for their food 
crops, a dependency they want to reduce after the food price increases from 2008 
(Rice, 2009; Smaller and Mann, 2009).  Investors range from private investment 
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funds such as Tiris Euro Arab from the UAE which manages 700,000ha in Morocco 
for the growth of crops for the Middle Eastern and European markets (Gulf Times, 
2010), to government related investors such as Qatari based Hassad Food which 
operates a 100,000ha food growing venture in Sudan (Hassad, 2010). 
 
Not all investment in Africa is made by investors from outside the continent. South 
Africa and Egypt are reported to plan, have signed or are operating 20.5million ha and 
1.7million ha respectively. This finding makes South Africa the largest investor in the 
continent as measured by land area allocations. Although South Africa is the largest 
investor from a surface point of view, the number of deals linked to this country is 
smaller than that of the UK and India. This is due to the fact that the projects are 
concentrated on one investor: commercial farmers organisation Agri SA. This 
organisation reportedly has signed deals for 200,000ha in the Republic of Congo 
(Brazzaville) with the option to expand this to 10 million ha (Hall, 2011; Reuters, 
2011a). The government of the Republic of Congo aims to decrease the import of 
food through this project, although the deal also incorporates concessions for export 
(Hall, 2011). Furthermore, farmers belonging to Agri SA are in the process of 
developing one million ha in neighbouring Mozambique (Pearce, 2011). It is reported 
that the total area to be used by South African farmers will cover 10 million ha at a 
later stage (Görgen et al., 2009). According to the Econergy International Corporation 
(2008, 22), “Five million hectares of land are currently under production, and land 
available for expansion of production ranges from 10 million to as much as 19 million 
hectares”. The deal with Agri SA would occupy most of this available land. Overall, 
by early 2010, the organisation was in negotiation with 22 countries across the 
continent for proposed land deals (Reuters, 2010b). Because the details on these plans 
other than the Republic of the Congo and Mozambique are unknown, they are not 
included in this study. 
 
What sets the nature of the largest South African deals apart from other projects is the 
fact that the agreements are made by an umbrella organisation that represents 
individual farmers rather than a single investor looking for land to farm as one 
operation. The farming organisation is involved in signing agreements with host 
countries, which in turn simplifies the process for individual farmers to establish 
themselves in a new country, especially in terms of title deeds (Agri SA, 2010). The 
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organisation has launched AgriSaMoz “to create a single platform which will 
represent the interests of RSA farmers and agribusinesses (AgriSaMoz, 2011, 1). 
According to Agri SA deputy president De Jager, over 800 South African farmers had 
already established themselves in Mozambique with a further 800 in the process of 
finalising deals (Reuters, 2011a). 
 
Not only is the set up of these investments, using an umbrella organisation for 
individual farmers, different from other large-scale investments, the drivers also differ 
from those elaborated on earlier in this chapter. During the apartheid period before 
1994, the government heavily supported white commercial farmers. This support 
consisted of subsidies, favourable pricing, and cheap credit (Hall, 2011). With the end 
of apartheid, commercial farmers not only had to deal with deregulation of the 
agricultural sector, but they were also faced with an increase in prices for inputs (Hall, 
2011). In addition, the rights of farm workers were extended and land distribution 
became a topic on the political agenda (Atkinson, 2007; Walker et al., 2010). These 
changes have led numerous white farmers to look at potential farming opportunities in 
other African countries to continue farming (Hall, 2011). Agri SA also sees the 
expansion into the continent as a way to contribute to the development of the host 
countries (Agri SA, 2010). The aim of the Republic of Congo government to increase 
food security illustrates this intention. 
4.4 The crops 
The majority of the investments are for fuel production; in total 63 out of the total 139 
projects. A total of 42 deals are reported to be for food production with a further 19 
for industrial crops such as rubber and palm oil; 8 projects combine food and fuel 
crops, mostly sugar production that can be used for bioethanol. Table 4-4 gives an 
overview of the number of projects per country grouped by crop for the ten African 
countries with the highest number of deals, whereas Table 4-5 lists the area covered 
for these countries. From an area perspective, it is clear that most land is being 
targeted for food production. This situation is mainly due to the two large deals being 
negotiated by Agri SA as discussed in the previous section. 
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Table 4-4: Number of projects by crop for top-10 African countries 
 Fuel Food Food + Fuel Industrial Unknown 
Madagascar 17 3 2 6  
Ethiopia 16 6 2 1 3 
Mozambique 10 5  6 1 
Sudan  9 1  2 
Tanzania 4 4  1  
Zambia 4 3 2   
Ghana 5 2    
Kenya 3 2    
DRC 1   2  
Rep of Congo 1 2    
Total 61 36 7 16 6 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Table 4-5: Area covered by crop for top-10 African countries (1,000ha) 
 Fuel Food Food + Fuel Industrial Unknown 
Madagascar 1,518 435 1,310 457  
Ethiopia 957 361 42 25 71 
Mozambique 288 10,097  641 10 
Sudan  1,189 84  878 
Tanzania 148 196  100  
Zambia 2,535 53 90   
Ghana 765 21    
Kenya 503 47    
DRC 2,800   248  
Rep of Congo 40 10,000    
Total 9,553 22,389 1,526 1,471 959 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Deals regarding fuel crops, especially jatropha, are concentrated in Madagscar, 
Ethiopia and Mozambique. Many host countries in Africa actively seek to attract 
biofuel companies through incorporating land FDI in their policies (Görgen et al., 
2009; FIAN, 2010). For example, after actively promoting biofuels as part of the 
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Rural Development Strategy of 2007, the Mozambique government tried to balance 
the large demand for land by biofuel producers with social and environmental 
considerations through the publication in 2009 of a National Policy and Strategy for 
Biofuels document (Nhantumbo and Salomão, 2010). Despite the aim of the 
government to replace biofuels, it still allowed ProCana to lease 30,000ha for ethanol 
production of which 80% would be exported, thus contributing only marginally to 
national fossil fuel replacement and possible electrification of rural areas (Borras et 
al., 2011). In Ethiopia, although not actively pursuing biofuel growth, the government 
does not object to these projects as they are in line with the wider agricultural strategy 
to earn foreign exchange and to produce input for the domestic industry (Lavers, 
2011). Before the political unrest in 2009, Madagascar followed a general policy to 
attract foreign investment as a generator of economic growth and welcomed biofuel 
investment as part of this strategy (Perrine et al., 2011). 
 
Kenya illustrates that government endorsement for biofuels in itself is not enough. 
After emphasising the strategic position of jatropha in particular (Government of 
Kenya, 2008), a concise policy to channel this support has not been forthcoming. 
Kenya only has a limited number of international jatropha investors. The few 
companies that did initiate projects were pulling out in 2010 due to high costs and a 
lack of markets (Hunsberger, 2010). 
 
Table4-6: Investments in biofuel crops by major investor country 
 # projects Area (1,000 ha) Average size (1,000ha) 
United Kingdom 16 1,567 98 
Italy 9 351 39 
Israel 4 270 68 
India 4 142 36 
China 3 5,200 1,733 
France 3 60 20 
Germany 3 125 42 
Norway 3 560 187 
USA 3 85 28 
Source: Own compilation 
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It is evident that Africa’s biofuel investors are mainly based in Europe, specifically 
the UK and Italy, followed by Israel, India and China (see Table 4-6). The average 
size of European biofuel projects is significantly smaller than those of Chinese 
investors at over 1.7million ha. In the DRC, telecommunications firm ZTE reportedly 
signed a contract covering 2.8million ha (The Associated Press, 2008). Aiming to 
verify this deal, Brautigam (2010) finds little proof, certainly not on the large scale 
claimed in the Associated Press article. Similar reports of a 2million ha investment in 
Zambia are being denied by the Biofuel Association of Zambia (Sinkala, 2011). This 
leaves the actual activities by the Chinese considerably less than is often reported. 
 
As Table 4-4 illustrates, investments in food production are concentrated in Sudan 
and Ethiopia. Table 4-7 lists the main food investor countries. After South Africa, 
which has been discussed earlier, Egyptian investors have claimed the larges area of 
land for food crop production in other African countries. All four projects by Egyptian 
investors are in neighbouring Sudan. Egypt, a water scarce country reliant on water 
from the Nile River, imports most of its staple food, wheat (Brown, 2011). In a time 
of a growing population, the amount of water flowing into the country is reducing 
with more water being used for large agricultural schemes in upstream Sudan and 
Ethiopia (Brown, 2011). The private equity firm Citadel Capital has acknowledged 
the potential of the Sudanese agricultural sector and set up farming operations that 
cover approximately 100,000ha in both Sudan and the newly established South Sudan 
(Ombok, 2011). Controversially, a large contributor to Citadel’s funds is the IFC, the 
private investment arm of the World Bank (McNellis, 2009). The World Bank advises 
African countries to establish easy access for FDI to generate development. Through 
the IFC, the World Bank then benefits from this advice (Daniel, 2011). Aside from 
these private investments, the Egyptian government, wanting to secure food supply 
for its population, has signed a number of agreements with the Sudanese government 
to boost trade between the countries and is aiming to set up cooperation aimed at food 
security (AFP, 2011). 
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Table 4-7: Investments in food crops by major investor country 
 # projects Area (1,000 ha) Average size (1,000ha) 
South Africa 9 20,387 2,265 
United Arab Emir. 7 842 120 
China 6 283 47 
India 6 591 98 
Saudi Arabia 5 54 11 
UK 5 275 55 
Egypt 4 1,420 355 
USA 4 444 111 
Source: Own compilation 
 
It is observed that India is a major food investor in Ethiopia. The Indian government, 
aiming to reduce its reliance on the world market for its food supply, encourages its 
businesses to set up operations in Ethiopia through the provision of cheap credit to the 
Ethiopian government and the establishment of preferential trade agreements for food 
imports from the country (Cherian, 2010). Apart from a number of large-scale 
businesses, farmers from the state of Punjab also are encouraged to move their 
activities to Ethiopia (The Economic Times, 2010). Section 4.5.1 will look in more 
detail into Karuturi, the largest Indian investor in Ethiopia. 
 
One country with a high concentration of sugar projects is Mali. It is observed that 
sugar production takes place on a smaller scale than wheat or rice production. 
Therefore Mali is not included in Tables 4-4 and 4-5, which focus on the leading 
countries. Apart from hosting a number of foreign sugar companies, the Mali 
government has also signed a much reported, and highly controversial, deal called the 
MaLibya project, in which the Libyan government has obtained 100,000ha to grow 
rice and rear cattle in the fertile area of Office du Niger in order to obtain food self-
sufficiency for Libya (e.g. Aarts, 2009; Diallo and Mushinzimana, 2009). This 
particular deal was signed without public consultations and has led to the 
displacement of local farmers who have not been compensated either for their loss of 
land or relocation costs (Diallo and Mushinzimana, 2009). 
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4.5 Case studies: Ethiopia and Madagascar 
As Table 3-1 illustrated, Ethiopia and Madagascar are amongst the countries with the 
largest areas allocated to foreign investors globally. This section looks into 
government policies and large-scale projects in these two countries to obtain a better 
understanding of the nature of foreign FDI, the role of the host government and the 
impacts on the local population. 
4.5.1 Ethiopia 
According to the World Bank (2010a), nearly 1.2 million ha of land in Ethiopia was 
allocated to investors in the five years between 2004 and 2009. More than half of this 
land was for foreign investors which had applied for an average of 4,000ha per 
project. My analysis based on data collected from a large number of sources, puts the 
total area at more than 2.2 million ha, equal to 6.4% of agricultural land and 16.2% of 
arable land. This figure includes all projects larger than 5,000ha from the planning 
stage until the operational stage and discontinued projects. As pointed out earlier in 
this chapter, these figures are open to questions. Nevertheless, they illustrate the 
large-scale extent of foreign land investment in Ethiopia. Figure 4-1 provides a 
geographical overview of reported investments in Ethiopia. 
 
The largest foreign investors in Ethiopia are based in India, Saudi Arabia, Israel and 
the UK, with the majority being private investors. Dutch investors are also active, 
albeit on a much smaller scale in the more labour-intensive floriculture occurring in 
the highlands of the country (Meles and Helmsing, 2010). Saudi and Indian investors 
concentrate on food, whereas European investors are more interested in fuel crops. 
Overall, there seems to be a balance between the two kinds of crops. Nearly half of 
the area leased to large-scale foreign agricultural investors is destined for export 
production, with more land used for a combination of export and domestic sales 
(Cotula et al., 2009; Lavers, 2011). This is despite the fact that cereal production for 
export purposes is severely limited by high transportation costs with the only access 
for this land-locked country to a reliable sea port being through Djibouti (Lavers, 
2011) and the ban on the export of cereals imposed by the government in an attempt 
to secure national food security (Rashid, 2010). Exceptions to this ban are made under 
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political pressure8 (Lavers, 2011). As will be illustrated, large investors are not 
hampered by these policies and even are stimulated to export part of their crops. 
 
Figure 4-1: Documented land acquisitions in Ethiopia 2004-2009 
 
Note: the Karuturi and Saudi Star projects are not identified on this map as they were not documented 
by the Ethiopia Investment Agency (Lavers, 2011). 
Source: Cotula et al., 2009, 44 
 
The majority of foreign large-scale land investment occurs in the lowland regions of 
the west of the country (see Figure 4-1). This area has a significantly lower population 
density than the highlands where 80% of the population lives (World Bank, 2010a). 
The Ethiopian government is aware of the importance of smallholder farming and 
sees migration as the “source of economic, political and social instabilities”9 (MoFed, 
2002, 56). Whereas the government has put the commercialisation of smallholder 
farmers at the heart of its policy for the highland areas, the lowland regions are 
targeted for large-scale agriculture (Makki and Geisler, 2011). Limited infrastructure 
and the prevalence of malaria and the tsetse fly have so far made these areas 
                                                 
8
 The government of Djibouti has been assigned a 3,000ha plot to grow wheat for export to Djibouti. 
The Ethiopian government most likely made an exception to maintain friendly relationships with the 
neighbouring country and in this way ensure continued access to Djibouti’s port (Lavers, 2011). 
9
 It nevertheless aims to voluntarily resettle 440,000 households to achieve food security at household 
level (MoFED, 2006). 
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inaccessible for small-scale farmers (Makki and Geisler, 2011). Pastoralists are using 
these lowlands extensively for grazing purposes, although the government classifies 
these areas as ‘unused’, indicating the low status of this group (Lavers, 2011). 
Permanent settlement is the only option seen for pastoralists, as was suggested by Dr 
Abera Deressa, Minister of Agriculture. He remarked that “… we are not appreciating 
pastoralists remaining as they are. We have to improve their livelihood by creating job 
opportunities. Pastoralism, as it is, is not sustainable. We want to change the 
environment” (Butler, 2010). Whereas sedentary farmers by law should receive 
compensation for loss of land equalling ten times the average annual income over the 
previous five years (FDRE, 2005), this regulation does not apply to pastoralists who 
do not hold a registered land deed. 
 
The Ethiopian government has linked agriculture and FDI in several policy 
documents. For example, in the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to 
End Poverty, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development states that “the 
ultimate goal of field crop production and productivity increases is twofold: to make 
the country food self-sufficient and ensure household food security for the rapidly 
growing population, as well as to improve the provision of quality products for the 
local agro-industry and for the export market” (MoFED, 2006, 72). On the other hand, 
several policies and incentives have been put in place to stimulate an export-driven 
development of the agricultural sector, without displacing smallholder farmers. Under 
Ethiopian Investment Incentive regulation, investors exporting at least 50% of their 
production are eligible for a five year exemption from income tax payments, extended 
for one more year if the investment is located in “relatively underdeveloped areas” 
(FDRE, 2003). In addition, import of capital goods is exempt from any import duties. 
The Investment Proclamation allows for generous remittance of funds (FDRE, 2002). 
Since all land is owned by the government, it holds the sole right to allocate land to 
investors through the Agricultural Investment Support Directorate. The national 
government draws from a land bank set up by the regions and has identified 3.7 
million ha of land to be allocated to private investment (Lavers, 2011). So far, it 
appears this allocation has mostly taken place in less densely populated areas (Lavers, 
2011). As Makki and Geisler (2011) point out, the land policy and land bank creation 
have enabled government to use the “Terra Nulius” concept to allocate land to 
commercial agriculture, leaving the current land users with little rights. 
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All regulations together indicate the wish of the Ethiopian government to increase 
exports as a way to obtain foreign currency. This aim was underwritten by Minister 
Abera Deressa saying “If we get money, we can buy food anywhere. Then we can 
solve the food problem” (Butler, 2010). As was illustrated in the previous chapter, 
however, a policy reliant on agricultural exports for a country where many people are 
food insecure is extremely risky. As soon as the prices for the export crops fall or the 
prices for staple crops that need to be imported increase, a large share of the 
population can no longer afford the minimum consumption (Chang, 2009). 
 
High profile investment projects in Ethiopia are those of Karuturi and Saudi Star. 
Karuturi is an Indian based business and global leader in the production of roses and 
operates in Ethiopia under the name of Karuturi Agro Products Plc (UNCTAD, 2009; 
MoARD, 2010a). This firm obtained a 50-year lease over 100,000ha in the south-
western region of Gambella, with the option of a further 200,000ha if the company 
manages to develop the first plot within a two year period (MoARD, 2010a). In 
addition, it operates a 11,000ha farm in the Bako area. The company has invested 
US$100 million in the Gambella project so far. In the three years since its inception, 
the company has brought a total of 65,000ha under cultivation with crops including 
rice, cereals and palm oil. The harvest is projected to be sold both on the domestic 
market and the regional East African markets according to the company (Davison, 
2011a). 
 
Karuturi pays a very low land rental of around US$1.20/ha/year to the local districts 
where the project is situated10. Some claim the first six years are rent free (Rice, 
2010), although no mention of this exists in the contract. The Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development reserves the right to change the land rental during the 50 year 
lease period (MoARD, 2010a). In return, the company receives the right to “develop 
the land […] use irrigation water from rivers or ground water […], develop or 
administer the leased land [… and] develop and cultivate the land and harvest the crop 
and carry on all other activities by mechanisation or such means that the lessee in its 
own discretion deem fit and proper in the circumstances” (MoARD, 2010a, 2-3).  
 
                                                 
10
 The rental fee for the plot in Bako is around US$8.00/ha/year because of the more central location 
(Rice, 2010). 
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The company plans to invest up to US$1billion in Ethiopia, including by bringing in 
over 1,000 tractors to work the land. It aims for a total of 20,000 jobs, generating 
employment in this remote area (Rice, 2010). Although the company claims to pay 
above the minimum wage, the rate of US$60cent per day is still extremely low. This 
was confirmed by a local farmer who admitted that it was good that local people now 
had jobs, but that the wage was too small (Rice, 2010). 
 
Despite the low population density, one local inhabitant commented that “all the land 
round my family village of Illia has been taken over and is being cleared. People now 
have to work for an Indian company. Their land has been compulsorily taken and they 
have been given no compensation. People cannot believe what is happening. 
Thousands of people will be affected and people will go hungry” (Vidal, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the Gambella department of investment claims that relocations are 
voluntary: "This year we will relocate 15,000 people to give them better access to 
water, schools and transport. [But] it is a coincidence that the investors are coming at 
the same time as the villages are being relocated" (quoted in Vidal, 2011). 
 
After three years of operation, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
claims it has revoked the second concession of 200,000ha, arguing that the original 
land allocation was too large to manage (Davison, 2011a). This position was denied 
by Karuturi and only a few days later the MoARD announced it might issue the 
200,000ha of land according to the contract (Davison, 2011b). The turn-around by the 
MoARD indicates the power that these large international investors can hold over 
African governments. 
 
Another company that has received much publicity is Saudi Star Agricultural 
Development. Saudi Star is owned by Ethiopian-born (but Saudi based) billionaire 
Sheikh Mohammed al-Amoudi who plans to invest US$2.5 billion by 2020 in a rice 
producing enterprise (Davison, 2011c). In 2009 the company signed a 50-year lease 
for 10,000ha in the Gambela region for which it pays around US$1,80 per ha per year 
(MoARD, 2010b). According to CEO Haile Assegide, a former minister of Trade and 
Industry, the intention is to rent a further 290,000ha (Davison, 2011c). The venture is 
most likely supported by the ‘King Abdullah Initiative for Saudi Agricultural 
Investment Abroad’ initiative which was launched by the Saudi government to 
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stimulate national and international food security (Cotula et al., 2009). In order to 
ensure optimal productivity from its land holding, the company is building a 20-mile 
canal for irrigation purposes (Vidal, 2011). 
 
It is estimated that the portion of produce to be exported is at least 60% of the total 
harvest, although precise figures are lacking (Davison, 2011c; Capital Newspaper, 
2010), thus classifying the company to be exempt of import tax for six years 
according to the Ethiopian investment regulations. Mr. Assegide acknowledged that 
Saudi Arabia was expected to be a “dominant” destination (Davison, 2011c). Indeed, 
in 2009 Al-Amoudi presented the first shipment of Ethiopian grown rice to the Saudi 
King Abdullah (Rice, 2009). Lavers (2011) expects small food exports by Saudi Star 
not to be an issue as long as food prices stay relatively low and as Saudi Arabia can 
easily source grains from the world food market. However, when Saudi Arabia faces 
issues feeding its own population, Saudi Star might export a larger share of its 
harvest, preferring exports to its domestic market over sales in the host country. It is 
suggested that the Ethiopian government might prevent this contractually if and when 
it grants the company a larger land concession (Sisay, 2011). 
 
Saudi Star envisages employing up to 250,000 people directly when it has reached its 
full operation. The company states that its strategy is to find a balance between 
mechanisation and labour. It was remarked by CEO Assegide that “we don’t want to 
make it capital intensive. We want to make it a mix of labour and capital” (Davison, 
2011c). Nevertheless, employees do not seem to be fully content with the jobs 
offered. The company pays them around US$75 cents a day, barely enough to survive. 
As with the Karuturi operation, locals complain that they no longer have access to 
land that they previously used (Rice, 2009). The company insists that there was no 
original settlement when the farm started, despite the government plan to relocate 
45,000 households from the region (Davison, 2011c).  
 
As a further investment to the Gambela project, Saudi Star acquired a small plot of 
land closer to Addis Ababa in order to set up a rice polishing and packing facility 
where it will process the rice produced from the Gambela region (Alemu, 2010). 
Aside from Saudi Star, Al-Amoudi has major business interests in Ethiopia through 
his MIDROC Ethiopia company, involved in sectors across the economy. One of the 
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companies under this umbrella group is Ethio Agri-CEFT which operates coffee 
plantations, grows food crops, medicinal and biopesticides and produces cut flowers 
(MIDROC Ethiopia, 2009). Lavers (2011) claims that Sheik Al-Amoudi has sufficient 
power to influence policy and trade relations between Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia.  
 
In his critical assessment of the role of foreign investment in Ethiopia, Lavers (2011) 
argues that these kinds of large-scale projects which are operated by foreign 
companies are not without considerable risks. Flora EcoPower11, a German based 
company, started with an 8,000ha plot for the growth of castor seeds to be used for 
biofuel production. Upon arrival in the area, the company found smallholders were 
actively farming the land despite the government’s ‘unused’ classification. It was 
decided that these smallholders would be incorporated in the project. They were 
offered a three year contract with a fixed price for castor seeds that they would grow 
for Flora EcoPower. The smallholders would have to convert half their land from food 
production (mainly sorghum) to castor. The Ethiopian government was highly 
supportive of this investment that they saw as in line with their strategy to 
domestically produce industrial input, earn foreign exchange and, by processing the 
seeds locally into biofuel, reduce the country’s dependence on imported fuel. Small 
farmers were also forthcoming in great numbers, enabling this project to quickly 
expand to an area of 72,000ha, mainly using smallholders (Lavers, 2011).  
 
Nevertheless, this investment soon encountered serious problems. First, the expected 
castor yields were highly overestimated. Second, the local prices for sorghum 
increased rapidly. This left the smallholders with an income from castor much lower 
than what they would have received for sorghum. In addition, they now had too little 
money and had grown too little food to feed their families. As a result, the site 
managers left the company and activities were halted for nearly a year. Only in late 
2011 were activities expected to resume (Acazis, 2011). The experience of this project 
illustrates the risks that smallholders run when converting from subsistence crops to 
commercial outgrower schemes. Furthermore, it confirms what the World Bank found 
in its field study in Ethiopia: “Many project proposals, even in regions with more 
advanced governance, only vaguely indicated intended land uses and lack key 
                                                 
11
 Lavers does not reveal the identity of this company in his publication 
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information, such as the value of the investment and the type of production. 
Moreover, checks on economic viability do not exist” (World Bank, 2010a, 42). 
 
Overall, it has been suggested that large-scale foreign land investment does not seem 
to benefit Ethiopia to a great extent. Due to the policy focus on export, the impact of 
FDI on food security is limited. Cereal production for the domestic market is not a 
first priority for foreign investors and certainly not for those who are supported by 
their home government to ensure better access to these crops for their own country 
(such as the case of Saudi Arabia). The alternative to increasing domestic food 
security would be through the generation of jobs, giving people the opportunity to 
earn money in order to buy (imported) food. As the three cases have illustrated, wages 
on the plantations are extremely low and possibly lower than what these labourers 
could have earned by subsistence farming. The World Bank (2010a, 45) calculated an 
expected job creation of only 0.005 jobs/ha. It is significant that none of the contracts 
made public by the MoARD includes any clauses with regards to job creation. 
 
Spin-offs from these investments are likely to be minimal. Equipment such as tractors 
is imported from abroad (Rice, 2010), and both Karuturi and Agri-CEFT employ 
foreign experts to manage their farms (Rice, 2009). The rice processing plant for 
Saudi Star is to be built by a Japanese firm (Alemu, 2010). Local farmers look 
envious at the tractors brought in, but most have issues just buying subsidised 
fertiliser from the government. It is unclear how they will benefit from the investors. 
"We think they might be beneficial to us in the future, but so far we have not 
benefited anything," said one local farmer referring to the newly established foreign 
companies (McCrummen, 2009). 
 
The Ethiopian government does not accrue many financial gains from these investors. 
Land fees are extremely low, generous tax holidays are offered and profits can be 
remitted to the investors’ home country without limitations. It also does not seem to 
be able to ensure only projects with a high chance of success are selected as the castor 
oil case and the World Bank findings confirm. The latter organisation also concluded 
from its field work that “few agricultural investment projects had an EIA study as 
required by law” (World Bank, 2010a, 41). The rather flimsy contracts do not contain 
the exact location of the areas allocated, potentially leading to conflicts with the local 
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land users. Lastly, through its negative attitude towards pastoralism, FDI in land 
greatly jeopardises the traditional way of life of minority groups in the rural south-
western lowlands. 
4.5.2 Madagascar 
In March 2009 Malagasy president Ravalomanana was overthrown by a population 
dissatisfied with his government. One of the reasons underlying the anger of the 
Malagasy population was the rumoured allocation of 1.3million ha of land to Daewoo 
Logistics, a large South Korean conglomerate. The rural population feared for their 
“ancestor’s land” and participated in protests in order to prevent the loss of access to 
these lands and their livelihoods (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al., 2011). 
 
The situation of political instability has reduced the interest of foreign investors in 
Madagascar. In an analysis on the status of large-scale investment, the ILC found that 
beyond the Daewoo Logistics and Varun projects, another five investments have been 
halted. The total area of all cancelled projects is over 2 million ha, roughly the same 
as the area cultivated by the country’s 2.5 million family farmers (Andrianirina-
Ratsialonana et al., 2011). The reasons for cancellation are not only related to the 
political situation, but also include the financial crisis (see Chapter 3) and the drop in 
world food prices (Burnod et al., 2011). Nevertheless, another one million ha of land 
in Madagascar is still either controlled by or planned to be handed over to foreign 
investors. The data in this section is largely based on information from this ILC study. 
 
By far the largest share of the land is targeted for the biofuel sector. Food only takes 
up a minor part, made up of a single project Madabeef, a UK financed operation 
which intends to raise beef cattle on 200,000ha for the export market. All other 
investors are in Madagascar to grow mostly jatropha and sugar for biofuel production. 
Initially, Sime Darby planned to grow palm oil and rubber on a total of 200,000ha 
(Üllenberg, 2009a) but it appears the company has cancelled these plans and instead 
plans to focus on West Africa (Sime Darby, 2011). Most investors in Madagascar are 
based in Europe, with the UK leading. Without exception, they all aim to sell their 
harvest outside Madagascar. 
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Figure 4-2: Surfaces announced, ongoing and cultivated, Madagascar 2005 
 
Source: Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al., 2011, 12 
 
Despite the large number of investment deals signed, once again little activity is in 
evidence on the ground in implementing these large-scale agricultural projects. The 
ILC study found that many investors took more than two years to finalise procedures 
in order to obtain their land lease, a result of both the cumbersome regulations and the 
political uncertainty. In the interim, investors have developed a small pilot plot on 
land rented on an informal basis from willing landowners (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana 
et al., 2011). Figure 4-2 shows the location and scale of projects as originally 
requested, projects still continuing, and the land actually cultivated as in 2005. These 
figures include domestic projects and all projects from 1,000ha upwards. 
 
In 2005 the Malagasy government under president Ravalomanana initiated a land 
reform policy with the most important change concerning non-titled land. Whereas 
previously this land belonged to the state, this new legislation stipulated that all 
untitled land that was unused by the state for specific purposes was transferred to the 
local communities and the individuals cultivating the land and to be categorised as 
“untitled private property” (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al., 2011). The 
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administration at local government level is in the hands of the land registry office 
which is responsible for the allocation of land titles to individuals or communities 
depending on historical use. In the five years since the inception of the land reforms, 
only one-fifth of local councils have set up a land registry office. Although the new 
legislation does accord the local population higher security over their land, most local 
land rights have not been legalised as yet (Burnod et al., 2011). 
 
The majority of international investors looking for large areas of agricultural land in 
Madagascar target State-owned land (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al., 2011), both to 
limit transaction costs and not get involved with potential local tensions over land 
ownership. During the process of obtaining land rights, the investors in general use a 
top-down approach, starting with building relationships with the State government 
before approaching regional administrators, although certain direct negotiations with 
lower levels of government also occur. Usually the local population is not informed 
about plans until at a late stage, despite the requirement in the Environmental Impact 
Assessment policy to consult with the local population (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et 
al., 2011). Further, the role of the mayor is most important on the local level and it 
depends on this person how and when the locals are involved in the land allocation 
process (Burnod et al., 2011). International investors prefer land lease rather than 
buying land, both to limit start-up costs and to reduce potential controversy with the 
population.  
 
Since the political change-over in 2009, international investment in Madagascar has 
reduced significantly and the remaining projects are making slow progress 
(Andrianirina-Ratsialonana, 2011). It is thus difficult to determine precisely the 
effects of large-scale agricultural FDI on the country and the local population. The 
only case with significant activity and for which limited information is available is 
GEM BioFuels Plc. 
 
GEM started operating in Madagascar in 2005 and since has planted over 55,700ha 
with jatropha trees (GEM BioFuels Plc, 2010). In addition, it has secured land rights 
for a further 396,800ha and the rights to 40,000ha of natural forest that contain a 
considerable number of mature jatropha trees for harvesting. The company operates 
on a managed plantation model, rather than incorporating outgrowers. Land access for 
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exclusive rights to establish plantations has been negotiated directly with 18 local 
communities in the south-west of the country (GEM BioFuels Plc, 2009). Figure 4-3 
shows the location and size of the operations located around the city of Toliaru.  
 
Figure 4-3: GEM BioFuels Plc land holdings in South-West Madagascar, 2010 
 
Source: GEM BioFuels Plc, 2009 
 
The company by-passed the State owned Land Services bureau in the process of 
acquiring land, indicating the many different ways that an investor can use to evade 
central planning agencies (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al., 2011). No information is 
currently available on the length of these land rights. According to the CEO of GEM, 
the company does not pay rental fees but instead gives the local community the 
chance of development through employment of 4,500 part-time workers and other 
benefits (Benotti, quoted in Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010). According to Vermeulen 
and Cotula (2010, 912) “these jobs tend to be unskilled, short-term and small in 
number relative to the size of the investment”. Despite the low cost of land and 
labour, it has taken the company four years to produce its first crop for sale and no 
profits have been made since the start of the project (GEM BioFuels Plc, 2010). 
 
Additional criticism has been made of the way GEM has conducted negotiations with 
the local communities. It was observed that “the GEM negotiation was very short, like 
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a simulation, because rural communities were not in a good position to negotiate with 
the investor. Extreme poverty, joblessness, drought, and absence of immediate 
alternatives basically oblige people and the regional and commune authorities to 
accept investor proposals rapidly” according to one researcher quoted by Vermeulen 
and Cotula (2010, 913). Both the apparent lack of proper consultation and the small 
compensation in the form of temporary, low-paid jobs does not indicate a situation 
which can be beneficial to the local farmers who have surrendered their land rights. 
 
Nevertheless, investors can bring positive change to a region, depending on the 
position a mayor takes and his negotiating skills. This is shown by an anonymous 
mayor remarking on an unidentified investor: 
 
“Why are we giving our land to project C.? The Malagasy state doesn't even 
look at our village whereas we have lots of concrete advantages thanks to C. It 
pays the land fees that strongly increase the financial resource of my local 
government. Several times I asked the Minister: we need schools, we need 
hospitals. But they haven't done it. But on the contrary, C. did a lot. They built 
a school, they pay a teacher, and there are already 30 pupils. They also support 
a local association” (as quoted in Burnod et al., 2011, 13). 
 
The final impact on the local region, therefore, seems to be more dependent on the 
investor and local government than the overall stance taken by the State government 
of Madagascar which does not seem to have a clear strategy or process in place with 
regards to large-scale land investment. 
4.6 Conclusion 
It has been shown in this chapter that Africa does receive considerable interest from 
international investors around the globe. Some governments allocate a large 
proportion of their agricultural land to foreign businesses or governments. This can 
indicate that either these governments do not have a clear policy on land and 
agriculture or that the reports published are much larger than the deals actually signed. 
As was observed by the World Bank (2010) and the IIED/FAO/IFAD (Cotula et al., 
2009), this analysis confirms that most reports are on projects in the planning stage. 
Only a limited number of land deals are signed and even less become operational. 
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Projects range from a few thousand hectares to, in two cases, ten million hectares. The 
largest projects, such as the Agri SA deals, and those by Chinese biofuel producers, 
either are still in the planning stage or have been discontinued. Due to the large land 
offers made to commercial farmers organisation Agri SA, currently South Africa is 
the largest investor in the African continent. At present Mozambique and the Republic 
of the Congo are the largest hosts for FDI in land. Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Ethiopia and Sudan are host to the highest number of deals.  
 
It was shown that most deals are being initiated by Europeans investors, in particular 
from the United Kingdom. In addition, investors from China and India play a major 
role, although not as large as is frequently reported. In general Asian investments 
cover a larger area than projects undertaken by European investors. Both European 
and Asian investors largely are interested in countries in the region of southern Africa. 
By contrast, Middle Eastern investors, a number of which are connected to national 
governments, prefer to target land in eastern Africa. India, through several 
government initiated policies, is actively pursuing private businesses to enter into land 
deals in Ethiopia in order to increase Indian food security. 
 
The evidence reveals that African countries are targeted for both the production of 
food and fuel crops, with the highest number of projects designated for fuel 
production, particularly jatropha. Projects for both kinds of crops range considerably 
in size from a few thousand ha to over a million ha. Most biofuel investors originate 
from the UK and Italy, although Chinese investors operate on the largest scale. Apart 
from the large projects by South African commercial farmers union Agri SA, Middle 
Eastern and Asian governments and businesses are the largest food investors. This 
situation is in line with the observations made in Chapter 3 that these countries are the 
most dependent on the world market for their food security. 
 
The documented case studies of Ethiopia and Madagascar demonstrate that opponents 
of large-scale land FDI are rightly concerned about the effects of such land deals. It 
was shown that several projects operate on a much smaller scale than the area under 
the company’s control, if projects are implemented at all. Foreign investors are 
‘footloose’ and do not necessarily stay for a long period of time. One of the largest 
risks for African host governments and the local population is the loss of land to 
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investors not cultivating it due to unrealistic plans. Jobs created on these large-scale 
operations often are lowly paid and generally do not compensate for the loss of 
income from their small plots of land which the local population surrenders to the 
foreign operator. Income for the country overall is limited due to low land fees and 
generous tax holidays granted by the host governments and crops which are grown for 
export rather than for the domestic market. The case studies seem to indicate that the 
impact on the local population is greatly dependent on the attitude of the investor. 
Host governments so far have not been able to regulate foreign investors sufficiently 
to ensure the country as a whole gains maximum benefits and certainly has not given 
the interests of the local population priority. 
 
With these conclusions the analysis narrows in Chapter 5 to examine the specific case 
of Zambia. An analysis in undertaken of the scope, patterns and unfolding impacts of 
large-scale land investments in Zambia. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 




In earlier studies on large-scale foreign land investment, Zambia received relatively 
little attention. This is despite the fact that Zambia has been identified as one of the 
countries with a high potential for agricultural growth (Bruinsma, 2009). This chapter 
aims to establish the scale of large-scale foreign land investment, the key actors, and 
analyse the impacts of these investments on the country and the local population. 
 
Before analysing available investment data, the broad directions of Zambia’s 
agricultural policies and performance since independence will be discussed, followed 
by policies related to land and biofuels. As will be illustrated, Zambia went through 
similar stages of agricultural planning to other developing countries, albeit with mixed 
results. Although the agricultural sector has opened up to private sector investment, 
there are still major barriers to ensure both efficiency and rural development. Once the 
framework for agricultural FDI has been described, details of these investments are 
analysed. This chapter will include an analysis on domestic investment and smaller 
scale agricultural FDI in order to complete the investigation of agricultural projects. 
 
Based on fieldwork and previously published studies, it is argued in this chapter that 
Zambia can benefit from large-scale foreign land investment, although there are 
certain negative considerations and care needs to be taken for future investments. The 
chapter concludes with a set of suggested recommendations to enable Zambia to 
increase possible benefits, whilst reducing the negative impact of large-scale 
agricultural FDI. 
5.2 Economic and agricultural policies and performance 
In order to understand the current environment in Zambia with regards to both 
agriculture and foreign investments, it is necessary to provide the historic background. 
This section looks into general macro-economic policies and more specific changing 
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policies with regards to agriculture, land, biofuels and foreign investment since 
Zambian independence in 1964. In addition, it will analyse the effects of the several 
policies by demonstrating how the agricultural sector has performed. 
5.2.1 Economic and agricultural policies 
It is possible to differentiate a series of different macro-economic policy periods in 
Zambia, each impacting on how the agricultural sector was managed. The first period, 
from de-colonisation in 1964 until the financial crisis of the late 1970s, was 
characterised by import-substitution industrialisation (Gulhati and Sekhar, 1982). As 
with other developing countries, Zambia faced severe balance of payment issues in 
the later half of the 1970s, in this case mainly triggered by a drop in copper prices 
(UNDP, 2007). Reforms were (partially) implemented under President Kaunda who 
had been in power since independence. More drastic reforms took place under the 
new government that was elected in 1991, heavily leaning on Structural Adjustment 
Programmes from the IMF (UNDP, 2007). Three different periods will be described 
in further detail in this section. 
5.2.1.1 Import Substitution (1964-1978) 
The newly independent socialist government under Kaunda inherited an economy that 
was largely dependent on copper exports and concentrated along the ‘line of rail’ 
stretching from Lusaka in the south to the Copperbelt in the north (Hawkins, 1991). A 
large role for the government in national planning was envisaged through the various 
National Development Plans, the first of which was published in 1966. In these 
National Development Plans, Kaunda expressed the aim to diversify the economy 
away from copper and implemented a strategy of import-substitution industrialisation 
(Gulhati and Sekhar, 1982; Osei-Hwedie, 2003). The way to achieve this was through 
government-led development which expressed itself in a programme of 
nationalisation and market intervention. Parastatal enterprises grew considerably, 
absorbing a large share of the labour force (Hawkins, 1991; Gulhati and Sekhar, 
1982). Although the Zambian government tried to become less dependent on copper, 
it was copper revenues that kept the parastatals operational, the value of the kwacha 
up, and food prices down (Hawkins, 1991). Overall, the implementation of the ISI 
policy failed as most manufacturing business became greatly dependent on import of 
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components and hence “there has been very little genuine import substitution” (GRZ, 
1979, iii) as admitted by Kaunda. 
 
During the Third National Development Plan which was launched in 1979, President 
Kaunda stated that “While the public sector will continue occupying the commanding 
heights of the economy and supply the main driving force behind development, there 
is a clear recognition in the plan that, in the transitional period from capitalism to 
socialism, the private sector, both domestic and foreign, will play an important role in 
fostering increased investment and rapid growth of the economy (GRZ, 1979, iv). 
Nevertheless, the process of nationalisation drove away many foreign investors, 
having lost the ability to reap profits in a largely state controlled market and harmed 
by an over-valued Kwacha (Hawkins, 1991). Amongst the foreign investors who left 
Zambia were the expatriate farmers, arguably one of the reasons behind the poor 
performance of the agricultural sector during the first years of independence (Dodge, 
1977). 
 
Zambia’s agricultural sector fared badly under the economic policy of ISI, despite the 
importance of the rural areas and farmers expressed in the first three national 
development programmes (GRZ, 1966, 1972 and 1979). Whereas in the First National 
Development Plan the focus was on developing large-scale state farming and 
cooperatives driven by technology, this was changed to make the labour-intensive, 
small-scale family farm the centre of development in the Second National 
Development Plan (GRZ, 1972). Both approaches failed to increase production 
(Dodge, 1977). The largest share of the budget went into maize, the staple food source 
for most Zambians in line with the government’s aim to keep consumer prices low 
and secure popularity amongst the urban population (Hawkins, 1991). Tight control of 
the market through the parastatal National Agricultural Marketing Board, 
NAMBOARD, and an over-valued kwacha meant that farmers had little option but to 
sell crops at the low prices set by government. All incentives to optimise maize 
production were removed, leading to a hugely under-performing agricultural sector 
(Hawkins, 1991). To make matters worse, the government did not provide 
NAMBOARD with sufficient funds and thus the marketing board frequently could 
not pay farmers on time and experienced problems with transport and storage of 
crops. Fertiliser distribution was another area where the parastatal under-performed 
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often with late deliveries (Dodge, 1977). Between 1965 and 1970, agricultural exports 
dropped whilst imports increased. Overall, the agricultural sector and the majority of 
small-scale farmers became largely dependent on imports (Hawkins, 1991). Despite 
most agricultural programmes targeting maize production for the domestic market, in 
this period agriculture was not given the priority it required in order to ensure 
sufficient food production to stimulate industrial growth and economic growth in 
general. As was illustrated in Chapter 2, throughout much of the developing world, 
the agricultural sector generally suffered under ISI policies and with stagnating food 
production, overall economic growth stagnated. Zambia proved not to be an 
exception. 
5.2.1.2 Reform under Kaunda (1978-1991) 
The economic system implemented after decolonisation and driven by high copper 
prices collapsed in 1975 along with the collapse of the world market price for this 
commodity. Zambia’s copper industry was affected even more because of the high 
price of inputs caused by the high exchange rate of the kwacha, high transportation 
costs after the Rhodesia border closure12 and a lack of investment and skills faced by 
the commercial mining corporations which were unsure of their future after 
independence (UNDP, 2007). The impacts of the copper price drop were dramatic. 
Foreign exchange income was limited, hampering the import of inputs for several 
sectors. The drop in inputs led to a fall in production and hence a sharp rise in 
unemployment. Further, it led to a shortage in consumer goods, driving up inflation. 
In addition, the government no longer had funds to subsidise food in order to keep 
consumer prices low. Overall, between 1975 and 1984, GDP contracted in six years 
and only showed minor growth in the other three years (Hawkins, 1991). 
 
Faced by this economic crisis, Zambia required assistance from the IMF. Conditional 
loans given by the IMF required the government to cut food subsidies, reduce 
government spending and devalue the kwacha. Despite a short improvement in 1979 
(Bank of Zambia, 1980), the first half of the 1980s continued to see high inflation, a 
drop in jobs, a lack of foreign exchange, and an increasingly large debt burden (Bank 
                                                 
12
 The border with Rhodesia, current Zimbabwe, was closed after the unilateral declaration of 
independence by Rhodesia. As a result, Zambia lost access to its main sea ports in South Africa both 
for the export of copper and for the import of other goods. This increased transportation costs 
considerably (UNDP, 2007). 
LARGE-SCALE FOREIGN LAND INVESTMENT IN ZAMBIA 
- 106 - 
of Zambia, 1984). Further IMF assistance in 1983 required the government to freeze 
wages and surrender more price controls (Hawkins, 1991). These additional methods 
also had limited impact. 
 
Input and price subsidies, the main instruments to support the agricultural sector, were 
abolished under pressure by the World Bank, which argued that these put too much 
strain on the government’s budget (UNDP, 2007). Reforms in the agricultural sector 
included an increase in producer prices combined with a reduction in consumer price 
subsidies. Subsidies on fertilisers were also reduced and maize marketing was opened 
up to other parties than NAMBOARD. These liberalisation efforts triggered an 
increase in maize and wheat production and a diversification trend towards export 
crops (Thomas and Weidemann, 1988; Hawkins, 1991). Despite liberalisation efforts, 
the national government could not allow consumer prices to rise as fast as producer 
prices, or risk losing the support of the politically important urban population. 
Subsidy payments therefore remained unsustainably high (Thomas and Weidemann, 
1988). At its peak, the government dedicated 17% of its total expenditure on 
consumer and producer subsidies for maize (Howard and Mungoma, 1996). In 1986, 
the government finally decontrolled the maize prices completely and prices increased 
120%, resulting in a wave of political riots which left 15 people dead (Thomas and 
Weidemann, 1988). Widespread protests eventually made the Kaunda government 
capitulate to political pressure, cooperation with the IMF was terminated and pre-
reform policies were re-introduced (Hawkins, 1991). Nevertheless, the macro-
economic performance remained dismal and characterised by high inflation, 
stagnation of GDP, and high budgetary deficits. Eventually, Kaunda and his UNIP 
party lost the national elections in 1991 after 27 years in power. This result paved the 
way for a change in policy away from state intervention and towards greater 
liberalisation (Hampwaye, 2008). 
5.2.1.3 Structural Adjustment and Liberalisation (1991 – Current) 
The newly elected Movement for Multiparty Democracy MMD fully embraced the 
policies of liberalisation as propagated by the World Bank and the IMF and, with their 
support, embarked on a radical path of structural adjustment (UNDP, 2007). The aim 
of the reforms was to diversify the economy away from copper, a goal not achieved 
since independence, and to stabilise the macro-economic environment. The changes 
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focussed on three key areas: abolishing subsidies, liberalisation and stabilisation, and 
privatisation of the large parastatals (UNCTAD, 2006, 17). Initially, the policy 
reforms had a negative impact. Floating of the exchange rate triggered a rapid 
devaluation of the kwacha which, in turn, caused inflation to spiral upwards. 
Domestic players were no match for increased foreign competition and further were 
hampered by high borrowing rates (UNDP, 2007). In addition, debt repayments 
continued to put a heavy burden on the government budget. As Figure 5-1 shows, it 
was not until the early 2000s that per capita GDP figures finally went into positive 
growth. 
 
Figure 5-1: GDP and GDP per capita, % growth rates, 1968-2004 (3 year moving average) 
 
Source: UNDP, 2007, 26 
 
One of the largest operations to be privatised was the Zambia Consolidated Copper 
Mines (ZCCM) which was brought under government control in 1969. Under extreme 
pressure from the international community, this privatisation process was finalised in 
2000 but with disastrous consequences. Investors who obtained a majority share either 
withdrew a few years after making their investment or proved to have very limited 
experience and funds to invest in the mining industry. In addition, to attract foreign 
investors, very favourable conditions of purchase were offered, including tax 
reductions and customs exemptions (UNDP, 2007). This severely reduced the amount 
the government could have received from the copper mining activities, one of the 
main contributors to GDP and responsible for the large majority of exports, a situation 
which still continued in 2011 (Haglund, 2010; Torkelson, 2011). 
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Liberalisation policies did trigger an increase in FDI inflows. Most of the mines 
owned by ZCCM were taken over by foreign investors. In addition, the service sector, 
especially banking and communication, and the tourism sector have large shares of 
foreign ownership (UNCTAD, 2006). Early foreign investors in Zambia originated 
from the United Kingdom and South Africa with the subsequent investment funds 
coming from China, which was eager to secure mineral resources for its economic 
growth (UNCTAD, 2006; Haglund, 2010). By 2007 China was the largest foreign 
investor in Zambia, with a total pledged investment more than the second, third and 
fourth investors combined. As part of its investment strategy, the Chinese government 
has supported the development of a Special Economic Zone, situated in the 
Copperbelt, which enables Chinese companies to qualify for favourable tax breaks 
(Carmody et al., 2011). 
 
After a decade of liberalisation, the MMD government realised that “even in a 
liberalized economy, development planning is necessary for guiding priority setting 
and resource allocation” (GRZ, 2006, p.i). It published its first plan, the Fifth National 
Development Plan (FNDP), in 2006 in which it identified a number of strategic 
sectors: infrastructure, tourism, mining manufacturing and energy, the same sectors it 
would continue to focus on during the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP). The 
agricultural sector was seen as the cornerstone for economic and social development. 
Despite the increased role the MMD sees for the public sector, this should mainly be 
as an enabler aiming to stimulate the private sector to generate most of the economic 
growth (GRZ, 2006). 
 
The continued policy of liberalisation led to improvements in the economy. During 
the Fifth National Development Plan period from 2006-2010 GDP grew steadily at 
around 6% per annum, exports rose, inflation decreased and the balance of payments 
was positive (World Bank, 2010a; GRZ, 2011a). Poverty levels, both rural and urban, 
also were reduced (World Bank, 2010a). This positive economic performance was 
largely driven by a steady increase in the price of copper (CSO, 2011b). 
 
From 1991, important changes were made in the heavily regulated agricultural sector. 
Consumer subsidies on maize were abolished, fertiliser subsidies were reduced, 
export of maize was freed, and the import of agricultural inputs was partially 
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liberalised (GRZ, 2002). Further, the state marketing board, NAMBOARD, was 
dismantled and replaced by the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) tasked to “efficiently 
manage sustainable National Strategic Food Reserves, ensuring National Food 
Security and income through the provision of complementary and high quality 
marketing and storage services, in line with international standards” (FRA, 2010).  
 
Initially, these changes had a dramatic effect on small-scale farmers, the large 
majority of the country’s population. Inputs became more expensive and hence the 
use of fertiliser and hybrid seeds reduced, leading to a decline in production 
(Deininger and Olinto, 2000). By the first decade of the 21st century, the agricultural 
sector was performing relatively well with an increase in production, a diversification 
away from maize in areas not suitable for this crop, a rise in the growth of export 
crops driven by private investment, and a decline in rural poverty (Jayne et al., 2007). 
Overall, however, the growth of the agricultural sector averaged less than 2% per 
annum, far below the target of 6% set in the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme, CAADP (CSO, 2010). 
 
The Zambian government continues to view agriculture as a driving force for 
economic growth and poverty reduction, as reflected in the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper from 2002, the National Agriculture Policy from 2004, the Fifth 
National Development Plan from 2006 and the recently published Sixth National 
Development Plan (GRZ, 2002, 2006 and 2011a; MACO 2004). Within current 
policy, there is a shared focus on the small-scale farmers and commercial farmers 
with the aim of building linkages between agribusiness and smallholders. To facilitate 
this, the government implemented a Farm Block plan where the public sector provides 
basic infrastructure to develop large areas across the country. On these farm blocks 
both large and small-scale farms will operate, offering jobs and land to the rural 
population (MFNP, 2005). The core venture with a size of around 10,000ha will 
mostly grow crops for exports, with further support for food crops and it will offer 
outgrower opportunities to the small-scale farmers situated on the Farm Block 
(MFNP, 2005). Biofuel production is discouraged (Sichembe, 2011). Although the 
plan aims to have a Farm Block in every province, by 2011 only the first block, 
Nansanga in Central Province, had been advertised to investors (GRZ, 2011b), mainly 
due to a lack of funds to develop required infrastructure (Sichembe, 2011). 
LARGE-SCALE FOREIGN LAND INVESTMENT IN ZAMBIA 
- 110 - 
Notwithstanding the continuous expression of the potential of the agricultural sector, 
budgetary support has been small at around 7% (Chapoto, 2010). In addition, the 
majority of government funds have been allocated towards the Fertiliser Support 
Programme (FSP), its successor the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) and 
crop purchases by the FRA (Chapoto, 2010).  This has occured despite the policy that 
government “will not ordinarily intervene in inputs distribution or crop marketing in a 
way that will undermine or undercut private sector participation especially if the 
private sector has the will or capacity to do so” (MACO, 2004, vi). Figure 5-2 shows 
the budgetary allocation to the FISP and the FRA.  
 
Figure 5-2: Proportion of MACO, Livestock and Fisheries Budget Allocation Devoted to FRA 
and FSP 2001-2011 in % (Excluding donor funds) 
 
Source: Chapoto, 2010 
 
Illustrative of the impact maize has on the government budget is the outcome of 
improved crop output in 2010. In order to purchase maize from smallholders, the FRA 
had to spend over one trillion Kwacha (Miti, 2010). This amount was nearly ZK700 
million more than budgeted and took the allocated MACO budget from ZK1.2 billion 
to over ZK1.8 billion, putting a heavy strain on government finances (Chipoto, 2010). 
An even bigger harvest was expected in 2011 on the back of high prices received by 
small-scale farmers from the FRA in 2010 and an increase in farmers benefiting from 
the FISP (CSO, 2011a). The above market prices paid by FRA make maize exports 
uncompetitive (Munro and Fynn, 2010). In order to sell excess stocks to neighbouring 
countries, the government makes an additional loss selling below the price it bought 
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for (Burke et al., 2010). With the signing of the CAAPD, Zambia committed itself to 
a 10% budget allocation to the agricultural sector, a target it is working towards, 
although with the high percentage going to maize marketing and input subsidies, not 
necessarily in the most productive manner. 
 
Since the liberalisation of the agricultural sector, a number of private enterprises have 
sprung up, offering farmers access to inputs and markets for several cash crops 
through the use of outgrower schemes. Some crops like cotton and tobacco continued 
from privatised programmes previously run by the government. Other crops such as 
sugar and horticulture are fully established by the private sector (Likulunga, 2005; 
UNCTAD, 2006). Foreign investors such as the cotton producer, Dunavant, and 
Zambia Sugar13, are the major drivers in the development of the agribusiness sector 
(UNCTAD, 2006). Growth in these crops, which are mainly destined for export, has 
given smallholder farmers in rural areas a source of income, thereby assisting in the 
reduction of rural poverty (UNCTAD, 2006; Jayne et al., 2007). Nevertheless, these 
crops remain small in volume compared to the heavily subsidised maize. 
 
A large role was envisaged for the private sector that would take the place of the 
retreating government in areas such as maize marketing, fertiliser supply and credit 
facilitation (Deininger and Olinto, 2000). Lack of clarity in government policies 
however, created an uncertain environment for private enterprises to establish and 
operate (e.g. GRZ, 2002; Jayne et al., 2007). Despite some efforts to liberalise the 
market, fertiliser subsidies continued to exist (Jayne et al., 2007). More damaging 
were the interventions in the maize market. The FRA became an increasingly 
dominant buyer, especially in remote areas, where maize production was 
uncompetitive (Jayne et al., 2007). In addition, the government continues to intervene 
in the import and export of maize (Dorosh et al., 2009). As a result, of the six 
international grain-trading companies that entered the Zambian market after 1991, 
four have since closed down (Nijhoff et al., 2003). 
 
Another disincentive to the private sector to get involved in the Zambian agricultural 
sector is inconsistent trade policies that the government has followed, especially with 
                                                 
13
 South Africa based Illovo Sugar has an 82% share in Zambia Sugar. In turn, Illovo Sugar is 51% 
owned by Associated British Foods (Illovo Sugar, 2010). 
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regards to the import and export of food crops such as maize and wheat. In both 2002 
and 2003 the government remained unclear on the pricing and levels of its maize 
imports which were needed due to low domestic harvests. The uncertainty of 
government actions led the private sector to hold off decisions on its own imports. 
Ultimately, this resulted in domestic maize prices going up to unnecessary high levels, 
even higher than import parity prices (Nijhoff et al., 2002, 2003). Similar 
indecisiveness on the governments’ part drove up prices again in 2005-06 
(Mwanaumo et. al. 2005). Although no export ban was in place after the record 2010 
harvest and large stocks were available, exports have still been limited. Private traders 
have been uncertain throughout the season of the quantity available in the market after 
the FRA adjusted its target quantity to buy upwards numerous times during the 
season. Once again, the high involvement of the FRA in the maize market had a 
negative impact on the private sector (Nkonde et al., 2011). 
 
One indirect effect on the private sector resulting from continuous government 
intervention in the maize market can be seen in the cotton industry. Cotton production 
increased considerably since the privatisation of the parastatal LINTCO and 
liberalisation of the cotton market. Output of cotton seed increased from 42,000 
metric tonnes in 1994/95 to 227,000 metric tonnes in 2003/04. Since then, farmers 
have reduced the area dedicated to this crop, resulting in reduced crops and over-
capacity of processing facilities operated by the private sector. Apart from a decline in 
world cotton prices, it is argued that increased government support for maize made it 
more attractive for farmers to convert their land to maize production (CDT, 2008). 
This example illustrates how the private sector is influenced by government 
intervention, and demonstrates how reliance of processing companies on outgrowers 
can make these companies extremely vulnerable. 
 
Despite a largely positive performance of the agricultural sector in Zambia, a number 
of issues still exist. Amongst others, productivity is low and crops are largely rain-fed; 
post-harvest losses are extremely high due to lack of proper storage facilities both at 
the household and the FRA level; inadequate infrastructure; grain markets are 
functioning inefficiently, and, the land tenure system is insecure (GRZ, 2006; FAO, 
2009). This makes it challenging for farmers to produce crops at a competitive price 
for exports and limits the possible outlets to mainly the domestic market. 
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5.2.2 Land Policy 
Land policy in Zambia is regulated through the Land Act of 1995. According to this 
Act, all land is vested in the President who holds the land on behalf of all Zambian 
citizens. There are two categories of land classification: Statutory or State Land and 
Customary Land (ZLA, 1995). State Land is mostly titled land and used for urban 
areas or commercial farming. During colonisation, these areas used to be Crown Land 
from which Africans were excluded (Jayne et al., 2008). The majority of State Land is 
located on the railway line between Lusaka and Copperbelt provinces. It is an area 
rich in minerals and enjoys the highest agricultural potential (Adams, 2003). In total, 
State Land covers around 6% of the total Zambian land area. 
 
The remaining 94% of Zambia’s land surface is classified as Customary Land. Out of 
this, 8% is allocated as National Park, another 8% is used as forest reserves, 22% is 
designated as Game Management Area, 2% is under urban use and 12% is unspecified 
(e.g. state farms, military, research stations) (Metcalfe, 2005). This leaves a mere 
42%, to be classified as ‘arable’, part of which is marshland or too hilly to use for 
agricultural production (Chizyuka et al., 2006). Smallholders generally farm on 
communal land. Jayne et al. (2008) conclude that despite the apparent abundance of 
land, many Zambian farmers perceive there is no land with agricultural potential 
available to them, mainly due to lack of access to infrastructure, services and markets. 
 
Customary Land is subject to customary law and under the authority of the local 
Chief. The Chief and Headmen allocate land to individuals. Under the Lands Act of 
1995 it is possible for the President to transfer communal land to Statutory Land and 
consequently to issue it under leasehold. The traditional rulers need to give their 
written consent before they surrender their land rights. The President will also have to 
consult those that are occupying and/or using the land. This process has been subject 
to much debate. Several press reports exist on irregularities and fraudulent 
transactions (e.g. Sunday Mail 2007, The Post, 2007). Chiefs have protested that they 
are insufficiently engaged in consultations with government officials, including 
around large-scale land deals (Changala, 2010). The Lands Act of 1995 does not 
make any provision for the return of Statutory Land to Customary Land. Once land is 
owned by the State, it is not possible for traditional leaders to regain control. This 
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situation is a source of great frustration to some chiefs who observe large areas not 
being fully utilised without having the possibility to claim this back for more 
productive use by the community (Changala, 2010).  
 
Under the Lands Act of 1995, the President can allocate land to foreign investors. The 
foreigner must be an “investor” according to the Zambian Investment Act or a 
company registered under the Companies Act. The President can also issue his 
personal consent to issue land to a non-Zambian in writing. If land to be allocated to a 
foreign investor is classified as Customary Land, the local Chief will have to give his 
approval to convert this land to State Land. The maximum leasehold is 99 years 
(GRZ, 1995).  
 
In the absence of a proper functioning Lands Act and limited availability of State 
Land, the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives (MACO) intends to open up new 
farm blocks across the country to “facilitate availability and accessibility of land for 
agriculture in potentially productive agricultural areas” (MACO, 2004, 11). Farm 
blocks are large areas of customary land of minimum 100,000ha identified by the 
Ministry which are then converted to Statutory land with the help of the Ministry of 
Lands (MFNP, 2005; Jayne et al., 2008).  
 
Several opinions exist on whether customary land hampers agricultural development 
or offers a vital safety net for poor families. It is beyond the scope of this research 
project to assess whether this transfer from customary land to state land and the 
development of farm blocks are the best way for Zambia to develop the productivity 
of its agricultural sector, to ensure food security for the country or to attract (foreign) 
investment.  
5.2.3 Biofuel policy 
There is great potential in Zambia to establish a biofuel industry. It can serve as a 
generator of revenue for small-scale farmers growing biofuel crops, offer employment 
on commercial farms, attract foreign capital and knowledge in the processing of 
biofuel crops into bio-diesel or ethanol, and reduce the expenditure of foreign 
exchange on imports of petroleum and diesel. In the Energy Chapter of the Fifth NDP 
of 2006, the Government recognises the role that biofuel can play as a renewable 
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source of energy and also as a means of income for small-scale farmers. It has 
therefore identified the need to develop a strategy for the promotion of biofuel use 
(GRZ, 2006). Following up on these ideas, a Revised National Energy Policy was 
approved by Cabinet making biofuel an accepted part of the national fuel mix and can 
therefore be managed by the Energy Regulator Board (ERB) and distributed by 
companies with a petroleum license (Kalumiana, 2009). The Sixth NDP published in 
2011 stipulates fixed blending targets for both biodiesel and bioethanol (GRZ, 2011a), 
creating a guaranteed market for biofuel producers, which is one of the major 
impediments to the growth of the biofuel sector according to the Biofuels Association 
of Zambia (Sinkala, 2011). Although some progress has been made, Richardson 
(2010) notes that little has actually been achieved by the Government to regulate the 
biofuel sector and stimulate private investors. He mentions that by early 2010 “no 
blend mandates, no government concessions for start-up costs and no commitments 
on infrastructure had been agreed” (Richardson, 2010, 930). In a 2009 report, Oxfam 
cites indifference by the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives as hindering the 
Ministries of Commerce and Energy to move forward (Oxfam, 2009). In addition, the 
current players in the oil industry are extremely powerful and unwilling to give up 
even a small fraction of their market share (Richardson, 2010). Lack of regulation, 
especially with regards to the tax regime, has been mentioned by a number of biofuel 
producers as increasing the risk of their investment. 
5.3 Land investment in Zambia 
This section aims to identify the large-scale investors, agricultural sub-sectors they 
invest in, the scale they operate on and the reasons why they selected Zambia. Data is 
based on interviews held during a field visit in early 2011 and numerous media and 
other publications. In addition, data supplied by the ZDA is used. Since its foundation 
in 2007, the ZDA has maintained a database with all the pledged investment in the 
country, subdivided by sector, building on data collection by the Zambia Investment 
Centre (ZIC) since 1993. Unfortunately this database does not capture the land 
surface area involved but only the US$ amount planned to be invested and the number 
of jobs pledged to be created. The number of projects is therefore substantial and the 
majority concerns projects smaller than 5,000ha. In the general analysis, all pledges 
other than those without foreign involvement are incorporated. When going into 
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further detail however, only information from identified large-scale projects is 
included in the analysis. 
 
In addition to the lack of area information, numerous large-scale projects, both by 
domestic and foreign investors, have been arranged without the assistance of the ZIC 
or the ZDA and therefore do not feature in the database. Even when deals are signed 
through these organisations, they are not always captured in the database. For 
example, in January 2010 the ZDA signed a land lease of 5,200ha with a Saudi firm 
for the production of pineapples. This deal was published in the press in early 2011 
(Zambian Watchdog, 2011). Nevertheless, no mention is made of this project in the 
ZDA database, even though the ZDA representative did discuss this project during a 
personal interview (Lungu, 2011). In this analysis all known projects are included, 
regardless of whether they are included in the ZDA database. It is noted that the 
database captures pledges and not actual investments, which might be smaller. In 
general, issues regarding data collection in Zambia are similar to those problems 
encountered by other researchers and which were explained in Chapter 3. 
5.3.1 The actors 
The largest numbers of investors in Zambian agriculture are from South Africa, UK 
and Zimbabwe. Domestic investors also play an important role. As Figure 5-3 
illustrates, the number of pledged investments in the agricultural sector was 
considerable in the first half of the 1990s. This situation might have been due to the 
liberalisation process undertaken by the new government under the Structural 
Adjustment Programme that could have attracted initial investors. The consecutive 
drop in pledges later in the 1990s can be attributed to the revision of the investment 
act in 1996, revoking import duty exemption on capital goods14. Due to the colonial 
ties, Britain traditionally has been an important investor in Zambia (UNCTAD, 2006). 
The Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) was involved in many rural 
development programmes. For example, the CDC assisted the Industrial Development 
Corporation, run by the state, in the nationalisation process of Zambia Sugar which 
was envisaged by President Kaunda to be fully supplied by smallholders in the 
Mazabuka area (Richardson, 2010). It also set up the Mpongwe Development 
                                                 
14
 Investment incentives were reinstated in 2006 after which projects investing at least US$500,000 in a 
priority sector qualify for several incentives including duty free import of capital goods (ZDA, 2011) 
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Company in the Copperbelt area. Both these projects will be discussed in further 
detail later in this section. Since the late 1990s, the CDC has reduced greatly its 
investments such that private firms now account for the majority of agricultural 
investments in Zambia (The Economist, 2001; Scott, 2010). 
 
Figure 5-3: Number and amount of pledged investments by top 6 investing countries, 1993-2010 
 
Source: ZDA and own research.  
 
Overall, from Figure 5-3 it is evident that British investors account for most of the 
pledged investment projects, and also lead when it comes to US$ planned to invest 
these projects. Total anticipated inflow of funds from British investors between 1993-
2010 is estimated at around US$186 million, nearly double that of Zimbabwe, the 
second biggest foreign investor. One major contributor is Chayton Capital, an 
investment company based in Britain, currently owner of two smaller commercial 
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farms but planning to expand to a much larger scale, investing an estimated US$85 
million (Chobe Agrivision Limited, 2011; Nyagah, 2011). 
 
During the transition from apartheid to democracy from 1992 onwards, South African 
commercial white farmers faced uncertainty about their land rights and general impact 
of majority rule on their farms. It is argued that this caused them to look at other 
countries to continue farming, and explains the high number of projects in this early 
period (Hall, 2011). If this is the case, the fact that most projects are based on 
individual farmers rather than by firms explains the low average investment amount 
of under US$650,000 of South African projects as compared to investment pledges 
from other countries which average over US$4 million. As a whole, the years 2002-
2004 saw an influx of investment pledges from neighbouring Zimbabwe, where 
farmers fled their farms because of land dispossession under the Mugabe government. 
Most of the pledges registered by the ZDA concern relatively small commercial 
farms, which is reflected by the low average investment of just over US$1 million 
during these three years versus more than US$1.4 million over the total period from 
1993-2010. 
 
Many people interviewed during the fieldwork period, perceive both China and India 
as large investors (e.g. Muijs, D., 2011, Levin, 2011; Lungu, 2011; ZNFU, 2011). The 
ZDA database, however, does not reflect this perception. Although these countries are 
large investors in the mining, construction and manufacturing sectors (ZDA, 2010; 
Carmody et al., 2011, Mutumweno, 2011), their involvement in Zambian agriculture 
until 2010 is recorded as small. The number of pledged projects from China and India 
also do not seem to be increasing over the captured data period. According to a ZDA 
representative, there are a number of very large-scale projects in the pipeline which 
have not yet been captured, such as a 400,000ha project for a Chinese biofuel 
company as well as plans by an Indian firm to establish a 45,000ha sugar plantation 
(Lungu, 2011). Carmody et al. (2011) confirm the increase in Chinese activity in 
Zambia through the establishment of a Special Economic Zone, the first Chinese SEZ 
in Africa. Although the Chinese were amongst the first to enter the agricultural 
market, their operations are of moderate size and produce mainly for the domestic 
market rather than for export (Marks, 2008; Bastholm and Kragelund, 2009).  
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5.3.2 Profile 
Compared to foreign investment in the mining industry, agricultural FDI is relatively 
small. In the period from 2000-2010, agriculture consisted of a mere average of 3% of 
pledged investment value, a percentage that has dropped considerably after 2006 
(ZDA, 2010). Nevertheless, in absolute figures, FDI in agriculture has increased 
consistently over this period from under US$9 million in 2000 to nearly US$195 
million in 2010.  
 
Despite the relatively low investment amount, FDI in the agricultural sector is 
important in terms of employment. The 3% of investment value creates on average 
23% of all the pledged jobs in the period from 2000-2010. Despite the growth in 
investment value, the number of jobs created by these investments has not grown 
considerably. Whereas in 1993 an average of US$3,500 created one job, this 
increased to US$7,732 by 2000 and over US$30,000 by 2010. These findings indicate 
that projects have a higher degree of mechanisation rather than being dependent on 
manual labour (see Plate 5-1 on page 122). Figure 5-4 summarises the employment 
data and shows that investment in agriculture is increasing once again after a dip in 
2007. 
 























Source: ZDA, 2010 
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Another observation is an increase in the average size of projects in Zambia after 
2005. In 2006 ETC Bio-Energy bought the 45,000ha Mpongwe Development farm 
from the CDC pledging an investment of nearly US$ 60 million. In 2009 Chayton 
Capital made its first investment pledge under the name of Chobe Agrivision 
Company Limited. In total, this investor predicts to require US$85 million to expand 
its operation to 20,000ha for crop production (Nyagah, 2011). The German based 
Mann Ferrostaal signed a concession with the ZDA in 2009 for 120,000ha although at 
a relatively low investment value of US$1 million. In 2010 and 2011 a number of 
additional large-scale investments were announced. For example, the expansion of the 
Zambia Sugar operation increasing its total area to 27,500ha (Illovo Sugar, 2010), a 
5,200ha pineapple farm funded by a Saudi businessman (Zambian Watchdog, 2011), 
45,000ha for a planned sugar plantation by the Indian company Puzzolana 
(Mutumweno, 2011) and a massive 400,000ha for Chinese based Wuhan Kaidi which 
entered a joint venture with a Zambian partner under the name of Kaidi Biomass to 
set up biofuel production. All these plans were confirmed in an interview with a ZDA 
representative (Lungu, 2011). Table 5-1 gives an overview of large-scale investment 
projects in Zambia with the geographical spread across the country shown in Figure 
5-5. 
 
Table 5-1: Large-scale foreign land investment projects in Zambia 
Investor Nationality Sub sector Area (ha) Status 
D1 Oils UK Biofuel 35,000 Reduced 
ETC Bio-Energy Tanzanian / South 
African 
Crop Farming / 
Biofuel 
45,000 Operational 
Zambia Sugar British / South 
African 
Crop Farming 27,500 Operational 
Mann Ferrostaal German Biofuel 120,000 Pilot 
Chobe Agrivision British Crop Farming 20,000 Operational 
Menafea Holding Saudi Arabia Crop Farming 5,200 Signed 
Kaidi Biomass Chinese / Zambian Biofuel 400,000 Planned 
Puzzolana Indian Biofuel 45,000 Planned 
Source: ZDA and own research 
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Figure 5-5: Location of large-scale land investments in Zambia 
 
Source: own compilation 
 
The available data indicates that large-scale foreign investment in Zambia is 
increasing, albeit not on as great a scale which is reported in countries such as 
Ethiopia, Madagascar and Sudan. The 700,000ha identified in Table 5-1 covers 3% of 
total agricultural land, although due to the low arable land15 area, investments would 
take up over 28% based on this category (based on FAOSTAT data). This is more an 
indication of the limited usable land rather than the large scale of investment. 
  
As Table 5-1 shows, the largest areas of land are allocated in Zambia to the biofuel 
sub-sector. Most biofuel projects are situated on previously customary land in rural 
areas, secured through the ZDA. This has been the case for all of the examples above, 
with the exception of the biofuel activities undertaken by ETC Bio-Energy. Several 
biofuel companies have chosen the business strategy of partially or fully depending on 
outgrowers for their input. D1 Oils, Oval, Southern Biofuel and domestic Marli all 
                                                 
15
 The FAO defines arable land as “the land under temporary agricultural crops (multiple-cropped areas 
are counted only once), temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, land under market and kitchen 
gardens and land temporarily fallow (less than five years). The abandoned land resulting from shifting 
cultivation is not included in this category. Data for “arable land” are not meant to indicate the amount 
of land that is potentially cultiviable” (FAOSTAT, 2011b). 
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chose to incorporate outgrowers to produce their input rather than purchase large 
areas of land (Freim, 2008; GEXSI, 2008; Chongo, 2010). 
 
Plate 5-1: Large-scale soya bean farming, ETC Bio-Energy 
Source: Author’s photograph 
 
By contrast, crop farming investors usually target land which already is under 
leasehold. For example, ETC Bio-Energy took over the Mpongwe Development 
Company and it grows maize, soya beans and wheat, partially on irrigated land. Plate 
5-1 illustrates a large-scale soya bean field at ETC Bio-Energy. This plot is 
mechanically sewn, irrigated and harvested. Illovo Sugar took over the sugar 
operation initially set up with the assistance of the CDC and in 2009 completed the 
acquisition of a neighbouring farm previously owned by Zambeef (Lusaka Times, 
2009; Richardson, 2010). Chayton Capital operates on at least two previously 
established farms (Mutumweno, 2011). Amongst the major crops that are grown on 
large-scale farms are maize, soya beans, wheat and sugar. Whereas the first three 
crops are for the domestic market, a significant part of the sugar production is 
exported and has potential for the generation of bioethanol (Illovo Sugar, 2010). 
 
A different picture emerges if the analysis is undertaken of all agricultural FDI, 
regardless of land area. An analysis of ZDA data from 2000-2010 reveals that crop 
farming dominates, accounting for over 70% of the pledged investment value. Mixed 
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farming and poultry each take up around 8% respectively. Horticulture and 
floriculture appear to be growing with pledged investment for three consecutive years 
from 2008-2010. Overall, however, biofuel production accounts for only 2% of the 
pledged investment value. This figure could increase considerably once further data 
becomes available on the Puzzolana and Kaidi Biomass projects. In addition, ETC 
Bio-Energy has invested a large part of their funds into establishing a jatropha 
plantation, but this is classified under the category of crop farming. Therefore, the 
impact of the biofuel industry is potentially on a larger scale than the ZDA figures 
reveal. In the discussion below, only the five sub-sectors of crop farming, mixed 
farming, poultry, horti-and floriculture, and biofuel are taken into account. 
 
Several sub-sectors have a different effect in terms of foreign exchange earnings and 
jobs, two of the main objectives for a government in seeking to attract FDI. The 
average US$ investment pledge per project is highest in the crop farming sector at 
over US$5.5 million followed by the biofuel sector with just under US$5 million 
average per project. Mixed farming averages less than US$ 700,000 per project. If the 
aim of the Zambian government is to try to create employment, the biofuel and crop 
sectors once again seem to be attractive, pledging an average of 314 and 173 jobs per 
project respectively. These figures are dependent on the actual crop grown. Biofuel 
crops either can be the labour-intensive jatropha or the highly mechanised sugar. In 
the crop sector, grains such as maize and soya beans largely are mechanised whereas 
cotton requires more hand labour. The poultry sector is the most capital-intensive, 
averaging nearly US$ 60,000 per job created. Table 5-2 contains an overview of the 
economic impact of the five main sub-sectors. 
 
Table 5-2: Economic development indicators, averages per project for several sub-sectors 
Sub-sector Avg employment Avg investment 
(US$ x 1,000) 
Avg investment per 
job created (US$) 
Crop farming 173 5,687 32,960 
Biofuel production 314 4,867 15,483 
Mixed farming 85 639 7,568 
Poultry 188 3,142 58,665 
Horti- & floriculture 68 2,209 32,636 
Source: Based on ZDA data 
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Geographically, most investment still takes place along the historically developed 
‘line of rail’ provinces. Lusaka receives the largest amount of investment, over US$ 
225 million in the period 2000-2010 (see Figure 5-6). This result is skewed because of 
the fact that companies register in Lusaka whereas their main activities take place 
outside this province. For example, D1 Oils is registered by the ZDA as a Lusaka 
project, but its main operations were located in the Northern and Eastern Provinces 
before the company reduced its activities in Zambia. There is a large dominance of 
crop farming in Lusaka province. Also, Lusaka is the main centre for horticulture and 
poultry farming, expected to be driven by the large market of the capital city. The 
Copperbelt attracted US$126 million in the five main sectors between 2000-2010, 
which was equally distributed between crop and mixed farming. The Copperbelt is a 
densely populated area where demand for food is high. In the Central province, 
agricultural activity mainly is centred in the Mkushi district, where 54 investment 
pledges have been made in the period 2000-2010. As in the Copperbelt, almost all 
projects focus on crop and mixed farming. 
 
The picture looks different when only large-scale FDI (larger than 5,000ha) is 
analysed. Although crop farming enterprises focus on the more densely populated 
areas and prefer to acquire established farms, such as ETC Bio-Energy in the 
Copperbelt province and Chayton Capital in the Mkushi district, Central province, the 
biofuel enterprises seek out virgin land which is usually only available on a large 
scale in the more rural provinces. For example, Mann Ferrostaal has set up in the 
Northern Province, together with domestic firm Zambeef which started a palm oil 
plantation in the same region. Puzzolana plans its plantation in the Western Province, 
whereas Menafea will produce pineapples in the North West. Sugar production is 
concentrated around the farms operated by Zambia Sugar in Mazabuka, Southern 
Province. For crop farming investors, it is important that a farm exists with an 
established infrastructure, such as roads and irrigation, enabling them to quickly 
generate income. In addition, the property rights for established farms are likely to be 
more secure with less risk of other people inhabiting the property. By contrast, the 
priority for large-scale fuel producers is large areas of uncultivated land which are 
easy to clear and cheap. These fuel producers do not depend on irrigation for their 
crops. Large areas of cheap land are mostly available only in the provinces furthest 
away from the line of rail. 
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Figure 5-6: Pledged investment per province in US$1,000 between 1993-2010 
 
Source: based on ZDA data 
 
In Chapter 3, one observation was that whilst the reported scale of FDI in agriculture 
was very large, actual operations on the ground seemed to be of a lesser scale. This 
situation is also the case in Zambia. For example, whilst Mann Ferrostaal acquired 
120,000ha of land in 2009, by the beginning of 2011 it was reported to have only a 
number of nurseries to determine which crop to grow (Lungu, 2011). In addition, D1 
Oils (as many other biofuel investors who entered the Zambian market around 2006) 
has withdrawn from the large areas where they distributed inputs to outgrowers and 
only works now with a handful of small farmers covering an area not more than a few 
hundred hectares (Ross, 2011). Even large-scale, established, commercial farms such 
as ETC Bio-Energy, only use part of the available land. Of its 45,000ha only 15,000ha 
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is used for cropping (Verus, 2011). The remainder of the land is kept as unused bush 
land, although it was envisaged to convertpart of this land to jatropha plantations. 
According to one interviewee, as long as 5% of the allocated land area is used within 
a period of three years, the state cannot take back the land (Muijs, A., 2011). The 
ZDA states that if within 24 months the investor has not lived up to its promises, it 
can take the land back. Nevertheless, so far the organisation has not acted on this 
statement, mostly due to the fact that projects for which they have acquired land are 
less than two years old. In general, ZDA claims that for those companies whom they 
grant an investment license, 50% of the pledged investment is made in the first year 
and the full project should be ‘up and running’ within three years (Lungu, 2011). 
Experience with large-scale agriculture does not seem to confirm these figures, 
although for smaller projects this appears to be the case. 
 
The reaction to the efforts by the government to attract foreign investors to the newly 
developed Nansanga Farm block appears disappointing. After receiving pre-
applications from ten foreign and six domestic companies in February 2011 
(Simpelwe, 2011a), only two final bids were made respectively by one domestic and 
one foreign investor, namely Bonafarm Group from Hungary (Simpelwe, 2011b). The 
Hungarian group was assigned as the winner of the tender (Lusaka Times, 2012). 
5.3.3 Drivers 
Chapter 3 identified a large number of drivers for increased global large-scale 
agricultural investment. These were all linked to the financial, oil or credit crises or to 
the longer-term changes in the world climate. These global drivers are also 
underpinnings of investments in Zambia. There are a number of factors that make 
Zambia particularly attractive for large-scale land investments. 
 
First, Zambia has been identified as one of the countries with the highest gross land 
balances, land with crop potential that is not currently used for agriculture (Bruinsma, 
2009). Although amongst the people interviewed for this research opinions differ 
whether land is actually abundant, the general opinion amongst the interviewees is 
that large areas of land are available (Hamusimbi, 2011; Muijs, D., 2011). This was 
also the viewpoint which was communicated by several government officials (Lungu, 
2011; Sichembe, 2011). 
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Second, Zambia has sufficient water resources to be used in agricultural production. 
Investors looking at crop farming also indicate that land is available which is well 
developed with irrigation and other infrastructure already available on the farms 
(Chobe Agrivision Limited, 2011; Nyagah, 2011). The Zambia Land Alliance (ZLA) 
is of the opinion, however, that most land in Zambia is used in many ways such as for 
grazing, fire wood collection or for future generations. It claims it is impossible to 
find an area of 45,000 ha anywhere where there is no settlement (ZLA, 2011). 
 
Third, not only is land perceived as abundant, it is also cheap. Land rental fees, to be 
paid to the central government in 2011 are around US$1.00 per hectare per year16. If 
land is obtained through the ZDA, no other charges are applicable to the purchase of a 
land leasehold. In the case of a market transfer between private parties concerning 
statutory land a purchase price for the use of the actual land can be applicable. Land 
prices have gone up considerably, according to some of the interviewees (Huddy, 
2011; Muijs, D., 2011; ZNFU, 2011). 
 
The fourth driver of agricultural investment is a growing market, both domestically 
and regionally. Zambia, and many of its neighbours, is mostly dependent on rain-fed 
agriculture, which leads to instability in the production of the main food crops and can 
lead to food imports (Burke et al., 2010; Munro and Fynn, 2010). With land and water 
available, there is the potential to grow sufficient crops domestically. Not only is there 
an opportunity for farmers to substitute imports. With a growing population and 
increase in incomes, the demand for food increases, enlarging the potential market. In 
addition, the demise of the Zimbabwean agricultural sector under the Mugabe 
government in the first decade of the 21st century left a gap in regional production 
which investors in neighbouring countries are keen to take advantage of.  
 
The fifth factor making Zambia attractive to agricultural FDI is the increased role of 
the private sector since the liberalisation processes implemented during the early 
1990s. This stimulated infrastructure development in support of commercial farming. 
Examples are private millers and seed companies. The sugar sector specifically can 
take advantage of preferential access to the European Union (Illovo Sugar, 2010).  
                                                 
16
 None of the interviewees could verify a proposed increase to US$4.00 per ha per year. 
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Sixth, for biofuel investors, Zambia offers an attractive market. Without its own 
resources, Zambia imports all of its fuel. Being a land-locked country, the costs of 
these imports are significant. The largest source of energy in the country is wood fuel, 
making Zambia a country with a high deforestation rate and desertification already a 
threat in some areas (GRZ, 2008; World Bank, 2010a). The government has 
acknowledged the fact that the current rate of deforestation is not environmentally 
sustainable, whereas the import of petroleum at an ever-increasing rate is a heavy 
burden on foreign exchange reserves (GRZ, 2008). Biofuel investors believe that 
domestically produced biodiesel and bioethanol can compete with the high prices of 
imported fuels. 
 
Finally, investors are attracted by the positive business climate of Zambia. The 
government of Zambia is supportive of foreign investment and has established the 
ZDA to assist investors in setting up operations in the country. Amongst others, the 
ZDA acquires land for investors or can allocate land from a land bank it has 
established. In the Fifth and Sixth National Development Plan, the agricultural sector 
has been labelled as a priority sector and investors in this sector therefore can apply 
for a number of tax incentives (GRZ, 2006; 2008). For example, the import of capital 
goods required for the operation is tax free and the investor is exempt from corporate 
tax for the first five years of profit making. Overall, the investment climate in Zambia 
is perceived as good with high potential (Nyagah, 2011; Verus, 2011). In addition, the 
political situation in Zambia is considered as stable. Despite the perceived stability, 
Chayton Capital, operating in Zambia under the name of Chobe Agrivision, has 
signed an agreement with the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), an 
agency within the World Bank Group, focussed amongst others on insuring investors 
in developing countries against political risk (Daniel and Mittal, 2010; Nyagah, 2011). 
5.3.4 Issues 
Despite the perceived availability of cheap land and water and a beneficial investment 
climate, investors face a number of challenges that might limit the full potential of an 
agricultural investment. Several of these issues are general, whereas others are 
specifically crop-related. The investors who were interviewed raised a number of 
problems they face, which are reflected in several other studies.  
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The first problem is that Zambia is a land-locked country. This makes the cost of 
transportation higher than for neighbouring countries such as Mozambique and 
especially South Africa. High transportation costs mean higher prices for imported 
inputs such as fertiliser and capital equipment, thus increasing the total cost of 
production. In addition, there are higher costs involved to export finished products 
especially to countries outside the region (Munro and Fynn, 2010; Verus, 2011). 
 
Second, not only do transportation costs make production uncompetitive, the 
infrastructure in general is seen as inadequate. Many rural areas are not easily 
accessible and, especially in the rainy season, roads become impassable. As a result, 
inputs under the FISP do not arrive in time (World Bank, 2010c). The Cotton 
Development Trust (CDT) identifies both high transportation costs and inadequate 
infrastructure as reasons for making the production of cotton less competitive, 
especially in rural areas (CDT, 2008, 4). The government has long recognised the 
need to develop rural infrastructure in order to grow the agricultural sector (MACO, 
2004; GRZ, 2006, 2011a). The Farm Block policy stipulates that the government will 
provide basic infrastructure, supplemented by additional investment by the core 
venture (GRZ, 2011b). ETC Bio-Energy, although benefiting from a good road to 
Mpongwe village, indicated that they maintain their own access road rather than 
depending on the district council despite significant contributions to the district 
budget through grain levies17. 
 
Third, human resources are identified as another challenge for investors. Minimum 
wage levels went up from ZK268,000 to ZK419,000 or just under US$90 per month 
in 2011 (Wangwe, 2011). Although this rate is still extremely low and barely above 
the US$2 a day poverty line, it is higher than for other sub-Saharan countries, such as 
Malawi and Madagascar. Employment problems are not limited to high costs. Petty 
crime is a problem many investors have to deal with and manifests itself mainly in 
employee theft (Chingola, 2011). Furthermore, one investor identified people as one 
of the main issues they faced, stating corruption, honesty and reliability as particular 
challenges (Ross, 2011) whereas ETC Bio-Energy also indicate that petty crime, 
                                                 
17
 Grain levies are paid for those quantities of grain transported out of the district. In the case of ETC, 
most grains go to commercial millers outside Mpongwe. In 2010 the central government decided to 
abolish the grain levy. Districts are now dependent on centrally allocated funds for road maintenance. 
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mainly theft, is impacting their business negatively and they do not get support from 
the police in dealing with the offenders (Huddy, 2011). Commercial cattle farmer D. 
Muijs indicated in an interview the loss of a number of animals worth several tens of 
thousand US dollars, without the cases ever been pursued by the police. 
 
Overall, it is disclosed that operating costs in Zambia are high as compared to 
neighbouring countries, whether it is for transportation, labour, inputs or financing. 
This is the same for all farmers, large or small, and for all sectors, food or fuel, export 
or domestic. Aside from these sector-wide issues, certain investors face a number of 
problems specific to their field of operation. 
 
It is expected that large-scale food producers are hampered by inconsistent and often 
changing government policies on trade and pricing. Export and import bans are 
implemented on an ad-hoc basis, raising uncertainty for producers and damaging the 
reliability of Zambian export supply (Munro and Fynn, 2010). Maize is particularly 
sensitive and price controls for this crop are a major political instrument. Erratic 
policies include the import restriction of maize after a deficit harvest followed by 
strictly managed exports in excess harvest years such as 2007 and 2008 (Dorosh et al., 
2009). Tembo et al. (2009) illustrate the damaging dynamics between uncertain 
government policies and the private sector behaviour. Policy uncertainty and ad-hoc 
changes, especially with regards to export policies and purchase quantity targets of 
the FRA, translate into a restraint attitude by private players, leading in turn to 
excessively high prices for maize. In addition, the strong support for maize production 
to smallholder farmers through subsidised inputs and guaranteed high prizes set by the 
FRA have a large impact on the market (Tembo et al., 2009). Figure 5-7 illustrates 
both the market distortions created by government policies and the high costs faced 
by maize producers as compared to their South African counterparts. 
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Figure 5-7: Cost breakdown of Market Price per million tonnes Maize 
 
Source: Munro and Fynn, 2010, 17 
 
As noted earlier, many large-scale land investments in Zambia have taken place in the 
biofuel sector, particularly in the growth of jatropha. These investors have had to deal 
with numerous challenges specific to the growth of this particular crop. Whereas it 
was expected that this oil-seed bearing tree would readily grow on marginal soils, 
farmers have been experiencing many diseases and pests (see Plate 5-2). Due to the 
large scale of the intended operations with smallholders, companies were unable to 
supply sufficient support to these small farmers when they had to face these 
unexpected challenges. As a result, the harvests expected after a three-year period, 
have been limited. This situation occurs for both companies that have obtained large 
areas of land in leasehold and for those who rely on outgrowers for their input. 
Following these initial disappointing results, shareholders withdrew funds, adding 
further problems for biofuel producers. Another example of a large-scale investment 
suffering from unexpected problems, in this case pests, is ZamPalm, a subsidiary of 
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ZamBeef. An area of 20,000ha has been secured by this company in the Mpika 
district for the production of palm oil, 80% of which is currently imported from Asia. 
If the company is successful, this area can be increased to 100,000ha. Rats decimated 
the first set of plantings of the company, but after a year, the second set is reported to 
do better (Muijs, A., 2011). 
 
Plate 5-2: Un-irrigated jatropha trees struggle to grow, D1 Oils 
Source: Author’s photograph 
 
Biofuel producers point to problems relating to the lack of clear government policy. 
Some interviewees indicate that a fixed blending target is required to ensure a market 
for both biodiesel and bioethanol (Sinkala, 2011). These targets have since been set in 
the Sixth NDP (GRZ, 2011). Other parties state that regardless of targets, the market 
is there already and unrefined biofuel can compete with conventional fuels (Huddy, 
2011). One interviewee pointed out that if targets would be set, the government could 
face a situation where domestic production of biofuels was insufficient to fulfil these 
quantities taking into account the issues that producers face (Ross, 2011). Rather than 
set targets, some investors mention that it is more important to know what 
government will do with regards to tax policies (Huddy, 2011). This is considered as 
significant because if tax levels were similar to conventional fuel taxes, biofuel would 
not be competitive (Huddy, 2011; Ross, 2011).  
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5.3.5 Impact of large-scale foreign investment 
Due to the limited size of actual activities on the large land areas obtained by foreign 
investors, the impact of these projects cannot be fully evaluated at present. 
Nevertheless, based on the experience of ETC Bio-Energy and Zambia Sugar, two 
entities that have been operating for a longer period, certain tentative conclusions can 
be offered. The fact that large-scale investments take a considerable time to come off 
the ground is one finding which is insightful in itself. 
 
The most obvious impact of large-scale investment, whether this is by a domestic or 
foreign investor, is that of job creation. ETC Bio-Energy employs over 500 people on 
a permanent basis, and Zambia Sugar creates employment for just under 2,000 
permanent staff (Illovo Sugar, 2010) making both companies significant employers in 
their respective regions. In addition to permanent staff, both farm operations offer 
large numbers of casual jobs: around 1,500 at ETC Bio-Energy and over 4,000 at 
Zambia Sugar (Illovo Sugar, 2010) at the peak of their activities. ETC Bio-Energy 
expects this number of casual jobs to increase once they start to harvest jatropha seeds 
on a commercial scale as this is a labour-intensive process.  
 
As the numbers above show, most jobs created are seasonal, and only offer people an 
income for a short time of the year18. In addition, most casual jobs, such as weeding 
and harvesting, are low skilled and therefore lowly paid. Casual workers at ETC Bio-
Energy receive around US$1.90 per day, under the US$2.00 a day poverty threshold. 
Contract workers earn an income above the legal minimum wage. In addition, they 
receive benefits such as free housing on the farm estate, free electricity and water, and 
a 25kg bag of maize meal per month to assist with feeding their families (Chingola, 
2011). Even though employees complain this is insufficient for them, they do indicate 
that they are ‘happy’ to be employed (Anonymous employee, 2011). 
 
Not only do investors employ people directly, they can also provide work and income 
for outgrower farmers if this is part of their business strategy. Zambia Sugar operates 
according to the so-called Nucleus Estate model in which part of the sugar cane is 
grown on its own plantation, ensuring stability of supply to its processing plant 
                                                 
18
 A casual worker can work for a maximum of six months during the year before having to be taken on 
as a permanent employee according to the HR manager of ETC Bio-Energy (Chingola, 2011). 
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(McCarthy and Cramb, 2009). The remainder is grown by smallholder farmers in the 
vicinity, which reduces the investment in land for the company and offers market 
access of a commercial crop to small farmers. Outgrowers in the Mazabuka area 
provide about one-third of total cane input for the Zambia Sugar plant, earning a total 
of nearly ZK140,000 million or around US$30 million (Zambia Sugar, 2009). There 
are multiple risks involved for small-scale farmers when committing themselves to an 
outgrower contract. If their bargaining position is weak, the terms under which they 
operate can be highly exploitative. They can become trapped in a vicious circle in 
which they have to keep growing for the company in order to pay off their debts for 
inputs received (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010). In his analysis on the sugar industry, 
Richardson (2010) does not observe this phenomenon but rather points out that, whilst 
some problems exist between Zambia Sugar and outgrowers, small-scale farmers can 
earn considerably more from growing sugar than maize. 
 
ETC Bio-Energy planned to incorporate 4,000 smallholders once they had proven the 
viability of growing jatropha on their own plantation (Huddy, 2011). With the sale of 
the farm to Zambeef, it is unsure if this plan will be realised. Other biofuel companies 
in Zambia chose a strategy to rely completely on outgrowers. In this way, they did not 
have to invest a large amount of money upfront in land acquisition. D1 Oils, a UK 
based biofuel company, and Marli, Zambian registered, are amongst the companies 
which operate according to this particular business model (Chipokolo and Matongo, 
2007). Both companies started their operations on a large scale, incorporating over 
20,000 outgrowers countrywide (Freim, 2008). If the crop had grown as expected, this 
would have generated substantial income across the country, more importantly during 
a time in the season when no other income is available to the farmers. Due to 
numerous issues including pests, lack of extension services and limited financial 
resources, however, these operations largely have come to a halt. Although an 
outgrower scheme can offer access to the market and inputs to resource-poor 
smallholder farmers, which has been observed in several industries in Zambia, the 
risks can also be considerable if adequate support is lacking. This is especially the 
case for a new crop such as jatropha. If business turns out to be unprofitable, 
companies might pull out, leaving the contract farmers without a market for their 
product and land partially converted away from other crops that they could have used 
for either food or sale to established markets. The castor oil operation of Flora 
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EcoPower in Ethiopia (see Chapter 4) is one example of a failed investment with 
severe consequences for the local farmers (Lavers, 2011). The D1 Oils project in 
Zambia has also been downscaled considerably, although according to a D1 Oils 
representative, farmers have not suffered greatly from the collapse of the biofuel 
companies due to the fact that they received all the inputs for free and mostly used the 
land on which they planted the jatropha seedlings for intercropping with maize (Ross, 
2011). In order to reduce potential negative impacts on their own food security, the 
company now has limited the number of trees which a smallholder can plant and only 
intercropping with food crops is allowed (Ross, 2011). 
 
Investors have indicated that a lack of skills does hamper their operations (D1 Oils, 
2011; Huddy, 2011). The interviewed large-scale investors spend considerable time 
and effort on training staff. This training can relate to specific technical abilities for 
employees working in the workshops or general farming skills. ETC Bio-Energy 
indicated that farming skills then are transferred by the employee to his/her own small 
farm plot, where they might increase the yields of small farmers (Chingola, 2011). 
Skilled employees are sought after and easily can be headhunted by other companies, 
which is one reason why ETC Bio-Energy claims to pay skilled employees higher 
wages than other commercial farmers (Huddy, 2011). Not only does ETC Bio-Energy 
transfer skills to their own employees, even the local representative of the Department 
of Agriculture and Co-operatives states that he has learned from their activities 
(Mweemba, 2011). 
 
Through job creation and outgrower income, several spin-off businesses have the 
chance to establish. In general, small shops selling food, mobile phone credits and the 
like often become established around the large-scale investment. ETC Bio-Energy has 
a market space and a few shop facilities on the estate that it rents out to small 
entrepreneurs. In total 24 stalls were operated at the time of the field research, mostly 
by people living in the neighbouring village of Mwanga. Most stallholders sell fish 
vegetables, or second hand clothes. Although their incomes are low, the majority of 
the stallholders welcome the opportunity offered by ETC Bio-Energy (Anonymous 
market, 2011). According to one interviewed investor, the biggest contribution their 
project made to the area was to ‘bring money into the community’. Whereas 
previously locals bartered whatever they had available, “they now can go to the new 
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shops that have opened and pay with the money they have earned on the plantation” 
(Muijs, A., 2011). 
 
Another positive impact of large-scale land investment is that the investor can trigger 
infrastructure development. This is the case in Mpongwe, the farm operated by ETC 
Bio-Energy. When first established as an employment project, financed in part by the 
CDC, a 70km tar road was built from Luanshya to the village of Mpongwe. In 
addition, electricity was brought to the district as it was required for irrigation. The 
Zambian government was influential in this development, in a similar way to opening 
up the planned farm blocks such as the Nansanga block. When the Mpongwe 
Development Company (MDC) (as the operation was then called) was privatised and 
sold to ETC Bio-Energy in 2006, the company simply took over a fully operating 
farm in an accessible area. ETC Bio-Energy also continued with the running of a 
school and clinic for employees, that had been set up during the days the farm was 
managed by CDC. It can be argued that the town of Mpongwe would not be as 
developed without the MDC, illustrating the importance of government spending on 
rural infrastructure (Rasfold, 2011). 
 
A further example of positive impact is that of the irrigation infrastructure constructed 
by Zambia Sugar in the Mazabuka area that has stabilised water provision to the area. 
Nevertheless, the company is the only party that takes advantage of subsidised water. 
The local population has to pay the normal fee for water, which reduces the incentive 
for small-scale farmers to irrigate their plots (Richardson, 2010). ZamPalm expects 
the government to contribute to improving the road to their palm plantation in Mpika 
once this is running on a larger scale, using its economic power to gain benefits from 
political parties wishing to gain influence in the area (Muijs, A., 2011).  
 
A further benefit is that most large-scale land owners contribute to rural service 
delivery, such as clinics and schools in the area, as part of their corporate social 
investment programmes. ETC Bio-Energy has taken over the operation of the school 
and clinic set up during the time the farm was operated by the CDC with support of 
British aid funds. ZamPalm, even though still in the pilot stage of the project, 
purchased an ambulance for the local village (Muijs, A., 2011). By contrast, investors 
solely operating through outgrowers have not contributed to infrastructure 
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development. Overall, whilst investors do contribute to the construction of 
infrastructure, the national government appears to be a major financing partner, either 
directly or indirectly.  
 
Critics of large-scale land investment often highlight the risk to local people of losing 
their land and being relocated with loss of access to certain resources such as wood 
for fuel or grazing land. To a certain extent, these events have emerged in Zambia, 
although opinions differ on which party is at fault. Investors claim that squatters are 
“illegally occupying land” that has been put on leasehold, whereas the local 
population insists that they have “the right to use land” and are “not aware of the fact 
that land has been put on title” and leased to a private party (Richardson, 2010; 
Milimo et al., 2011). This finding illustrates not only the lack of information 
regarding land deals, but also exemplifies the weak land rights of the local population 
under the current land policy, a view echoed by the ZLA in a personal interview 
(ZLA, 2011). 
 
Although little is known about the operation at the time the Mpongwe Development 
Company started in 1978, ETC Bio-Energy has had conflicts with the local population 
since it took over this farm. Squatters had settled on the farm when it was still seen as 
a development project. In addition, people were allowed free access to the fields and 
could help themselves to the maize that was growing on the farm. When 
commercialisation occurred under ETC Bio-Energy, a fence was put up to prevent 
people from gaining unlimited access. In addition, about 30 family squatters were 
removed after a period of five years. Initially these people had been given the right to 
stay on the ETC Bio-Energy land provided that they paid the symbolic land fee of 
ZK1 per year and maintained the fence. When they failed to do this and were 
unwilling to leave, the company won a court case and removed these squatters. This 
situation generated a hostile attitude from the community and also attracted negative 
publicity (Huddy, 2011). The local district commissioner expressed that people still 
feel the company is not as much part of the community as in the time of first 
operation, mainly due to the fence that has been put up (Rasfold, 2011). 
 
Similar issues occur when domestic actors develop land on a large scale. For the 
establishment of the Nansanga Farm Block, MACO decided to allocate the best land 
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along the river to the large-scale commercial venture. The 43 families who occupied 
this land had been relocated to another area on the farm block. In an interview with 
the Deputy Director – Technical Services of MACO, it was claimed these families 
have each been given a small block of land to farm, close to the new villages which 
are being developed, a claim that the ZLA disputes (Sichembe, 2011; ZLA, 2011). 
With the initial creation of the sugar operation in Mazabuka in the 1960s, squatters 
and herders lost access to the (State) land they formerly used (Richardson, 2010). The 
construction of the Kafue dam in the early 1970s, which was used for electricity 
generation and for irrigation of the sugar cane fields, caused many people to lose 
access to their livelihoods (WWF, 2005). Even the purchase of Nanga farm by 
Zambia Sugar in 2010 resulted in conflict when residents of a small settlement 
refused to be evicted from their land (Mpundu, 2006). 
 
Small-scale farm development also can cause households to be evicted. In one study 
of a 3,000ha area owned by a church mission, the ZLA found that when this mission 
decided to lease out part of their land to a commercial investor a total of 222 families 
were removed from their land. These families had been allowed to settle on the 
missionary land in times when this land was not used for any purpose. When the 
commercial company started operations, families were instructed to leave. Due to 
weak legal representation and a lack of title deeds, the families lost the court case and 
with that, their land. Despite being allocated new land, many families do not have the 
means to grow as much food as they used to and thus suffer from increased hunger 
according to the ZLA study (Milimo et al., 2011). 
 
The issue of squatters on formerly titled land is better understood when taking into 
account that with many large-scale investments, large areas are left unused and are 
impossible to protect, at least in the beginning of a project. Even after around 30 years 
of operation, the Mpongwe farm run by ETC Bio-Energy uses only 15,000ha for crop 
production out of the 45,000ha it owns. Although there were plans to develop an 
additional 12,000ha for jatropha plantations (which is in doubt after the sale to 
Zambeef), this still would leave 18,000ha unproductive and easy for squatters to settle 
on (Verus, 2011). A similar situation exists on the mission land studied by the ZLA 
(Milimo et al., 2011) and has been mentioned by parties interviewed as occurring on 
other farms (Mweemba, 2011). Of the 100,000ha allocated to Mann-Ferrostaal only a 
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limited area is used for nurseries to test different biofuel crops whilst the rest lies 
fallow (Lungu, 2011). A similar situation exists with the ZamPalm plantation close to 
Mpika (Muijs, A., 2011). Even though the ZDA claims that investors need to develop 
their land according to their plans within a period of two to three years, none of the 
investment licenses have yet been withdrawn based on this criterion (Lungu, 2011). 
Moreover, even if the ZDA had the actual power and will to follow up on this legal 
provision, it cannot do so to investors who do not get their investment license from 
the organisation. Overall, the ZLA recommends a change in the current land laws to 
prevent titled land from being left unproductive for a period longer than ten years 
(Milimo et al., 2011). 
 
Investment projects that rely on outgrowers rather than direct land ownership do not 
pose a threat of relocation to the local population (Cotula et al., 2008). None the less, 
they prove to be much more “footloose”. In this situation, the investor has put less 
effort and money into obtaining land rights and is more flexible in reducing its size if 
the business faces difficulties. This has occurred in the biofuel sector in Zambia where 
most investors have reduced their scale of operations or have disinvested from the 
country altogether (Ross, 2011; ZNFU, 2011). As a result, many outgrowers across 
the country now have allocated part of their land to jatropha trees without being able 
to fully develop this crop or sell to an easily accessible market. Even though D1 Oils 
claims that the impact for the outgrowers is “insignificant” due to the fact that they 
still use the same land for other crops, one promised source of income has not 
materialised. As one small-scale farmer remarked “This jatropha reminds me of 
cotton. Many years ago when Dunavant19 came here, they promised that if we grew 
cotton, we would be paid lots of money. We stopped growing our maize to make 
more money from cotton. But when the time to sell it came we were paid very little. 
We went hungry because we had neglected growing our traditional crop maize” 
(Chipokolo and Matongo, 2007, 15). 
 
The above quote signals that commercial crop growing does not necessarily lead to 
higher incomes and that foreign agricultural investment might actually cause a 
deterioration in food security at local level. This situation was highlighted in the ILC 
                                                 
19
 Dunavant became one of the major players in the Zambian cotton industry after privatisation of the 
parastatal Lint Company of Zambia (Poulton et al., 2004) 
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study on the impact of the land lease to a foreign investor on the church mission land 
(Milimo et al., 2011). Nevertheless, Richardson (2010) points out sugar outgrowers 
on average have a much higher income than farmers growing maize, thus enabling 
these outgrowers to increase their food security. Some outgrowers protest however, 
that they are forced into agreements with Zambia Sugar, whereas others see it as a 
way out of poverty (Hatyoka, 2010).  It appears that food security under an outgrower 
scheme depends on the relative amount of land previously used for domestic food 
consumption converted to cash crop production and the price received for the cash 
crop. In the case of crops grown for the export market, fluctuating exchange rates and 
world market prices can mean that incomes of outgrowers are volatile as is seen in the 
cotton industry (CDT, 2008; Tschirley and Kabwe, 2010). To prevent a negative 
impact on domestic food security to their outgrowers, D1 Oils stipulates that jatropha 
activities are only an addition to domestic food growing activities rather than a 
substitution (Ross, 2011). 
 
Finally, large-scale land investment, whether by a domestic or a foreign investor, 
seems to trigger social tension and increased levels of HIV and AIDS. The (seasonal) 
employment opportunities attract migrant labourers, mostly males. It is argued that 
the high presence of this transitory, male workforce is one of the major reasons for the 
high levels of HIV/AIDS infection rate in Mazabuka where Zambia Sugar is based 
(Richardson, 2010). Communicable disease is also mentioned by ETC Bio-Energy as 
a result of migrant labourers coming into the area, commencing when the farm was 
operated by the CDC (Chingola, 2011). An informal settlement, Mwange village, has 
grown next to this farm with job seekers and migrant workers who have decided to 
stay in the area in the hope of securing further employment. This illegal settlement 
creates many problems including water pollution and petty crime (Huddy, 2011). The 
council does not seem capable of removing people from this settlement and the farm 
continues to hire labourers from the township despite company policy (Chingola, 
2011). To prevent further water pollution, it is argued that steps need to be taken, both 
by the community as well as by the farm operators (Rasfold, 2011).  
 
In general, it can be argued that both the local and the national government and the 
local population gain little income from the investments. Land rental fees have the 
potential to generate a steady and substantial income to the government, but are at an 
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extremely low level in Zambia. Considerable tax breaks are given to foreign investors, 
reducing the potential income to the government. One of the local taxes, the grain 
levy, was abolished by the national government in 2009 (Mweemba, 2011; Rasfold, 
2011). This abolition has had a major impact on the Mpongwe district council which 
lost between US$150,000-200,000 per year on income (Huddy, 2011).  
Controversially, Richardson (2010, 929) states that “It can be argued that the priority 
of Zambian politicians in promoting these investments has been to capitalise 
electorally rather than economically”, implying that the main aim of politicians to 
attract foreign investors is to gain votes rather than bring development to the people. 
 
The local population, equally, seems to gain relatively little from large-scale 
agricultural investments. Wage levels are low and many jobs are only seasonal. 
Instead, the gains to a local district seem to be dependent on the amount of social 
investment the investor is willing to commit. Increased effort and intervention seem to 
be needed in order to ensure Zambia as a whole benefits more from large-scale 
foreign land investment. 
5.4 Conclusion and recommendations 
As this chapter reveals, large-scale land investment is taking place in Zambia, similar 
to developments elsewhere in Africa and around the world with a number of large-
scale projects announced particularly since 2006. As was observed in studies of other 
countries, actual activity on the ground seems limited, especially in the biofuel 
projects where severe challenges exist in growing jatropha, a new crop in Zambia. 
The number of investment projects is divided equally between food production and 
biofuel production, albeit the latter sector operates on much larger land areas. 
Whereas investors in crop farming tend to look for established farms, biofuel 
investors are more interested in virgin land, usually in more remote areas where the 
pressure on land is not yet significant. Not only foreign investors are active on a large 
scale, domestic players also have initiated projects on large land areas, both in food 
and fuel projects. Whereas some investors choose to have control over their own land, 
other investors opt to rely heavily on outgrowers. In some cases a combination occurs. 
Although most investors are based in Europe, it is apparent that Chinese and Indian 
companies are becoming active in the agricultural sector in Zambia. 
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The benefits of these large-scale foreign investments mainly are in terms of 
employment creation, market access, increase in food security and development of 
physical and social infrastructure. This appears to be in line with studies by numerous 
agencies as discussed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, considerable tax incentives are 
given by the national government of Zambia to attract FDI and many of the jobs are 
seasonal and lowly paid. This situation severely reduces the possible income to the 
country. So far, no successful outgrower schemes have been set up other than the 
relatively well-functioning sugar operation. 
 
The potential to ‘grow’ the agricultural sector in Zambia exists with apparently 
sufficient land available for development both for food and fuel crops. Although the 
country has produced sufficient maize, the basic food staple for the majority of the 
population, to feed the country in the two years since 2009, many people still live in 
poverty. Most maize production is rain-fed, with the consequence that one dry year 
can threaten the harvest and consequently the food security status of the country. 
Large-scale commercial farming with access to irrigation infrastructure might be one 
option to stabilise food production and hence food security. Irrigation is an 
increasingly important issue considering the more extreme weather patterns in the 
long term due to climate change. 
 
As a land-locked country without its own oil supply, biofuel production can reduce 
greatly the reliance of Zambia on imported petroleum, and correspondingly reduce the 
burden on foreign exchange expenditure. Several potential labour intensive crops can 
be grown by outgrowers to offer poor rural farming communities access to extra 
income. Care must be taken, however, that these farmers do not sacrifice land that is 
dedicated for growing their own food to commercial crops, thereby putting individual 
food security at risk. Commercial crops for export markets make small-scale farmers 
more vulnerable to world market price fluctuations and exchange rate volatilities. 
 
Despite the recommended focus on the domestic market, it has to be taken into 
account that the Zambian market is relatively small and hence export options must be 
encouraged especially for food crops. The Zambian government must play an 
essential role in facilitating this through establishing a positive export environment. 
Also government should abstain from ad-hoc and unpredictable trade policies such as 
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export bans or tariff changes. In general, the country needs to be able to produce at a 
cost that makes them competitive in at least the southern African regional market. The 
emphasis on export production for the commercial venture in the Nansanga farm 
block (GRZ, 2011b) counters the recommendation to first ensure domestic food 
security and possibly is based on the wish by government to earn foreign exchange 
and to make it more attractive for foreign investors to sign up for this venture without 
being limited by the constraints of the domestic market. In addition, the government 
should reallocate the budget of the agricultural sector for expenditure on rural 
infrastructure and crop developments rather than on subsidised inputs and maize 
prices. It is argued that not only is this more likely to benefit a wider range of 
smallholder farmers, the expected agricultural growth and reduction in rural poverty 
will also be higher (von Braun et al., 2005; Poulton et al., 2010). 
 
To counter many of the negative impacts that can be caused be large-scale land 
investments, a number of measures could be put in place. First, the land rights of 
communal landowners need to be protected both from chiefs who might be looking 
for deals to enrich themselves and from government. When state land is converted to 
leasehold, this must be clearly communicated to prevent future issues with regards to 
squatters illegally occupying privately owned land. In addition, a provision in the land 
policy must be made that leasehold land can be returned to communal ownership in 
the event that pledged investments do not materialise. To support this, it is 
recommended that the ZDA must have a strong mandate to revoke investment 
licenses in case investors do not comply with their investment plans. This would 
reduce land speculation and ensure investments become productive. Lastly, the ZDA 
must realise that operations on large land areas are not manageable, especially with 
regards to the labour requirements for non-mechanically harvested crops such as 
jatropha. In order to avoid land being unproductive, it is argued that the organisation 
should not allocate unrealistically large areas to such crops. These measures will 
become more important in the future when the pressure on land in Zambia will 
increase further due to a growing population and possible increased interest from 
foreign investors. 





This study aimed to investigate the extent and impacts of large-scale foreign land 
investment in Africa, and particularly in Zambia, as per mid-2011. Aside from 
establishing the extent of large-scale agricultural FDI, the study sought to describe the 
main drivers behind these investments and expose the different actors. Finally, this 
study aimed to answer the question if and how large-scale foreign land investment can 
contribute to economic development in the host country and what the role of both 
smallholder farmers and the host government can be to add to overall development 
and poverty reduction.  
 
In the first decade of the 21st century, traditional agricultural systems experienced a 
considerable change. After an increased globalisation of supply chains and an increase 
in food trade across the world during the preceding decade, the world market for 
agricultural products, and staple crops in particular, expanded considerably and food 
prices increased (Pingali, 2007; Sarris, 2009). Accordingly, several countries 
dependent on imports for their food supply were confronted with a rapidly increasing 
bill to fund these imports, leading to situation of social unrest and food riots. It is 
argued that these increases were driven by a number of long term and short term 
causes, ranging from a continually growing population that is changing to a more 
protein-rich diet, oil resources becoming more unstable, climate change 
considerations driving demand for alternative fuels amongst which biofuels derived 
from food crops, speculative money searching out commodities to make short term 
gains, a financial crisis and a decline in productivity growth rates for many crops 
around the world (e.g. Brown, 2009; Cotula et al., 2009; Sarris, 2009). 
 
In response, food importing governments, agribusinesses and investment companies 
have become involved in large-scale land investment in other, mostly developing, 
countries (Cotula et al., 2009). Governments are concerned about increased instability 
and costs of their food imports and by obtaining large areas of land overseas, aim to 
by-pass the world market for their food security (World Bank, 2010a). Agribusiness 
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becomes more vertically integrated to gain more control over their inputs (Selby, 
2009). New agribusinesses focussing on the production of biofuels to serve the market 
created by government regulations in developed countries are searching for large land 
areas to grow crops to convert into biodiesel or bioethanol (Cotula et al., 2008). 
Investors are looking for anti-cyclic ways to counterbalance the high losses witnessed 
on stock exchanges across the world (HighQuest Partners, 2010). Due to the structural 
nature of (some of) the underlying drivers behind foreign land acquisitions, these 
deals are likely to continue in the years to come. 
 
Africa has been the continent where most large-scale agricultural land deals have been 
signed, although agreements have been signed in other areas including in Asia and 
South America (e.g. World Bank, 2010a). Deals vary from a few thousand hectares to 
several million hectares, with the largest projects (potentially) covering ten million ha. 
Food crops and fuel crops both play a significant role. In some countries, such as 
Sudan, food is more important, whereas in other countries, for example in 
Madagascar, more fuel projects are initiated. The land area covered also varies greatly 
between crop and country. Analysis shows that Gulf States invest mainly in food 
projects, primarily in eastern Africa. European investors focus more on biofuel crops, 
with a preference for southern Africa. Asian companies and governments invest in 
both food and fuel in a wide range of host countries. 
 
It was shown that Zambia is one of the countries that has received interest from a 
number of large-scale investors. Both food and biofuel producers have set up across 
the country. Whereas food crop operations are concentrated in the heavily populated 
provinces of Lusaka province and the Copperbelt, fuel producers look for large areas 
that are available in more rural provinces. The majority of the investors come from 
the UK and regional neighbours, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Although China and 
India have shown interest in large areas of land but no significant contracts have been 
signed with investors from these countries as yet.  
 
Overall, investors see Zambia as a country with ample land and water available for 
agricultural production. In addition, the country offers an attractive business 
environment with numerous tax breaks on offer. It enjoys a stable political climate, as 
opposed to neighbouring Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Due 
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to the fact that the country is land-locked, costs for importing both fuel and food are 
high. This creates an attractive market for domestic food and biofuel production, with 
additional export opportunities to the region. Despite a positive business climate with 
generous tax breaks on offer, government policies with regards to food marketing and 
export have been inconsistent and no official regulation has been drawn up to support 
a market for biofuels. This has frustrated investors who are left unsure of the market 
for their production. Zambian investors, both in food and fuel projects, have indicated 
that they perceive government policies as hampering their operations. 
 
Host governments can have a number of objectives in attracting large-scale 
agricultural FDI: employment, food security, access to foreign markets and new 
technology (e.g. von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Opponents of large-scale 
foreign land investment in developing countries argue that jobs and wages on these 
large-scale operations are limited, the local population loses access to land and water 
and the host government does not gain due to generous tax breaks and low land fees. 
In addition, only a small amount of crops grown are destined for the domestic market 
(e.g. Daniel and Mittel, 2009; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). Experience with 
large-scale operations so far has shown that in numerous cases the local population 
does lose access to land, often without prior consultation. This has been observed in 
various countries across the continent such as Mali (Diallo and Mushinzimana, 2009), 
Mozambique (Borras et al., 2011) and also in Zambia.  
 
The benefits host governments hope for have, however, not materialised. Many 
projects have not (yet) reached operational status, certainly not on the large areas 
leased to the investors. This is due to lack of funds, difficulties with growing new 
crops or simply due to the long process of clearing such large areas and managing 
them. Jobs have, therefore, not been created. As Borras et al. (2011, 224) note: “this 
employment issue would only be resolved in the medium-term, and not in the 
immediate future”. Production has equally lagged behind, and thus no significant 
contribution to either food or fuel security or foreign exchange earnings has been 
made. It appears that the negative impact of dispossession and relocation takes place 
at the start of a project whereas the potential benefits for both the local population and 
the host government in general take much longer to materialise. Moreover, businesses 
adjust their operations in order to secure profitability. If this means a higher degree of 
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mechanisation rather than hiring local labour, the investor will not hesitate to do so 
(Murray Li, 2011).  
 
When looking at the impact large-scale foreign land investment so far has had 
compared to the four roles identified for the agricultural sector to contribute to 
economic development of the host country in classical theories (e.g. Kuznets, 1964; 
Johnston and Mellor, 1961), the following can be concluded: 
 
• Product contribution: numerous large-scale foreign land investments are for the 
growth of biofuels (mostly by commercial investors) or export crops (usually by 
food importing governments). These projects will have only a very limited 
contribution to local food or fuel security; 
• Market contribution: large-scale foreign land investments are generally technology 
intensive, rather than labour intensive. A limited number of jobs is created on these 
large-scale operations. Especially food crops such as maize and soya beans are 
highly mechanised. Oil bearing crops as jatropha are more labour intensive, 
although highly seasonal (Murray Li, 2011). But, since investors are interested in 
developing countries because of the low costs for land and labour, wages are 
generally low. In addition, most machinery and higher skilled labour is imported. 
Despite an optimistic tone, the World Bank study shows that jobs created are 
limited (World Bank, 2010a, 39). In addition, job creation takes place on the 
medium term when the projects become fully operational; 
• Factor contribution: excess capital in the form of profits largely can be repatriated 
to the country where the investor is based. Host governments also grant generous 
tax holidays and offer low land fees to attract investors. The World Bank estimates 
irrigated land for sugar cane production in Zambia to be worth US$1,407/ha 
(World Bank, 2011, 109), as compared to the government rent fee of US$1. 
Overall this reduces the potential gains a target country has by hosting foreign 
investors; 
• Foreign exchange: a large number of projects are set up for export crops, either 
food or fuel. In theory, this would give the host government foreign exchange that 
can be used for the imports of food or fuel. As observed, since as far back as the 
1970s, the strategy to export crops in order to pay for import of basic food crops is 
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highly risky due to price and exchange rate fluctuations (Dinham and Hines, 1983). 
A more secure alternative is to grow staple crops and hence reduce the foreign 
exchange reserves required for import, either food or fuel. 
 
In addition to these general links of the agricultural sector to the wider economy, the 
majority of people in host countries are dependent on small-scale farming (World 
Bank, 2007). One of the often mentioned benefits of large-scale foreign companies 
investing in a developing countries is that these operations will offer smallholders 
access to global markets, to new technology and inputs such as improved seed 
varieties (e.g. Cotula et al., 2009; World Bank, 2010a). Such benefits will help to raise 
rural families out of poverty.  
 
For investors there are both benefits and costs to involve smallholders in their 
operation (e.g. Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). By using smallholders, the investor can 
reduce the amount of land, and thus the amount of money, required to grow the crops 
it wants to harvest. By outsourcing the growth of crops, it also outsources the labour 
required. In this way, the investor can reduce the initial investment which is required 
for start up. Lastly, as Borras et al. (2011) argue, using outgrowers is a way to 
outsource the risk of rain-fed crops, leaving the investor to focus on a more limited 
area that can be irrigated. Nevertheless, using an outgrower strategy makes it more 
difficult for the investor to control the quality of the crops as considerable effort is 
required to manage the large number of smallholder farmers. This research has shown 
that foreign companies opt for both strategies, although it is mainly in the labour 
intensive oil crop projects in which smallholders are included. 
 
For smallholders, incorporation into a large operation does not always bring an 
increase in income. Due to the unequal balance of power, they end up in a debt trap 
where the revenue they receive for their crops does not cover the cost for the inputs 
provided to them (Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010). Outgrowers also have to produce to 
very high quality standards, sometimes not obtainable with the limited means 
available to them (Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002). Further, new cash crops are 
introduced without prior knowledge on how to grow these crops. The experience with 
jatropha in Zambia illustrates that commercial crops do not always succeed. 
Insufficient support was given to the outgrowers by the biofuel companies which did 
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not yet know how to grow this crop in the Zambian climate and soils. As a result, the 
outgrowers are left with greatly reduced income and no own food production. These 
families do not have a safety net to shield them from such failures. 
 
Successful projects do occur, as is seen in the sugar operations in the Mazabuka area 
of Zambia and also with small-scale palm oil growers in Asia (Richardson, 2010; Rist 
et al., 2010). Despite complaints that they are not compensated sufficiently, these 
farmers have been able to increase their income and with it their own food security. 
The key to success is for the large-scale commercial operator to first prove that a 
certain crop can be grown in an area, a strategy which was followed by ETC Bio-
Energy in Mpongwe, although never implemented due to early sale of the farm 
operation. Once it is known what the risks are and how to prevent them, then 
outgrowers can be involved. These small farmers then need to receive adequate 
support in order to successfully grow a new crop. In addition, they need to be allowed 
to maintain sufficient land to grow food for their own family, a condition that D1 Oils 
include in their contracts with small farmers. 
 
In general, theevidence reveals that the arrival of a large-scale agricultural operator, 
foreign or domestic, holds mixed prospects for the local population. Often, they will 
lose access to land and water, either by losing their own plots to which they do not 
hold official title or by losing communal land used for activities such as grazing and 
the collection of firewood. Governments or tribal chiefs can be of the opinion that 
commercial farming will be more productive than the less intensive use under 
traditional farming methods. This situation poses a severe threat to local families. 
Complaints and protests in reaction to large-scale investments have been reported in 
many countries, including in Zambia. In the case of a large-scale foreign operator 
producing for the local food market, smallholders might also have to face ‘unfair’ 
competition. These large-scale investors have access to cheaper credit overseas and 
receive generous tax breaks from the host government (Murray Li, 2011). 
 
In order for large-scale land investments to contribute to economic development, the 
role of national governments in developing countries across the world is critical. First, 
they have to ensure that the local population does not lose access to their resources. 
Small-scale farmers earn more working their own land than as wage labourer on a 
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large plantation (Murray Li, 2011). Especially in the case of cash crops rather than 
food crops, such plantations will reduce a country’s production and food security 
position. The local population requires clear ownership rights, whether these are 
communal or on private title. Governments, together with the investor, also need to 
make concerted efforts to include communities where they intend to reserve land for 
foreign investors. Only when the community has been properly engaged in the lead up 
to the project will they support the enterprise and hence contribute to making it a 
success. 
 
Second, if a government wants to reap benefits from FDI, it needs to charge fair land 
fees and taxes and press foreign investors to adhere to national laws. Giving land 
away for free or at a symbolic price will not generate the income required for 
infrastructure development and social investment. In several cases studied in this 
report, the investor has pledged to build roads, clinics and the like. Experience has 
shown that either these facilities are only built once an operation starts to generate a 
profit (as stated by a representative from D1 Oils Zambia), or are only accessible for 
employees of the investor (as is the case of ETC Bio-Energy). A more solid approach 
is for national government to take responsibility for the provision of public goods and 
generate the income from the investors. In addition, national government needs to 
establish a labour environment that offers protection to employees without hampering 
the efficient working of a business. A minimum wage level that enables a labourer to 
reach a basic level of living must be part of the conditions. Aside from land and 
labour laws, foreign investors need to comply with environmental laws in order to 
protect natural resources such as water and air. The challenge for national government 
is to not engage in a “race to the bottom” with other countries, but also not make itself 
uncompetitive. As is shown by South American and former Soviet countries, higher 
land fees can still attract investors, provided other conditions are in place, such as 
reliable infrastructure, political stability and good soils.  
 
Third, large-scale foreign investments need to be part of wider agriculture and 
development strategy. Under the Import Substitution Industrialisation policies 
implemented in the 1960s and 1970s, agriculture was seen as a factor contributor to 
the manufacturing sector and later, under the Structural Adjustment Programmes, it 
was subjected to the working of the market. It is evident that agriculture deserves 
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more direct attention from national governments, if it is to make a valuable 
contribution to economic development and poverty reduction. Governments need to 
have a clear strategy for their agricultural sector and related policies regarding land 
and energy, including identifying parts of the country where agriculture can develop 
and where land is available. They need to take their country’s strengths and 
weaknesses into account. In the case of a land-locked country such as Zambia, where 
transportation costs are high, it will be difficult to compete on a market for export 
products. Food production for the domestic and regional market has more potential 
opportunities. With complete dependence on imports for oil, opportunities exist for 
biofuel crops. In both cases national governments need to be clear on their aims. 
Investors are unwilling to embark on projects if clear policies are not in place, for 
example with regards to fertiliser subsidies or blending ratios. Beyond formulating 
policies, governments need to ensure that foreign investors contribute to the national 
economy and integrate with the local community rather than operating as a stand-
alone unit without links to the environment in which it operates. In general, the farm 
block development in Zambia represents one step in the right direction albeit with 
limited success so far. 
 
Furthermore, national governments need to ensure that detailed contracts are signed 
and investors follow up on these contracts. Many projects discussed in this study have 
very limited information in the agreements signed. For example, rather than the exact 
location of a project, only a rough description of the area is given. This situation has 
the potential for conflict with the local population. Many agreements are for 
unrealistically large projects. Experience in Zambia, and across the world, shows that 
it is a very long term process, if not impossible, to manage extremely large areas. To 
plant 100,000ha with jatropha trees and harvest these trees takes an enormous amount 
of time and labour. As a result, land belonging to an investor often lies fallow, 
whereas local farmers could have used this productively. Beyond unrealistically large 
land requirements, investors have low priority to implement infrastructure they might 
have agreed on, as this will not directly contribute to their profits. The same situation 
holds for the creation of jobs. Finally, although foreign investors intend to operate on 
a project for a considerable number of years, often they have proven to be ‘footloose’. 
In Zambia, ETC Bio-Energy sold the Mpongwe farm after only six years, despite 
plans to be there for longer. Many biofuel companies had to greatly reduce operations 
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or cease altogether due to funding issues and disappointing harvests. National 
governments need to ensure safety nets are available in case foreign investors bail out. 
 
Unfortunately, many national governments in the developing world do not have the 
capacity or the resources to ensure proper processes take place. The consequences for 
the local population and the country as a whole can be far-reaching. Commercial 
investors are interested in monetary gains, not economic development (Murray Li, 
2011). The weaker the host government, the more potential benefits there are for 
investors, albeit at some risk of political instability (World Bank, 2010). It is evident 
that voluntary guidelines, as proposed by a number of international organisations, are 
not the answer to ensure both investor and host country benefit from large-scale FDI 
in agriculture. Rather, the scale of projects should be limited and investors should be 
made to pay reasonable fees. Only when a project has proven successful can larger 
concessions be granted. This way of working can reduce the risk of speculation from 
the investor side, limit the risks of land loss to the local population, and ensure both 
the government and the national economy as a whole benefits. 
 
In final analysis, FDI in agricultural land will continue to be attractive taking into 
account the structural nature of the drivers behind such investment. Pressure therefore 
will increase in those countries where currently land seems to be abundant. Increased 
output in currently under-productive land is required to feed the global population, 
although biofuels are not necessarily the best way to supply the growing demand for 
oil. Foreign operators are able to help to increase this productivity. But, national 
governments need to ensure that national interests as food security do not succumb to 
the monetary interests of overseas investors. 
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AFRICA 
      
Host country Investor 
Investor 
country Area (ha) Land use Status Source 
Angola Lonrho UK 25,000Rice Signed Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Angola Agri SA South Africa 140,000Food Planned Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Cameroon Sino Cam IKO China 10,000Rice Operational http://www.afronline.org/?p=2908 
Cameroon SOCAPALM Belgium 58,063Palm Oil Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
Cameroon Sime Darby Bhd Malaysia 300,000Palm Oil Planned Sime Darby, 2011 
Cameroon Somdiaa France 12,000Sugar Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Central African 
Republic Somdiaa France 5,137Sugar Operational www.Somdiaa.com 
Chad Somdiaa France 11,000Sugar Operational www.Somdiaa.com 
Democratic Republic 
of Congo ZTE International China 2,800,000
Agrofuel oil palm 
plantation Signed Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Democratic Republic 
of Congo Eni Italy 180,000Palm Oil Unknown Görgen et al, 2009 
Democratic Republic 
of Congo MagIndustries Canada 68,000Eucalyptus Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
Egypt Jenat Saudi Arabia 10,000
Barley, wheat and 
livestock feed Unknown Görgen et al, 2009 
Egypt Janan UAE 42,000Wheat Unknown Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Egypt 
Al Dahra Agricultural 
Company UAE 9,700Animal fodder Operational http://www.aldahra.com 
Ethiopia Flora EcoPower Germany 15,000Castor Signed Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Ethiopia Karuturi India 311,700Maize, rice, vegetables Operational MoARD, 2010a 
Ethiopia Fri-El Green Power Italy 30,000Agrofuels Signed Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Ethiopia Ardent Energy Group USA 15,000Agrofuels Signed Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Ethiopia Ethio Agri-CEFT Saudi Arabia 19,200Coffee, tea, crops Signed Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Ethiopia Sun Biofuels UK 80,000Jatropha Operational Pohl, 2010 
Ethiopia Djibouti government Djibouti 7,000Unknown Signed Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Ethiopia 
Dubai World Trading 
Company UAE 5,000Tea Signed Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Ethiopia Becco Biofuels UK 35,000Agrofuels Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Ethiopia Hovev Agriculture Ltd. Israel 40,000Agrofuels Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
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Host country Investor 
Investor 
country Area (ha) Land use Status Source 
Ethiopia 




Jatropha and other 
agrofuels Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Ethiopia United Arab Emirates UAE 5,000Tea Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
Ethiopia IDC Investment Denmark 15,000Jatropha Operational Görgen et al, 2009 
Ethiopia LHB Israel 100,000Jatropha Unknown Görgen et al, 2009 
Ethiopia BHO Bio Products plc. India 27,000Cereals, pulses, oils Signed MoARD, 2010c 
Ethiopia Ruchi Group India 25,000Agrofuels Signed http://www.afrik-news.com 
Ethiopia National Bank of Egypt Egypt 22,000  Signed http://www.afrik-news.com 
Ethiopia Saudi Star Saudi Arabia 10,000Rice Signed MoARD, 2010b 
Ethiopia 
Bharat Renewable Energy 
/ Shapoorji India 50,000Jatropha Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Ethiopia Emami Biotech India 40,000Jatropha Signed http://www.emamibiotech.com 
Ethiopia Nadec Saudi Arabia 42,000Unknown Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Ethiopia 
Sannati Agro Farm 
Enterprise India 10,000Rice, pulses Signed MoARD, 2010d 
Ethiopia Global Energy Ethiopia Belgium 5,000Castor Operational 
http://www.ecofriendnews.com 
http://www.globalenergyethiopia.com/ 
Ethiopia Horizon Plantations Saudi Arabia 250,000
Jatropha, Rubber, Palm 






Nuove Iniziative Industriali 





Ethiopia BDFC Brazil 17,400Sugar Signed Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Ethiopia 
Hunan Dafengyuan 
Agriculture China 25,000Sugar Signed MoARD, 2010e 
Ethiopia Spentex Industries India 25,000Cotton Signed Davison, 2011a 
Gabon Olam International Singapore 400,000Timber Operational Olam International, 2011 
Gabon Olam International Singapore 300,000Palm oil Signed Olam International, 2011 
Ghana ScanFuel Africa Norway 400,000Agrofuels Operational www.ghanabusinessnews.com 
Ghana BioFuel Africa Norway 150,000Jatropha Discontinued Tsikata and Yaro, 2011 
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Host country Investor 
Investor 
country Area (ha) Land use Status Source 
Ghana Vepower UK 50,000Jatropha Signed 
http://www.commodafrica.com/fr/actualites/
matieres_premieres/jatrophaghanavepower 
Ghana Galten Israel 100,000Jatropha Operational http://www.galtengroup.com 
Ghana Kimminic Corporation Canada 65,000Jatropha Operational http://www.kimminic.com/ 
Ghana 
Jose Garcia-Carrion 
Group Spain 10,000Pineapples Unknown Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Ghana 
Solar Harvest 
(Continuation of BioFuel 
Africa) Norway 10,600Food Operational Tsikata and Yaro, 2011 
Ivory Coast 
Nauvu Investments (JV 
between Olam and 
Wilmar) Singapore 96,000Palm oil, rubber, sugar Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Ivory Coast Somdiaa France 11,800Sugar Operational www.Somdiaa.com 
Kenya Qatar Qatar 40,000Fruit and vegetables Signed Nunow, 2011 
Kenya Bedford Biofuels Canada 360,000Jatropha Operational www.bedfordbiofuels.com 
Kenya Bioenergy International Switzerland 93,000Jatropha Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Kenya Dominion Farms USA 6,900Rice, fish Operational FIAN, 2010 
Kenya 
Nuove Iniziative Industriali 
SRL Italy 50,000Jatropha Planned www.bbc.co.uk 
Liberia Dominion Farms USA 17,000Rice and other crops Operational Görgen et al, 2009 
Liberia Equatorial Biofuels LimitedUK 169,000Palm Oil Signed http://www.epoil.co.uk 
Liberia Sime Darby Bhd Malaysia 220,000Rubber Operational Sime Darby, 2011 
Liberia 
Libya Africa Investment 
Portfolio Libya 200,000Unknown Unknown West Africa Observer, 2009 
Lybia Agri SA South Africa 35,000Unknown Planned Reuters 2010a 
Madagascar Sime Darby Bhd Malaysia 220,000Palm Oil, Rubber Unknown Görgen et al, 2009; Sime Darby, 2011 
Madagascar Varun India 230,000Rice, maize, lentils Discontinued Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al, 2011 
Madagascar Daewoo Logistics South Korea 1,300,000Maize, palm oil Discontinued Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar Madabeef UK 200,000Lifestock Unknown Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar SUCOCOMA China 10,000Sugar cane Unknown Üllenberg, 2009b 
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Investor 
country Area (ha) Land use Status Source 
Madagascar Avana Group Ltd. UK 10,000Jatropha Planned Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar Global Agro-fuel Lebanon 100,000Jatropha Unknown Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar Delta Peroli Italy 20,000Jatropha Unknown Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al, 2011 
Madagascar ER Company   80,000Jatropha Unknown Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar Bio Energy Ltd Australia 120,000Jatropha Planned Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar GEM Biofuels UK 492,500Jatropha Operational GEM BioFuels Plc, 2009 
Madagascar J-Oils France 10,000Jatropha Unknown Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar JSL Agro-fuels Germany 10,000Jatropha Planned Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar New Ecology Oils France 30,000Jatropha Unknown Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar NOTS Renewable Energy Netherlands 15,000Jatropha Unknown Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar Oji Paper Japan 30,000Eucalyptus, Acacia Discontinued Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar OSHO Group South Africa 100,000Sugar cane for ethanol Unknown Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar Sithe Global USA 60,000Palm oil for ethanol Unknown Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar SOPREMAD France 20,000Sugar cane for ethanol Unknown Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al, 2011 
Madagascar Tozzi Renewable Energy Italy 100,000Jatropha Discontinued Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar 
Unitech and United 
Technologies Group USA 150,000Sunflowers Discontinued Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar Les Cultures du Cap Est India 9,100
Palm oil for industrial 
purposes Unknown Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar DEKO SA South Africa 33,000Agroforestry Unknown Üllenberg, 2009b 
Madagascar D1 Oils UK  290,000Jatropha Discontinued Interview 
Madagascar Land Mark India 5,000Maize Operational Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al, 2011 
Madagascar Fuel Stock UK 30,000Jatropha Unknown Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al, 2011 
Madagascar Flora EcoPower Israel 30,000Jatropha Discontinued Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al, 2011 
Madagascar DRT France 15,000Pine resin Discontinued Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al, 2011 
Malawi Djibouti Djibouti 55,000Unknown Signed Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Malawi Cru Investment UK 6,500Unknown Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Malawi D1 Oils UK 200,000Jatropha Operational Interview 
Mali 
Libyan African Investment 
Portfolio (MaLibya) Libya 100,000Rice Signed Diallo and Mushinzimana, 2009 
Mali 
Millenium Challenge 
Account USA 16,000Rice, vegetables Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
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Investor 
country Area (ha) Land use Status Source 
Mali Al-Korayev Saudi Arabia 100,000Unknown Unknown Görgen et al, 2009 
Mali Markala Sugar Project South Africa 14,100Sugar cane Signed Diallo and Mushinzimana, 2009 
Mali CAMEX UK 20,000Rice and vegetables Planned Diallo and Mushinzimana, 2009 
Mali CLETC China 20,000Sugar Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Mali Petrotech/AgroMali USA 10,000Jatropha Signed http://www.petrotechffn.com 
Morocco Tiris Euro Arab (TEA) UAE 700,000Citrus, olives Signed http://www.gulfinthemedia.com 
Mozambique Sekab Sweden 100,000Agrofuel Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Mozambique 
Trans4mation Agric-teck 
Ltd. UK 10,000Unknown Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
Mozambique ProCana / CAMEC UK 30,000Sugar cane Discontinued Borras et al., 2011 
Mozambique Sun Biofuels UK 15,000Jatropha Operational Ribeiro et al, 2010 
Mozambique Agriterra Europe 20,000Livestock Operational Görgen et al, 2009 
Mozambique SAB Mozambique Italy 11,000Jatropha Sold http://www.esvgroup.com 
Mozambique 
Energem Renewable 
Energy LDA Canada / SA 60,000Jatropha Discontinued 
Ribeiro et al, 2010; 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk; 
www.duelco.com 
Mozambique Enerterra Portugal 18,508Jatropha Signed Albino, 2010 
Mozambique MoçamGalp Portugal 10,000Jatropha Operational Ribeiro et al, 2010 
Mozambique Aviam Italy 10,000Jatropha Operational http://www.aviam.it 
Mozambique Principle Energy UK 18,000Sugar cane Signed Albino, 2010 
Mozambique Mauritius Government Mauritius 20,000Food Signed Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Mozambique Agri SA South Africa 1,000,000Food Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
Mozambique Agri SA South Africa 9,000,000Food Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Mozambique Grown Energy Zambeze South Africa 15,000Sugar cane Signed Albino, 2010 
Mozambique Green Resources / Lurio Norway 126,000Forestry Signed Albino, 2010 
Mozambique Portucel Portugal 173,327Forestry Signed Albino, 2010 
Mozambique Quifel Agricola Portugal 10,000Soy oil Signed Albino, 2010 
Mozambique Chikweti Sweden 76,000Forestry Signed CIP, 2011 
Mozambique Malonda Sweden 46,000Forestry Signed www.greenresources.no 
Mozambique Florestas de Niassa Finland 210,000Forestry Signed CIP, 2011 
Mozambique Madal Norway 57,000Agriculture Signed CIP, 2011 
Nigeria 
Trans4mation Agric-teck 
Ltd. UK 10,000Rice, cassave, fish Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
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Investor 
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Nigeria 
Vietnam Africa Agricultural 
Development Company Vietnam 10,000Rice Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Republic of the 
Congo Fri-El Green Power Italy 40,000Palm oil Unknown Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Republic of the 
Congo Agri SA South Africa 200,000Food   Signed Hall, 2011 
Republic of the 
Congo Agri SA South Africa 9,800,000Food   Planned Hall, 2011 
Senegal 
Several investors from 
Belgium and UK Belgium 233,000Unknown Unknown West Africa Observer, 2009 
Senegal Dangote Nigeria 40,000Sugar Unknown Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Senegal 
Nuove Iniziative Industriali 





Senegal AgroAfrica AS Norway 10,000Jatropha Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Sudan 
Hail Agricultural 
Development Co Saudi Arabia 10,000
Wheat, vegetables, 
animal feed Signed Cotula, 2011 
Sudan UAE UAE 378,000Unknown Operational von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009 
Sudan 
Abu Dhabi Fund for 
Development UAE 30,000
Corn, alfalfa, wheat, 
potatoes, beans Signed von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009 
Sudan Jarch Capital USA 404,000rice, wheat Signed Business Week in depth, 25 Nov 2009 
Sudan Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia 500,000Unknown Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Sudan Jordan Jordan 25,000Livestock and crops Discontinued GRAIN, 2009a 
Sudan Hassad Food Qatar 100,000Wheat, corn, soya Signed http://www.hassad.com 
Sudan Citadel Capital / Sabina Egypt 105,000Wheat, sugar, sorghum Operational www.citadelcapital.com 
Sudan ZTE International China 10,000Wheat, maize Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Sudan Egypt government Egypt 400,000Wheat, corn, sugar Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Sudan Citadel Capital / SEAC Egypt 105,000Maize Operational www.citadelcapital.com 
Sudan Beltone Private Equity Egypt 84,000Sugar Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Tanzania Sun Biofuels UK 8,000Jatropha Signed Theting and Brekke, 2010 
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Investor 
country Area (ha) Land use Status Source 
Tanzania 
Int. Water and Electric 
Corp. China 101,000Corn  Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
Tanzania D1 Oils UK 60,000Jatropha Discontinued Görgen et al, 2009; interview 
Tanzania 
Korea Rural Community 
Corporation South Korea 15,000




Tanzania CAMS Group UK 45,000Sweet sorghum Operational http://www.thebioenergysite.com 
Tanzania Bioshape Neth/Belgium 34,736Biofuels Unknown Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Tanzania 
Pharos Miro Agriculture 
Fund UAE 50,000Rice Unknown Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Tanzania Green Resources Norway 100,000Forestry Operational www.greenresources.no 
Tanzania Yes Bank India 30,000Wheat, rice Planned Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Uganda Heibei Company (China) China 40,500
Poultry, cattle, maize, 
rice, wheat Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Uganda 
Egyptian Agricultural 
Ministry Egypt 810,000Maize, wheat Planned Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Uganda McLeod Russel India 4,000Tea Operational http://www.mcleodrusselindia.com 
Uganda Agri SA South Africa 170,000Food Planned Friis and Reenberg, 2010 
Zambia China China 2,000,000Jatropha Discontinued DPA, 2009 
Zambia D1 Oils UK 35,000Agrofuels Reduced Freim, 2008 
Zambia Chayton Capital UK 20,000Wheat, soya Signed http://www.chaytoncapital.com 
Zambia ETC Bio-Energy Tanzania / SA 45,000
Wheat, soya, maize, 
jatropha Operational Interview 
Zambia Zambia Sugar South Africa 27,500Sugar Operational Richardson, 2010 
Zambia Mann Ferrostaal Germany 100,000Jatropha Operational Interview 
Zambia Menafea Holding Saudi Arabia 5,200Pineapples Signed Interview 
Zambia Kaidi Biofuel China 400,000Jatropha Planned Interview 
Zambia Puzzolana India 45,000Sugar Planned Interview 
Zimbabwe 
Int. Water and Electric 
Corp. China 101,000Corn Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
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ASIA 
            
Host country Investor 
Investor 
country Area (ha) Land use Status Source 
Cambodia Vietnam Rubber Group Vietnam 100,000Rubber Unknown Görgen et al, 2009 
Cambodia 
Chinese Farm 
Cooperation - Pheapimex 
Group China 300,000Forestry Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
Cambodia Marubeni Corporation   7,600Rubber Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Cambodia 
Rethy Investment 
Cambodia Oil Palm Co., 
Ltd (MRICOP) 
Cambodia, 




1996 Görgen et al, 2009 
Cambodia 
JV Mittapheap-men Sarun 
and Rama Khmer 
International of Cambodia 
and Globaltech Sdn. Bhd. 
Of Malaysia 
Cambodia, 




1995 Görgen et al, 2009 
Cambodia Kuwait Kuwait 50,000Unknown Planned http://www.economist.com 
Cambodia Qatar Qatar 10,000Agriculture   Planned http://www.economist.com 
Cambodia China China   
Rice, grains, livestock 
for export to Korea Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Cambodia China China 130,000Rice Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
Cambodia South Korea South Korea 200,000Forestry and agrofuels Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
Cambodia Green Rich Co. Ltd. China 60,200Palm oil and acacia 
Implemented; 
right to use 
for 70 years Görgen et al, 2009 
Cambodia 
China National 
Corporation for Overseas 
Economic Cooperation; 
Loadstars Development 
Co. Ltd. China 8,000
Agriculture and 
industrial crops Implemented Görgen et al, 2009 
Cambodia HLH Agriculture Singapore 10,000Corn Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Cambodia Socfin KCD France 10,000Rubber Operational ILC, 2011 
Cambodia MH Bio-energy Group South Korea 8,000Cassava Operational Üllenberg, 2009a 
China Goldman Sachs USA   Poulty and pig farms Implemented Görgen et al, 2009 
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Investor 
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Indonesia Bin Laden Group Saudi Arabia 500,000 Rice Discontinued Görgen et al, 2009 
Indonesia KS Oils India 34,000Palm oil Implemented http://ksnr.com.sg 
Indonesia Sime Darby Bhd Malaysia 195,856Palm oil Implemented Görgen et al, 2009 
Indonesia Golden Agri Resources Singapore 433,200Palm oil Operational http://www.goldenagri.com.sg 
Laos Vietnam Rubber Group Vietnam 100,000Rubber Unknown Görgen et al, 2009 
Laos Kuwait Kuwait 200,000
Crop production for 
export Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Laos Japan Japan 34,000
Food, energy, cash 
crops Unknown Görgen et al, 2009 
Laos 
ZTE International with 
Dynasty Company China 10,000Cassava 
Under 
discussion Görgen et al, 2009 
Laos Mitr Lao Sugar Thailand 18,000Sugar Cane Planned Görgen et al, 2009 
Laos Yunnan State Farms China 166,700Rubber Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Laos HAGL Vietnam 10,000Rubber Operational Kenney-Lazar, 2011 
Papua New Guinea Wilmar Singapore 200,000Sugar Cane Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Philippines 
Far Eastern Agricultural 
Invesment Company Saudi Arabia 50,000Fruit, rice, corn Signed http://www.mb.com.ph 
Philippines 
NEH Bahrain + AMA 
Group Bahrain, AU 10,000Bananas Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Philippines 
Pacific Bio-Fields 
Corporation Japan 400,000Coconut oil Signed http://www.pacificbiofields.com 
Philippines Jeonman Feedstock Ltd South Korea 94,000Soy Signed ILC, 2011 
Philippines Qatar Qatar 100,000Unknown Unknown von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009 
Philippines China China 1,400,000Unknown Discontinued Bagayaua, 2007 
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SOUTH 
AMERICA 
            
Host country Investor 
Investor 
country Area (ha) Land use Status Source 
Argentina Beidahuang China 320,000Soya, wheat, oil Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Argentina Sojitz Japan 11,000Soya, corn, wheat Planned http://www.sojitz.com 
Argentina Olam International Singapore 12,000Peanuts Operational ILC, 2011 
Argentina Arumugam Malaysia 60,000Oil Operational ILC, 2011 
Argentina South Korea South Korea 21,000Unknown Signed Görgen et al, 2009 
Argentina AdecoAgro USA 15,000Rice Operational http://www.adecoagro.com 
Argentina Lumex Capital Switzerland 50,000Diverse Operational http://www.lumixcapital.com 
Argentina Glencore Switzerland 13,335Unknown Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Argentina Pergram Finance 
France/Luxem
bourg 8,000Unknown Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Australia Olam International Singapore 12,000Almonds Operational Olam International, 2011 
Bolivia Cresud Argentina 7,600Cereals Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil Shree Renuka Sugars India 133,000Sugar Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil Chongqing Grain Group China 200,000Soya Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil Archer Daniel Midlands USA 18,000Palm oil Planned GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil Brookfield Asset Mgt Canada 97,000Sugar Operational http://www.brookfield.com 
Brazil Mitsui Japan 100,000Soya Operational von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009 
Brazil Cosan Brazil 128,000Unknown Operational Görgen et al, 2009 
Brazil El Tejar Argentina 405,000Soya Planned GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil Stora Enso 
Sweden/Finlan
d 257,000Eucalyptus Operational http://www.storaenso.com 
Brazil Hyundai South Korea 10,000Soya Planned GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil Macquarie Group Ltd Australia 202,000Soya + grain Planned GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil Bunge USA 10,000Sugar Planned GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil AdecoAgro USA 69,000Sugar Operational http://www.adecoagro.com 
Brazil Louis Dreyfus France 30,000Citrus Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil CalyxAgro France 27,000Soya, cotton, sugar Operational 
http://208.77.100.95/~calyxagr/portfolio_bras
il.html 
Brazil Agrifirma Brazil UK 69,000Soya, maize Operational http://agrifirma-brazil.com 
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Investor 
country Area (ha) Land use Status Source 
Brazil Clean Energy Brazil UK 7,000Sugar Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil Galtere USA 47,000Soya + rice Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil Grupo Iowa USA/Brazil 9,000Cotton, soya, maize Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil Morgan Stanley USA 40,000Unknown Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Brazil Quifel Natural Resources Portugal 50,000Palm oil Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Guinea 
Nuove Iniziative Industriali 





Paraguay Cresud Argentina 20,000Cereals Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Uruguay Stora Enso 
Sweden/Finlan
d 256,000Eucalyptus Planned http://www.storaenso.com 
Uruguay 
New Zealand Farming 
Systems NZ 36,300Dairy Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Uruguay Pergram Finance 
France/Luxem
bourg 32,000Unknown Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
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FORMER 
SOVIET UNION 
            
Host country Investor 
Investor 
country Area (ha) Land use Status Source 
Russia Black Earth Farming Sweden 323,000Wheat Operational http://blackearthfarming.com 
Russia Hyundai South Korea 50,000Soya, maize Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Russia Israel Israel 1,500,000Food, cattle Requested GRAIN, 2009a 
Russia Alpcot Agro Sweden 161,000Unknown Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Russia Trigon Denmark 100,000Unknown Signed von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009 
Russia Heilongjiang Province China 426,667Food  Signed GRAIN, 2009a 
Russia Monk Group UK 27,000Food Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
Russia AGRICO Ltd Russia/Israel 100,000Food Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Russia Agrowill AB Lithuania 35,300Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Russia Appleridge UK 27,462Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Russia Anninskoe UK 6,408Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Russia Ekoniva Agro Germany 13,359Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Russia Ivolga Holding LLC Kazakhstan 666,850Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Russia MTS Agro-Service Estonia 11,994Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Russia Redland Farms 
Switzerland/S
weden 180,000Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Russia Vostok Agro USA 15,914Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Russia Vostok Zernoprodukt Sweden 125,330Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Russia Yuznaya UK 9,396Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Ukraine Libya Libya 100,000Unknown Signed von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009 
Ukraine Morgan Stanley USA 40,000Unknown Signed von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009 
Ukraine Landkom UK 100,000Unknown Signed von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009 
Ukraine Renaissance Capital Russia 331,000Unknown Implemented Görgen et al, 2009 
Ukraine AgroGeneration France 120,000Cereals Implemented GRAIN, 2009a 
Ukraine Origin Enterprises Ireland 20,000Food Operational GRAIN, 2009a 
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Ukraine Alpcot Agro Sweden 161,000Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Ukraine Maharishi Japan/Austria 50,000Unknown Operational Visser and Spoor, 2011 
Ukraine ESV Group UK 12,000Food Operational http://www.esvgroup.com 
 
